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Introduction  
The literature analysed for the present project derives from several fields of academic research, 
primarily from behavioural economics, social psychology and consumer psychology. Further 
evidence has been gathered from studies in health psychology and neuroscience. This choice 
reflects the aim to provide a sophisticated and comprehensive account. Nowadays, behavioural 
economists, psychologists and neuroscientists all agree that human behaviour is the product of an 
array of unconscious and automatic interacting mental forces (Simon, 1955; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974; Zajonc, 1984; Damasio, 1994; Bargh, 1994, 2002; Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; 
Kahneman, 2003; Bargh and Morsella, 2008; Kahneman, 2011). Many mechanisms that guide 
behaviour and choices only occur at a perceptual or preconscious level, influencing successive 
rational and deliberate considerations: the acknowledgment of such condition reversed the past 
paradigm that posited the supremacy of conscious thought in human behaviour and decision-
making. 
Eating out of home is largely part of our contemporary lifestyle. While this environment should 
provide quality nutrition, research demonstrates how eating out of home is connected to higher 
calorie intake (Prentice and Jebb, 2004), deficient nutritional consumption (Kearney et al., 2001; 
O’Dwyer et al., 2005), and greater serving sizes (Diliberti et al., 2004; Ledikwe et al., 2005). A 
major challenge for public health is to support the population in reducing the calorie level of their 
meals and promote the consumption of fruit and vegetables (FAO, 2004). After years of 
information campaigns, regulations, policies and education to tackle the issue of unhealthy dietary 
behaviour, the public health sector has understood that changing the food environment in which 
choices take place, can be a more promising strategy to promote appropriate food choices 
(Appleton et al., 2016). 
The question of the impact of unconscious phenomena on behaviour is especially relevant for a 
discussion in the domain of food consumption and explains why classic communication campaigns 
on healthy eating and dietary advice are not effective to tackle the growing rate of overweight and 
obesity (see Peter et al., 2006, 2007; Roberto and Brownell, 2012; Roberto and Kawachi, 2014). 
Most factors that drive food choices cannot be explained with the classic theories of rational 
reasoning; on the contrary, many elements that guide food consumption are to be found in the 
environmental features, which affect behaviour more than rational considerations (see Wansink, 
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2004, 2006, 2010; Dayan and Bar-Hillel, 2011, Hanks et al., 2012). The existence of automatic 
processes of which we are largely unaware of is especially relevant when it comes to food choices: 
automatic responses often lead to poor food choices and excessive calorie intake (e.g. Painter et 
al., 2002; Wansink, 2004; Cohen and Babey, 2012). Understanding the true nature of how people 
make their choices in relation to nutrition and the effect of automatic responses to contextual cues 
is crucial. Therefore, one of the aims of this research project is to investigate this topic by merging 
the fields of behavioural economics and social psychology, providing prime research evidence to 
form a comprehensive account of the issue.  
While internal variables are difficult to study and predict, it seems more promising to consider the 
variety of contextual, external and more easily detectable variables that interact with the person in 
a particular context. Choice architecture is a recent field born out of studies in psychology and 
behavioural economics, which introduced the concept of nudging (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
Nudges are minor alterations in environment that - thanks to the knowledge of cognitive and 
behavioural processes that affect choices - are functional to steer people’s behaviour in a certain 
direction. The purpose of choice architecture is to equip people with improved environmental 
conditions that support them to act following to the best behaviour (Wansink, 2010).  
Health promotion is a key component of health policies, in the recognition that lifestyles are a 
primary cause of many chronic conditions. In the past, the approach to health promotion was to 
rationally motivate subjects to change behaviours, trying to influence their values, attitudes, or 
beliefs. Rather than focusing on individual behavioural change, this research project broadens the 
focus by targeting environmental features. The present project pertains to the domain of health 
promotion, which benefits not only individual well-being, but also the healthcare systems that 
demand increased efficiency and sustainability as they are burdened by rising operational costs.  
Choice architecture interventions have been widely implemented across nations and in a variety 
of policy settings. In Italy to date, no nudging interventions have been ever conducted in a hospital 
lunchroom. Thus, the research idea of this dissertation project is the implementation and evaluation 
of a nudge intervention by replicating similar research conducted abroad and adapting it to the 
context. The literature could take advantage from the replication of choice architecture initiatives 
on broader populations and in additional cultural contexts, which is another purpose of the present 
research project. More specifically, the purpose of the empirical research is to promote healthy 
food items in the lunchroom of Milan’s main public hospital, Ospedale Maggiore Niguarda Cà 
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Granda. The ultimate goal is to create a successful intervention that might be replicated and 
extended to the employees of the regional healthcare system. 
 
Summary of the dissertation structure 
 
The dissertation has been structured into four main chapters.  
Chapter 1 is dedicated to a broad illustration of how human nature is characterised by the constant 
work of unconscious, irrational, emotional, automatic, uncontrollable mental processes, 
elucidating the rupture from the past conception in which consciousness was seen as the prime 
guiding capacity of human behaviour and decision-making. Particularly, the section dedicated to 
priming stresses the sensitivity and automatic responsiveness of human behaviour in relation to 
environmental stimuli.  
Chapter 2 focuses on behavioural economics and nudging, the theoretical building blocks upon 
which the research project is based. First, the core findings of behavioural economics are discussed 
to deepen the analysis commenced in the previous chapter. Secondly, the nudging approach is 
presented, and an extensive section has been dedicated to the growing use of nudging as a policy 
tool, focusing on its application in the domain of health. The limits of nudging and the ethical 
debate that surrounds this discipline is also discussed to provide a critical evaluation and evade the 
adoption of an unquestioning stance. 
Chapter 3 narrows down the focus on nutrition behaviour. The chapter provides prime research 
evidence on the automatic mechanisms involved in eating behaviour, and on the environmental 
stimuli that trigger and shape our responses. Two specific sections discuss the nudges employed 
in the research (i.e. salience and labelling) to elucidate to the reader the research evidence available 
in this domain, its validity and possible applications. Finally, a brief section on habit points out the 
importance in terms of behavioural impact of this form of automaticity, whose effect need to be 
considered in the creation of any behavioural intervention. 
Finally, chapter 4 has been structured in two main sections. First, the context of the research is 
presented, to highlight the necessity of an intervention in the domain of nutrition by reporting data 
on the prevalence of overweight and obesity in Italy and Lombardy; and by illustrating the Workers 
Health Promotion program within which the present study has been activated. The rest of the 
chapter is devoted to the illustration of the study, from its early development to the presentation of 
the data and the discussion of the findings. 
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1. Human all too human 
 
1.1. Human beings, impeccable rational agents? 
 
The word conscious derives from Latin conscientia that derives from conscire, which means to be 
aware, to know (i.e. ‘scire’). Historically, the notion of being ‘conscious’ referred to actions of 
self-imposed maturity, as consciousness was considered the unique, distinguishing factor between 
man and animals, asserting our species’ superiority. During the Enlightenment, human behaviour 
took a historical turn in its conception, as the theory of rationality and reasonableness became the 
description and prescription for human behaviour. The rational reasoning model is the product of 
a historical period in which cognitive processes where assumed to be logical, mathematical 
processes, while undeliberate, emotive processes were discarded as secondary impulses (e.g. 
Descartes’ cogito; John Locke’s “mind first” cosmology). Disenchantment, domination of 
factuality, objectivity, calculability, discursive logic, are the sovereign standards in the 
Enlightenments’ culture. Back in this time, the nature of the mind was considered to be entirely or 
mainly conscious, and the processes of thought were believed to be intentional and controllable. 
Philosophers (e.g. Kant), scholars, and intellectuals more broadly, have defended the view that 
human inference functions following the laws of statistics and probability.  
In classical economics, the core theoretical principle is a conception of human decision-makers as 
fully rational beings. This conception is rooted in the studies of Adam Smith (1776) particularly 
in his masterpiece “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations”. Smith 
theorised that markets are governed by an “invisible hand” that guides and governs economic 
dynamics in the optimal way to allow the realisation of the highest level of utility. The economist 
posited that economic agents – guided by an egoistical logic of profit maximisation that chases 
self-interest – guarantee the attainment of the optimal level of collective wealth. Before the 1950s, 
the view of humans as homo œconomicus, guided most of the research in both psychology and 
economics. Classical economists employed as point of reference for their theories and models the 
concept of homo œconomicus, a perfectly rational decision-maker who is always able to deliver 
the decision that leads to the maximum level of utility that can be attained. According to this 
theory, this is possible thanks to the human ability to grasp all the necessary information, to 
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structure a stable and organized system of preferences, and to carry out the optimal evaluation. 
According to the rational model of decision-making, especially in economic decisions, choice 
follows a linear process of stages: (1) the recognition of the problem, (2) the evaluation of all 
available alternatives, (3) the evaluation of the characteristics of each alternative, and finally (4) 
the ultimate choice that will either confirm the solution to the problem or reject it if the problem 
has not been solved (Russo, 2015). This vision of humans is undeniably flawed, with inherent 
limits connected to the unrealistic assumption that human beings are capable of accurately interpret 
and evaluate all of the variables in economic decision-making. According to Evans et al. (1993) 
in the rational reasoning literature there are two main notions of rationality: the concept that logical 
reasoning is rational, and the concept that in decision-making the maximisation of expected utility 
is rational. Both conceptions consist of high-level cognitive processes. In a nutshell, the concept 
of rationality presumes that through logical arguments, people can develop valid conclusions.  
In his article “Rational fools” Amartya Sen (1977) critics the foundations of economic theory, 
namely the assumption that people’s actions are motivated by self-interest with the aim to 
maximize utility based on consistent choices (preferences). A person is considered rational when 
his choices reflect the ‘most preferred’ alternative. This view of human beings reduce behaviour 
to consistent choices for the sake of welfare maximization. Nonetheless, despite the lack of 
consideration of the complex web of psychological mechanisms underlying behaviour, this view 
has proved to be very persistent. 
1.2 A new conception of human inference 
 
The historical primacy of consciousness as the guiding virtue of human nature is also testified by 
the words that describe the related ‘inferior’ processes: ‘unconscious’, ‘subconscious’, or ‘pre-
conscious’. These words are all alterations of the prime human capacity, that is consciousness. In 
the 19th century, evolutionary theory and hypnotism both pointed to the existence of underlying, 
unconscious causes to human behaviour. Darwin (1872) posited in “The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals”, the existence of an unconscious and unintentional cause behind 
behaviour. In this classic treatise, Darwin aimed to extend his evolutionary theory to the realm of 
the mind, investigating the evolution of emotions. The core insight of his work is the finding that 
across the world, different populations share similar facial expressions in response to the same 
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emotions (Figure 1). Particularly, this was found to 
be true also in isolated populations, where the 
cultural transmission and learning of emotional 
responses did not occur. If similar emotions can be 
observed in different people from different places 
and different races, this suggests the presence of a 
genetic, heritable component. Further discussion 
about the unconscious dimension of the mind came 
with Freud, who defended the unconscious as the 
underlying force driving human behaviour. Freuds’ 
conception of the unconscious was principally 
motivational in nature, as a force to express 
profound wishes and needs, and to protect conscious awareness from dangerous contents. With 
the term unconscious, Freud referred to those actions that are not consciously intended and whose 
cause is not known by the person (take for instance the well-known ‘Freudian slips’, the errors in 
memory, in speech, or in the course of an action, which are interpreted as an interference from the 
unconscious mind). It is from his studies on hysteria (Freud and Breuer, 1985) that Freud became 
convinced of the presence of unconscious psychological mechanisms; however, his peculiar 
therapeutic perspective led him to focus primarily on abnormal behaviour and the negative effects 
of unconscious activity.  
Interestingly, from the field of economics, the work of Herbert Simon (1955) contributed to the 
shift of paradigm towards the recognition that human behaviour is much more automatic and less 
deliberative than it was thought in the past. Simon described rationality as the effective relation 
between the means and an end, in other words, a process to reach a specific purpose. According to 
the author, the rational process should involve three stages: (i) the identification of all possible 
options (ii) the identification of all the possible future consequences from each alternative, and 
(iii) the evaluation of the alternatives depending on the final objective. This is the concept of 
‘global rationality’ that presuppose a complete knowledge of a subject (Simon, 1947). Despite 
highlighting the difference between theoretical and actual behaviour, in his early work, Simon 
assumed this model of rationality. But later in his career, Simon’s attention shifted towards the 
identification of a new conception of rational decision-making to integrate the previous conception 
Figure 1. Images depicting the emotions of grief from 
Darwin, 1872. 
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posited in classical economics (i.e. Adam Smith’s rational agent), by including a series of abilities 
in accessing the entirety of the available information, and the attitude of cognitive elaboration that 
all decision-makers have. Progressively, Simon started to distance himself from the previous 
theory of global rationality. To attain this scope, it was no longer sufficient to employ a strictly 
economic perspective, which Simon integrated with the knowledge developed in psychology 
studies. Recognising that classical economic theory was unable to depict the actual behaviour of 
decision-makers, excluding a priori the irrational component of the human mind, Simon tried to 
identify new rules to account for the “anomalies” in human behaviour, in the attempt to make the 
classical model more applicable to real-life decisions. Hence, in 1955, Simon laid the basis for the 
Bounded Rationality Theory, introducing a novel perspective of human decision-making. The 
concept of bounded rationality underlines the cognitive limitations in computational capacity of 
individuals. In other words, human beings are not fully rational in their reasoning, but subject to 
simplifications and to a sort of ‘limited rationality’. This supports an evaluative process that is not 
comprehensive but rather ‘satisfying’ in the sense of ‘good enough’ (Barros, 2010). Humans only 
possess an incomplete knowledge about the possible courses of action; a fragmentary overview of 
the outcomes; and construct representations guided by preferences rather than exclusively focusing 
on maximising utility. Simon’s received the Nobel Prize for economy in 1978 for the theory of 
Bounded Rationality, paving the way for future research in the domain of behavioural economics. 
In the following decades, the Enlightenment’s tenets increasingly came under attack also by the 
proponents of heuristics and bias, who demonstrated the automatic patterns and cognitive 
limitations of the human mind (e.g. Kahneman, 2011). Behavioural economics has primarily 
developed out of the findings of a psychology branch called behavioural decision research 
(Camerer et al., 2005). More recently, paramount contribution has come from the field of 
neuroscience, where studies on mental functioning and on the role of emotional responses 
demonstrated that the affective component is indispensable for human reasoning and decision-
making (e.g. Damasio, 1994). Traditional economic theory can highly benefit from the new 
knowledge available in this field. Particularly, as Camerer et al. (2005) illustrate, there are two 
main inadequacies with classic decision-making theory: (a) first, the operation of the brain occurs 
primarily through automatic processes that are more rapid and efficient than conscious 
deliberation; (b) secondly, behaviour is highly influenced by complex affective responses. The 
operation of automatic processes and affective mechanisms occurs without the person feeling any 
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effort, nor being aware. These systems are crucial for everyday activities; they developed through 
evolution to support the deliberate, conscious processes of decision-making. As Camerer et. al 
(2005) stress, the cognitive and automatic/affective systems operate in interaction, however, 
behaviour is often interpreted as the output of exclusively conscious processes. The regions where 
these systems occur can be broadly identified in the brain: automatic processes occur in the 
posterior (occipital), upper (parietal), and side (temporal) areas of the brain; affective responses 
are mainly located in the amygdala; while controlled and deliberative processes are mainly 
concentrated in the frontal area (orbital and prefrontal cortex).  
1.2.1 The meaning of ‘unconscious’ 
 
“There is no single, definitive ‘stream of consciousness’, because there is no central 
headquarter, no cartesian theatre where ‘it all comes together’ for the perusal of a central 
meaner. Instead of such a single stream, there are multiple channels in which specialist 
circuits try, in parallel pandemonium, to do their various things, creating multiple drafts at 
they go” (Dennett, 1992: pp. 253-4)  
Dennett postulates that it is not our consciousness that drives what we think and do, but our 
subconscious mind. Our consciousness is a ‘symptom’ of a higher level of processing going on in 
our minds. As it is becoming clear, contemporary research reversed the previous paradigm, and 
for decades now, researchers have been documenting the broad range of higher mental processes 
that can occur unconsciously. Therefore, a first question that arises is: what do we mean by 
unconscious?  
Modern perspectives on the unconscious mind are varied. In the field of cognitive psychology, 
unconscious elaboration has been associated to the elaboration of subliminal stimuli. Because 
subliminal stimuli have a low intensity, the mental processes they enact are simplistic and 
unsophisticated. In the article “Is the unconscious smart or dumb?”, Loftus and Klinger (1992) 
conclude that the unconscious system may not be very smart for a variety of reasons: unconscious 
analytical skills are limited and little is achieved without conscious analysis; unconscious activities 
mainly serve for the performance of routinized activities; finally, unconscious processes are not 
reliable and does not always do what is best. Therefore, the authors conclude that “unconscious 
processes are relatively inflexible in that they are applied in much the same way time after time, 
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whereas procedures used for conscious learning appear to be more mutable and adaptable to 
different situations” (1992: p. 764).   
Social psychology approaches the question from a different perspective, by focusing on the higher 
mental processes one is not aware of, instead of the stimuli one is not aware of. This research on 
the influence of unconscious mental mechanisms over behaviour, led to the view that the 
unconscious mind is a pervasive, efficient, and intelligent force (Bargh and Morsella, 2008). The 
shift in the operational definition of unconscious made by social psychology studies, revealed the 
true scope and relevance of the unconscious in human functioning. In this view, the unconscious 
is a complex set of highly functional and adaptive activities that form behavioural guidance for the 
individual. As Bargh and Morsella (2009) explain, the unconscious is a form of ‘intelligentia’, it 
is the leading agent that drive our behavioural catalogue of responses. Unconscious does not mean 
that people are unaware of stimuli, but that we cannot consciously retrieve everything we process, 
that would actually be quite burdening. Research on priming and automaticity (e.g. Bargh, 2001) 
dug deep to understand how deliberate ‘higher order’ processes could be initiated without 
conscious intent. This led to the definition of the notion of unconscious as the person’s lack of 
awareness of the influence or effect of a triggering stimulus, but not of the triggering stimulus 
itself (Bargh and Morsella, 2008). This definition underlines the actual value of the unconscious 
in everyday life as posited by Darwin (1872), that is its adaptive quality. Evolutionary biology 
supports social psychology’s perspective. Unconscious processes have adaptively driven human 
behaviour and evolution, long before the initiation of conscious elaboration abilities. The adaptive 
nature of humans entails that we are highly sensitive to context. As Dennett (1991) exemplifies, 
any child that is born in a given context, then instantly relocated to any place and culture, will 
rapidly adapt to the new environment and different culture, just as any other infant born there. 
Genetic material has provided humans with predispositions that are highly adaptive to contextual 
variations. For instance, one of the simplest mechanism at work behind the scenes, is the instinctive 
‘approach vs. withdrawal behaviours’ that automatically enact responses to external stimuli 
(Davidson et al., 1990). 
Neurologist Benjamin Libet’s paradigm is consistent with the argument that behaviours are the 
product of unconscious mechanisms. Libet (1986) focused his research on time of intention, that 
is the time before a subject is aware of self-initiated actions. The surprising and seemingly 
contradictory discovery of the scientist is that a person’s consciousness of an act comes sensibly 
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later the activation of brain impulses for the volitional process. In other words, through his 
experiment, Libet found that the impulse to act came hundreds of milliseconds before the 
participant’s awareness and conscious intention to act (Libet et al., 1983). Participants were asked 
to freely decide when to move their index fingers; in the meantime, researchers measured the 
timing when the action was prepared in the brain, and when the person became aware of deciding 
to move the finger. Results revealed that the preparation of the movement in the brain activated 
before the participants were consciously aware of the decision to act. These findings reflect the 
notion that ‘idea precedes action’ suggesting that the unconscious mind is the source of behaviour. 
Libet’s study has been confirmed by successive research on brain activity conducted with 
functional magnetic resonance (see Haynes et al., 2007; Bode et al., 2011). Following this 
perspective, the role of consciousness seems to be that of a ‘sense maker’ after the behavioural 
response.  
 
1.2.2 Forms of unconscious activity  
 
In the domain of social psychology, four categories of mental systems that are involved in non-
conscious day to day behaviours, have been studied. Bargh and Morsella (2009) discuss and 
explore the four mental systems, illustrating them in separate points because each system has 
distinct qualities and operating features: 
▪ The perceptual system determines impression formation, and orients attention in the 
environment; 
▪ The evaluative system is behind immediate responses such as approach/avoidance that 
result from automatic assessments; 
▪ The motivational system guides us towards goal attainment; 
▪ And the emotional system guides our behaviour, motivation, and goal pursuit via affective 
responses. 
 
The perceptual system is fully automatic and instantaneous: if perception was not automatic, we 
would fall down holes we do not see while walking, we would be more vulnerable, like when we 
do not perceive a low beam and we hit our heads (Heath, 2012). Evidence for the unconscious 
operation of the perceptual system comes primarily from cognitive neuroscience studies (e.g. see 
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Prinz, 2003). For instance, in their renowned study “A neurological dissociation between 
perceiving objects and grasping them”, Goodale et al. (1991) provided evidence for the 
dissociation between the neural substrates for visual perception of object features (which is 
conscious), from the neural systems in charge of motoric control and manual skills (which is 
unconscious). The discovery of two diverse cortical visual pathways came from studies on patients 
with brain lesions: patients with dorsal lobe injuries could identify objects, but they were incapable 
of reaching for them; patients with lesions at the ventral-visual system instead, were not able to 
recognise the object, however they could still reach for it if asked to. The conclusion is that both 
pathways are involved in perception, but while the dorsal system (action responses) is not 
accessible to awareness, the ventral system (that refers to object qualities such as shape, orientation 
and size) is accessible to awareness. The evaluative system refers to the whole range of 
preferences and attitudes that guide individuals towards the appropriate immediate behaviours. 
Such behavioural responses are not ‘improvised’ but the product of past behaviours that served 
adaptive purposes. The approach vs. avoidance response is a typical example that is common to 
both human and animals: approach is the response towards stimuli that are perceived as desirable, 
while avoidance entails a defensive response towards stimuli that are perceived as negatively 
connotated. The motivational system refers to mental activities related to goal setting and pursuit. 
Social psychology research established goals can be unconsciously set in response to 
environmental stimuli to attain desired ends. These are some specific qualities that characterise 
such activity of the motivational system, that is the perseverance in the face of difficulties and the 
renewal of goal pursuit if interrupted (see Bargh et al., 2001; Chartrand and Bargh, 2002).  Finally, 
emotional events can determine motivational states of which the individual is unaware and does 
not deliberately intend such as sadness or anger. Emotions also guide behavioural responses to 
positive or negative stimuli, and the memory of the episodes provide a fundamental guidance for 
actual and future action. The memory of emotionally relevant stimuli is processed faster and more 
efficiently, this information also remains longer in memory in the case it needs to be retrieved (see 
Kern et al., 2005; Levine and Edelstein, 2009). In the domain of the present doctoral dissertation, 
the most relevant theories and concepts stem from the research on the automatic activation of 
behaviour (priming) and to the motivational system (i.e. goal pursuit), which are relevant additions 
to the studies in behavioural economics and to the discipline of nudging. However, some studies 
in the domain of the emotional system will also be presented, as they represent a fundamental 
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contribution for the conceptualisation of human functioning that finally moved beyond the narrow 
view of humans as fully rational decision makers. First, the role of the emotional system will be 
briefly discussed. 
1.3 The importance of Emotion for Deliberation 
 
“Emerging neuroscience evidence suggests that sound and rational decision-
making, depends on prior accurate emotional processing” Bechara and 
Damasio (2005: p. 336) 
 
The study of the human mind is so complex that it calls for an integration from different fields of 
study. Particularly, it is through the contribution of neuroscience and neuropsychology that more 
light is being shed on the functioning of the human brain. The aim of this section is to offer an 
understanding of the evolution of these studies and their influence in the study of human decision-
making. In the attempt to understand how consumer decisions are made, some basic questions 
must be addressed about the meaning and role of emotions. Consumer Neuroscience is the 
academic field that applies neuroscience’s insights and methodologies to the study of consumer 
psychology and behaviour; it focuses in decision-making, and is closely related to the fields of 
“decision neuroscience” and “neuroeconomics” (Ramsøy, 2014). For decades, research on 
consumer behaviour has been based on a rationalistic model, that posited humans as rational 
beings, wherein emotions were conceived as merely intervenient variables. In the recent past, it 
was considered unreasonable to study emotions in association to decision-making, it was 
unacceptable for a scientific community influenced by the cognitivist approach. Emotions, 
relegated to the sub-cortical area of the brain, the primitive area, were conceived as separate from 
the ‘superior’ area of the cortex (Davidson, 2012, p. 37). Today a new conceptualisation of the 
role of emotions has emerged. Emotions are recognized to be key elements to understand people 
and their decision-making process (see Damasio, 1999; Le Doux, 1996). No longer seen as 
‘disturbing elements’, emotions are essential components of the decision-making process; which 
explains why people often do not act in accordance to what they declare. 
Findings in the field of neurosciences allowed researchers to overcome the body-mind separation. 
Research on cognition demonstrates the prevalence of the emotional dimension in stimulus 
perception, and that our emotional responses have a deep capacity to influence the mind (Zajonc, 
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1984). Emotional states are tightly connected to bodily responses, and the diverse emotions 
determine diverse physiological changes (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). These can be measured in 
terms of (a) arousal, the level of activation (associated with changes in pupil size, perspiration, 
heart rate); (b) valence, the positive or negative direction of the response (associated to minuscule 
alterations in facial expressions), and (c) approach or withdrawal responses (associated to actual 
bodily movements that signal the person’s predisposition) (in Genco et al., 2013).  
Baumeister et al. (2007) proposed three ways in which emotions indirectly shape behaviour. First, 
unconscious emotions can promote learning, reinforcing mental associations after specific 
experiences. Secondly, emotions serve to automatically enact approach/avoidance responses, role 
indicated as anticipation. Finally, assimilated emotional experiences in memory, serve for the 
future selection of strategies and action selection. However, it is important to note, as Baumeister 
et al. (2007) highlight, that emotions are not the cause of behaviour, but rather concurring elements 
that shape a final behavioural outcome. 
Zajonc (1984) in “The primacy of affect” was the first to recognise the primacy of emotion over 
cognition. Our sensorimotor and neuroanatomical structures, he argued, react to stimuli in the 
environment and are translated into meaningful information, triggering the cognitive process. 
Affective responses take place autonomously, with no awareness from the individual, and precede 
cognition (Zajonc, 1980). Reflecting on this, it is evident that a person is always in an emotional 
state of some kind, be it a mood or a condition (e.g. depression), hence emotions characterise the 
individual at all times. Particularly, Zajonc’s (2001) great contribution is the discovery of the mere-
exposure effect. This effect entails that the mere exposure of the individual to a specific stimulus 
is able to enhance the positive affect toward that stimulus, impacting on the formation a preference. 
The phenomenon has proven to be present across cultures and is most effective when the exposure 
to the stimulus takes place subliminally, without the person’s awareness. This process supports the 
contention of an independence between affect and cognition, and later neurophysiological studies 
confirmed that affective reactions take place prior to cognition. The function of the mere-exposure 
effect is explained in terms of evolutionary adaptation since it offers a way of forming 
predispositions with little energy deployed. This mechanism allowed humans to recognise, after 
repeated exposures, safe stimuli and environments and dangerous ones, and to develop a primitive 
form of social attachment (ibid.). 
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1.3.1 A dual mode of human inference 
 
Human behaviour is the product of a constant interaction between a dual mode of processing. The 
separation of affective and cognitive processes was delineated by Damasio (1994) in the field of 
neuroscience, and by Le Doux (1996) in the field of social psychology. 
Antonio Damasio (1994) advanced in his “Descartes’s Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human 
Brain” a theory that once again establish the role of emotions as essential for the good functioning 
of the brain. Damasio formulated the Somatic Marker Theory (see Bechara and Damasio, 2005) 
to explain the role of emotions and how these determine choices and behaviour. According to the 
theory, environmental stimuli cause the body (i.e. somatic, from the Greek ‘soma’, body) to 
respond activating physiological changes and signals in the somatosensory brain areas. This 
process ultimately creates what we call a feeling that is noticeable by the person. In other words, 
emotions function as somatic markers, that are instantly activated to answer fast and efficiently to 
inner or external stimuli, in order to influence subsequent decision-making, and allowing the 
individual to select behaviour rapidly. If somatic markers have negative valence the response will 
be of alarm; and if the marker’s valence is positive it will serve as an incentive to continue towards 
a certain course of action. While confronting a life situation, somatic markers are rapidly accessed, 
influencing perception and decision-making, acting as a sort of ‘emotional guide’ that simplifies 
our ability to efficiently interact with the world (ibid.).  
Seemingly a paradox, Damasio’s (1994) research emphasized how emotions, rather than 
producing irrationality, are a source of rationality. In a laboratory study, Bechara, Damasio et al. 
(1997) paralleled the responses to a card game between healthy individuals versus patients that 
because of damages to the prefrontal cortex, were emotionally impaired. Choosing from some card 
decks, patients (players) could receive small rewards, large rewards, or very large losses. It turned 
out that brain-damaged patients returned more quickly to the risky deck even after a large loss. 
Further studies on patients with ventromedial prefrontal (VM) cortex lesions, revealed the loss in 
judgment and decision-making capacities in real-life settings, regardless of preserving a normal 
intellect (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). Such impairment leads to diverse issues, from financial 
losses, social losses of family and friends; moreover, the patients become incapable of learning 
from previous errors. The somatic marker hypothesis ascribes the patients’ failure in carrying out 
effective decisions in real-life settings to a deficiency in the emotive response that promptly signals 
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the potential costs of an action and supports the selection of the best option (ibid.). Put simply, 
because emotions facilitate learning and adaptation, the loss of an emotional ‘answering-system’ 
reduced patient’s tendency to learn and avoid the source of danger, leaving them more exposed to 
failure. Stripped of the emotional signal, patients depend on a rational cost-benefit analysis of the 
several and often contradictory alternatives, that implicate immediate and future outcomes. The 
brain damage impairs the rapidity of decision-making, as well as its appropriateness, leading to 
disadvantageous choices (ibid.). 
Human choices are often based on unconscious processes and influences, as we are unknowingly 
and substantially affected by emotions and contextual elements in the choices we make. Many 
decisions take place almost instantly, after receiving just a fraction of all available information. A 
growing number of neuroscientific studies demonstrate that cognitive and emotive processes, even 
if different in nature, are not separated and antagonistic, but strictly connected systems. Emotion 
and cognition ought to be considered as two distinct but interactive cerebral structures, mediated 
by diverse but interactive brain systems. Le Doux (1996), in his Theory of the Double Way, 
proposes the existence of two afferent cerebral routes of elaboration, both involving the mediating 
role of the amygdala. The low road is a direct sub-cortical circuitry that allows for a rapid 
elaboration, while the high road is the cortical circuitry that enables a slower, more deliberate 
elaboration process. When stimuli in the environment reach the sensory organs, they send 
information in the form of electric impulses to the thalamus, which in turn sends information 
following the two paths of elaboration. The low road connects the amygdala to the thalamus and 
enables the person to quickly, automatically respond the incoming stimuli. If a stimulus has a 
strong emotive connotation, the information that reach the thalamus is rapidly transmitted to the 
amygdala, alerting the cerebral areas that control the motoric system for a quick reaction. A typical 
example is the reaction of fear and flight in conditions of danger. The high road instead, slower 
and conscious, is characterised by a more complex relation between the amygdala, the thalamus 
and the cerebral cortex. This second pathway delivers a slower emotional response. This theory 
represents a move beyond the conception of emotion as the result of a process of cognitive 
elaboration, paving the way to a novel understanding of emotions as biological states that guide 
decision-making. 
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1.3.2. Moving beyond the dual mode  
 
If humans are not entirely rational, nor are they entirely irrational. The fact that the human brain 
is prone to heuristics (see chapter 2 for a full illustration of these mechanisms) and is limited in its 
deployment (i.e. ego depletion, see Baumeister et al., 1988) does not imply that humans are 
‘hopelessly lost’. Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996), following the theoretical work of Simon 
(1947) and its notion of ‘satisficing’, looked at a third way to explain human inference. They 
developed several algorithms based on a one-reasoning mode of decision-making they labelled 
‘fast and frugal’. Through a computer simulation the researchers compared these algorithms with 
rational-reasoning procedures (such as multiple regression). In other words, they compared a fast, 
satisficing reasoning mode vs. a rational, slower reasoning mode. They found that the first 
outperformed the latter in both speed and accuracy. Particularly, the Take The Best algorithm 
completed as many correct inferences as the other algorithms (e.g. weighted tallying). Overall, it 
was judged the best performing because of the highest speed. Other simplifications of the 
algorithm (Take the Last and the Minimalist) made less correct inferences and only when cues 
values were high. In this way, the researchers proved that fast cognitive mechanisms in real-world 
contexts, rather than being satisficing (as Simon posited) can actually be optimal. Surpassing the 
concept of bounded-rationality, Gingerezer and Goldstein (1996) have shown that rather than the 
opposition of rational vs. irrational, human inference should not posit such a rigid separation in 
efficient vs. inefficient. That division in fact, does not capture that both modes can be accurate, 
and that the ‘fast and frugal way’ should not be conceived as exclusively error-prone, as it can lead 
to correct inferences. The existence and role of the two systems, namely of the cognitive system 
of thought and the irrational, unconscious, emotive system (labelled differently depending on the 
different disciplines and theoretical approaches), will be discussed more analytically in chapter 2.   
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1.4 Automaticity of behaviour in everyday life 
 
“Much of everyday life - thinking, feeling, and doing - is automatic in that it is driven by current 
features of the environment (i.e., people, objects, behaviours of others, settings, roles, norms, 
etc.) as mediated by automatic cognitive processing of those features, without any mediation 
by conscious choice or reflection.” (Bargh, 1997: p. 2) 
While there is consensus on the definition of conscious processes as deliberate, effortful and 
controlled mental processes, there is no single definition regarding the automatic component of 
unconscious activity. Recent neuropsychological research corroborated the findings of social 
psychology, showing that many of the brain mechanisms of the motor system, in charge of guiding 
action, are inaccessible to conscious thought (see Prinz, 2003). Major cognitive neuroscience 
studies revealed the presence of this dissociation between conscious awareness and motoric 
behaviour. For instance, the discovery of mirror neurons (Rizzolatti and Vozza, 2007) is evidence 
of the direct connection between perceptual information (in this case, visual information) and 
action. The existence of a mirror system in the human brain is associated with imitation, action 
understanding, learning, empathy, language (see Oztop et al. 2006). This system enables us to 
automatically understand others and act without being aware of doing so, without the conscious 
control of the underlying operating motor system (Bargh, 2005). Hence, conscious intention to 
perform an act is not the sole determinant of behaviour: to select, pursue and complete a complex 
goal the activation of a conscious process is not the exclusive, indispensable condition. 
Furthermore, environmental features and stimuli can elicit motivations and goals within us, and 
non-consciously guide and shape our behaviour, without us being aware of trying to attain a certain 
goal (see Chartrand and Bargh, 2002).  
Indeed, this does not entail that consciousness does not exist or that it is of secondary importance. 
It simply means that the highly complex mechanisms in our exceptional human functioning can 
occur without conscious guidance. In the same way as we breathe, as our hearts pound, or as we 
walk on our legs. This leads to the question, what does consciousness serve for? As Bargh (2005: 
p. 58) notes: “one can be meta-aware of one's perceptions, thoughts, and actions (monitoring) and 
also be aware of guiding those thoughts and actions toward a goal (control), but if this guidance 
can also occur without conscious awareness and intent, then these capabilities do not distinguish 
conscious from nonconscious processes”. Then, Bargh explains, the purpose of consciousness may 
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be to give us the capability of being actively aware (my italic) enabling us to integrate a variety of 
functions and to allow us to accomplish complex tasks and objectives. In other words, the 
evolutionary function of conscious thought could be the integration of the sophisticated array of 
unconscious skills. 
Research on the phenomena of automatic behaviours has proliferated since the 1980s, and it 
appears useful in this context to elucidate the main concepts that demonstrate the role and extent 
of the automatic nature in human behaviour. Bargh (1994) highlights two fundamental points. The 
first point is that the complex processes at work in our minds, cannot be regarded as exclusively 
automatic or exclusively controlled and deliberate, rather they are combinations of both. There are 
many examples of actions that require attention, and that concurrently rely on automatic 
components, such as car driving or cooking a meal. A process can be deliberate and unintended at 
the same time. This point is important to make to avoid simplifications in the interpretation of the 
research results; for instance, demonstration that stereotyping is automatic does not entail that is 
uncontrollable. The second point is that different conditions determine different types of automatic 
processing responses. In this regard, it is useful to draw a broad distinction of three typologies of 
automaticity:  
1. Preconscious automaticity does not require any goal or intention, but merely that a person 
notices a stimulus in the environment. This category includes interpretations, evaluations, 
and categorisations that take place prior to a conscious response, such as immediate 
reactions to negative stimuli, or automatic activation of an attitude. 
2. Post-conscious automaticity involves some sort of attentional processing (e.g. the 
formation of an impression). 
3. Goal-dependent automaticity is activated deliberately and intentionally (e.g. the 
development of a certain behaviour after repeated practice).  
Since it is important for scholars to be specific about the qualities and features of automaticity to 
avoid confusion, Bargh (1994) decomposed the concept in four distinct qualities that he called the 
“four horsemen of automaticity”: awareness, intentionality, efficiency and controllability.  
1. First, awareness is essential for the deliberate control of thought and behaviour and for the 
understanding of the causes of one’s reactions. There are a variety of factors that can 
influence behaviour without the person being aware of it, and these influences determine 
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subsequent action and judgement. There are three main ways in which a person may not be 
aware of a mental mechanism: the person may not be aware of the stimulus (as in subliminal 
perception); the person may not be aware of how the stimulus was mentally elaborated and 
categorised (e.g. as it occurs with stereotypes); or the person may not be aware of an 
influence on his/her mood or judgement, misattributing the causes of the reaction. 
2. Intentionality refers to (a) the extent that actions, judgements, impressions are triggered by 
the environment or are under the intentional control of the individual; and (b) to the extent 
that actions, judgements, impressions can be intentionally interrupted and controlled by an 
act of will.  
3. The efficiency of a mental process is relevant for a variety of tasks, because people trust and 
need their categorisations and judgments. In this sense, automaticity can be also regarded as 
an efficient process because it enables people to effortlessly carry out some functions (e.g. 
the ease of processing in perceptual fluency, see Kahneman 2003). 
4. Finally, controllability refers to the moderation of the influence of automatic processes by 
the person’s motivation and effort. Indeed, cognitive control can be enacted, for instance 
when one is aware of the formation of a stereotypical response, or of an automated 
consumption behaviour (e.g. the desire for eating pizza at lunch), in these cases the person 
can adjust its judgment/action. In other words, automatic mental processes help us in 
classifying, evaluating, and assigning meanings; the output of these processes is then ready 
to be employed by deliberate and conscious judgements and decisions, however these 
automatic outputs can be still modified by deliberate and controlled elaboration (i.e. they are 
not pre-determined outputs). Likewise, the uncontrollable nature of automatic environmental 
perception does not entail that it is not possible to deliberately choose when to control it.  
Bargh’s (1994) framework highlights the advantage and the disadvantage of having automatic 
mental processes. On the one hand, they are efficient as they enable to protect our limited cognitive 
resources by “storing” them, to manage actions and decisions that require higher attention. On the 
other hand, the absence or relative unawareness of the processes our mind is engaging into, leaves 
us susceptible of biases or misattributions in the determination of the causes of our behavioural 
tendencies (i.e. actions, impressions, moods, etc.). In this sense, the existence of research that also 
demonstrates some extent of controllability over automatic inputs and judgments is reassuring (see 
evidence in Bargh, 1994). 
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1.4.1 Automatic perception  
 
Perceptual activity is the pathway through which environmental stimuli cause the activation of 
mental representations and responses. Through perception, humans identify and interpret 
information to understand the environment. From the previous framework (Bargh, 1994), we begin 
to understand that everyday actions, motivations, judgements, can become automatically activated. 
Two theoretical accounts are particularly relevant in this domain: the principle of ideomotor action, 
and the perception-behaviour link.  
The principle of ideomotor action refers to the process of consciously thinking about an action, 
which activates the tendency to engage in the behaviour. Carpenter (1852) studied the reflex 
function of the brain and the automatic release of reflexes through ideas and coined the term 
‘ideomotor’; but it was James (1980) who discovered the principle. The ideomotor theory assumes 
that by merely thinking about a behaviour, this increases the likelihood of an action taking place. 
Therefore, the process is idea > action. Clearly, for a causal effect to occur, this requires that the 
action had previously been learned. Once such a connection has been established in the mind, 
actions can be immediately initiated by the idea of a sensory movement (see Stock and Stock, 
2004). The ideomotor principle does not occur exclusively for the performance of simple 
behaviours such as grabbing an object, but also for more complex behaviours.  
The ideomotor theory has been extended to consider whether simply perceiving an other’s person 
action increases the person’s likelihood to perform the same behaviour. The stream of research 
based on the perception-behaviour link concept, assume that behavioural tendencies are created 
by the mind when the person automatically perceives the social environment (Prinz, 1997). 
Perception–behaviour link research is grounded on the idea that “mental representations 
responsible for perception, and mental representations responsible for behaviour are intimately 
linked” (Djieksterhuis et al., 2005: p. 194). The perception–behaviour link influences a range of 
behaviours from simple movements to complex interpersonal behavioural responses. Thus, 
according to these studies, the “ideo” in ideomotor theory can also come from outside the mind, 
that is from the environment. Carver et al. (1983) conducted one of the early experiments on the 
perception-behaviour link. The researchers exposed the participants to the concept of hostility 
through a set of words, in a so-called language experiment. The participants were divided to play 
the role of the teacher or the learner, who received shocks from the teacher when they gave an 
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incorrect answer to a question. Subjects who had been exposed to hostility-related words gave 
longer shocks to the students than participants in the control condition. 
Furthermore, perception-behaviour link studies demonstrate that perceiving the social 
environment is a strong determinant of behaviour, as people often engage in highly imitative 
behaviour. Chartrand and Bargh (1999) named ‘the chameleon effect’ the unconscious mimicry of 
others, suggesting the mechanism is involved the perception-behaviour link. There are two main 
varieties of automatic behaviours, one is a simpler mechanism of interpersonal mimicry, the 
second is a more complex process of action priming. A distinction has been made between a “low 
road” and a “high road” to imitation:  the low road concerns the imitation of simpler observable 
behaviours (i.e. interpersonal mimicry of gestures or facial expressions), while the high road 
concerns mimicry effects intermediated by personality traits, goals, and social stereotypes 
(Djieksterhuis et al., 2005).  
Hence, as the two previous theoretical developments illustrate (Figure 2), the source of automatic 
behavioural activation can be internal and intentional (i.e. as in ideomotor theory), as well as an 
external and unintentional (i.e. as in perception-behaviour link). In other words, these two sources 
of mental representation could be intended as having a top-down (internal) or a bottom-up 
(external) form (Hebb, 1949). 
 
 
Figure 2. The internal and the external sources of automatically activated behaviour (in Bargh and Chartrand, 1999). 
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1.5 Priming: automatic influence of external stimuli on behaviour 
 
Memories in our brain are not stored in an identifiable, clear area, instead they are widely 
distributed and interconnected by networks (Heath, 2012). These networks of connection are 
generated by a process named ‘encoding’, and each time we use a certain pathway it becomes 
better defined in the brain and is more likely to be employed again in the future, a process that is 
called ‘consolidation’ (ibid.). As Schacter (1992) illustrates, there are two forms of memory: 
explicit memory is the deliberate, intentional type of recollection of past experiences; implicit 
memory instead, involves the recollection of prior experiences without any conscious intent. The 
operation of implicit memory occurs at two levels: it registers perceived information (Tulving e 
Shacter, 1990), and it operates at a conceptual level (MacAndrews et al., 1987). The feature of 
conceptual elaboration of the information is especially relevant, and implicit memory appears to 
be superior than explicit memory for three main reasons: its storage capacity is higher because it 
holds all the procedural knowledge that we use for our lives (Heath, 2012); it lasts longer; and it 
works independently without the need for deliberate attention (Schacter et al. 1993). The common 
belief is that actively learning something should register it more strongly in the memory than 
implicitly ‘acquiring’ it, but in fact, the reverse appears to be true. 
There are several manifestations of implicit memory, but the process that is most widely studied 
is priming, an unconscious mechanism that enables a rapid identification of environmental cues or 
objects. The function of priming is to improve perception: even after a single experience with an 
object/stimulus, this mechanism improves our ability to detect it and identifying it in the future. 
Indeed, priming is the result of evolutionary necessities, as it increases the speed and efficiency of 
people’s interaction with the environment (Squire and Kandel, 2000). In fact, it has been 
documented that for a period of time, after the exposure to a stimulus, less neural activity is 
required to process that same stimulus (ibid.). As Molden (2014) illustrates, social psychologists 
have been particularly interested in the study of priming, initially in relation to the phenomena of 
social representation (stereotyping, trait perception, goals) and its role in social behaviours and 
judgments. Further research demonstrated that priming not only influences impressions, but also 
individual actions. Therefore, the focus has been set on the study of the effects of priming to 
determine what types of behaviours can be primed, and from what types of cues and environmental 
features the primes arise (Molden, 2014). Currently, research on priming expanded in a variety of 
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domains, from social psychology to health psychology, behavioural economics, and consumer 
psychology, documenting its role in a variety of domains. 
Priming means that a concept in the mind is activated following the exposure to a stimulus (called 
‘prime’), and this in turn, influences the behavioural responses. For instance, seeing a chocolate 
commercial during a television break may prime the idea of eating, and the person may 
inexplicably decide to eat something at the next advertising break. Priming is not only 
unconscious, it also occurs very rapidly: the core of this mechanism is a mental process called 
associative activation, in which exposure to a stimulus influences associated ideas in the brain 
(Kahneman, 2011). Ideas and concepts can be associated by meaning (semantic priming) or by 
emotional valence (affective priming). In priming, each element is connected to the other: a word 
can evoke memories that evoke emotions, generating facial expressions or other behavioural 
reactions. The association that occurs through priming acts as a sort of preparation to action, in 
accordance with the stimulus received.   
Bargh (2001) has shown how priming effects relate with the four mediational systems (i.e. 
perceptual, evaluative, motivational, emotional) outlined before. The automatic effects of 
contextual cues drive evaluation and behaviours without the person having any conscience of the 
effect of the stimulus (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. The unconscious behavioural guidance systems: “Step 1” - the compact arrows – concerns the automatic activation of 
internal information processing systems; “Step 2”- the dotted arrows – concerns the automatic influences of these systems (in 
Bargh, 2009). 
First, in relation to the perceptual system, priming influences have been widely demonstrated in 
the domain of social behaviour. People automatically categorise other individuals in relation to 
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their gender, race, social role, and other traits (Bargh, 1994; Uleman et al., 1996). The typical 
example pertains to studies on priming and automatic stereotyping (e.g. Bargh et al. 1996). 
Furthermore, people are wired to perceive and unconsciously imitate others, from gestures and 
posture, to more complex behaviours (Bargh, 1994). In relation to the evaluative system, it has 
been found that priming automatically activates implicit attitudes and preferences.  
For instance, research employing the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald et al., 1998), 
revealed the pervasive presence of automatic evaluations (i.e. implicit attitudes). The IAT is a 
response-time test based on priming, which measures the strength of association between two 
concepts: the more accessible a concept is the more connected in the mind the two concepts are. 
For instance, Connell et al. (2001) tested the priming effect on the evaluation of images of people 
faces with either white or black skin colour. The IAT assessed implicit preferences by asking 
participants to rapidly categorise stimulus words using two response keys (for instance, the faces 
of white or black people were associated at turn with adjectives such as good or bad). The results 
established the presence of implicit intergroup discrimination and biased social behaviour (ibid.). 
Thirdly, in relation to the motivational system, research on goal pursuit established that goals can 
be primed, that is, unconsciously activated by cues in environment and other representations 
(Bargh, 1990). An extensive literature is available on goal-priming in relation to a variety of 
behaviours, such as rudeness or politeness (Bargh et al., 1996), competitiveness (Kay et al., 2004), 
honesty (Bateson et al., 2006), cleanliness (Holland et al., 2005), or greed (Vohs et al., 2006). 
Finally, in relation to the emotional system, research found that the activation of feelings and 
emotional states is unconscious and automatic and can therefore be primed influencing behaviour 
(see Haidt, 1994; or Lerner et al., 2004). In the following paragraphs, some priming categories 
with be illustrated to offer some examples of the operation of this complex mechanism. 
An excellent, classic experiment on priming comes from Bargh, Chen and Burrows (1996, 
Experiment 2), who investigated the effect of exposing participants to the concept of elderly. The 
researchers, in the context of a language test, exposed some participants to words related to aged 
people, and other participants to words unrelated to the stereotype (see Table 1). When the test 
was terminated, participants walked to the closest elevator and the researchers secretly recorded 
the time of walking down the corridor. The data revealed that the participants primed with the 
elderly stereotype walked slower than those in the control condition. 
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Phase 1 - Scrambled sentence task Phase 2 - Walking down 
the hall (13 meters) 
Priming group: 
• forgetful 
• wrinkle  
• bingo  
• gray 
• Florida 
Control words: 
• awkward 
• California 
• tricky 
Time to walk to the 
elevator: 
• elderly condition: 
8.26 sec. 
• control condition: 
7.30 sec. 
Table 1. Schema of the experiment conducted by Bargh, Chen and Burrows (1996). 
Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998) replicated the study on trait or stereotype priming to 
investigate the effect on the performance of an intellectual task. During four experiments, they 
found that priming the positive stereotype of professors (i.e. the trait of intelligence) increased the 
performance of the participants in a general knowledge scale. In the same way, priming the 
negative trait of soccer hooligans (i.e. stupidity) reduced the performance of the subjects.  
Kay et al. (2004) conducted five studies to explore how the exposure to certain objects can impact 
automatic processes in social and organisational environments. This research is especially 
interesting since no studies had been previously conducted to test the influence of material, 
physical objects on perception, highlighting the relevance of everyday circumstances. In is 
important to note, that objects are imbued with cultural meanings carrying implicit values and 
ideas. Therefore, the researchers predicted that given the established influence of semantic and 
person primes, it was plausible to hypothesise that the exposure to material objects could also 
produce an influence. Experiment 4 tested the effect of business-related objects on behaviour. 
Participants were instructed to complete the ‘Ultimatum Game’ that obliges a person to propose a 
division of money that the other participant can accept or reject. During the experiment, 
participants in the competitiveness-prime condition found on the table close to them an executive 
leather portfolio, an executive-style pen, and a leather briefcase. Instead, participants in the 
cooperation-prime condition found standard pencils, and a black backpack. The data revealed that 
participants became more competitive and self-interested at the sight of the business items, instead, 
in the presence of the standard objects cooperation increased.  
A study from Bateson et al. (2006) investigated the priming effect of some images on behaviour. 
The experiment took place in the coffee room of a British university, where a “honesty box” was 
available for employees to pay for the tea/coffee they consumed. Hanging on the wall close to the 
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honesty box, was a suggested price list. Above the price list, the researchers posted a new image 
each week for ten weeks, alternating images of flowers and images of human eyes. The study 
charted the influence of each image on the value of payments into the honesty box each week. 
Over a ten-week period, the researchers found that when staff were primed by seeing eyes above 
the price list, they paid almost three times more than when they saw flowers (see Figure 4). In fact, 
in the ‘eyes week’ contributions were in average of 70 cents, while in the ‘flowers week’ 
contributions were in average of 15 cents. The researchers concluded that the mere idea of being 
watched primed participants to improve their behaviour. 
 
Figure 4. Pence paid per liter of milk consumed for each image type (Bateson et al., 2006). 
 
1.5.1 Unconscious motivation and goal pursuit  
 
The stream of research about automatic goal pursuit, demonstrated that individual goals can be 
triggered by external stimuli or manipulations. This entails that a person can pursue a goal in a 
social or interpersonal context, without a previous conscious intention to pursue that specific goal, 
nor being aware of doing so (see Bargh et al., 2001). For instance, research proved that 
subliminally presenting the goal of cooperation actually improved cooperative behaviour (ibid.); 
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in the same way, people primed with the concept of achievement, performed at higher levels on a 
task compared to control groups (Bargh, 2005). These findings on the unconscious ideo-motor 
effect of perception on action (Bargh, 2005) are difficult to accept and comprehend because of our 
society’s fundamental belief in intentional, conscious behaviour.  
It may appear that the concept of unconscious goal pursuit could be linked to behaviourism (i.e. 
Skinner, 1953; Watson, 1925) in its focus on the influence of the environment. However, the 
contemporary conceptualization of unconscious goal pursuit differs from behaviourist theory; it 
continues earlier studies on the involvement of cognitive processes in unconscious associative 
learning, and on the influence of environmental cues on behaviour (Bargh, 2006). Modern research 
builds on behaviourism (see Bargh and Ferguson, 2000), but moves beyond as the ‘black box’ is 
substituted by the study of a complex set of mental mechanisms such as priming, allowing 
researchers to investigate the processes that underlie unconscious goal pursuit. 
Previously, it was generally expected that the mental processes involved in goal pursuit required 
conscious activation. Recent discoveries revealed that under some conditions, goal themselves and 
goal pursuit can arise and operate unconsciously. In these cases, human behaviour may be the 
product of an act of “unconscious will” (Custers and Aarts, 2010). Environmental situations and 
stimuli can influence us by activating goals in our minds without us being aware and can operate 
motivating and guiding our behaviour (ibid.). This stream of research has extensive implications 
for our conception of consciousness and human behaviour. Investigating the mechanism of goal 
pursuit is relevant because of its fundamental role in several aspects of life, such as in social 
interaction, nutrition, and health behaviour. The reason for the existence of goal pursuit is that it 
supports the person to persist on a task, even if conscious attention is directed elsewhere 
(Gollwitzer and Bargh, 2005). By promptly and effortlessly answering to environmental triggers, 
automatic motivations promote a certain goal, which is particularly useful in complex social 
environment where deliberate attention need to focus and is a limited resource (ibid.).  
Bargh (1990) developed the auto-motive model, which posits that once a goal has been 
unconsciously activated, its process will advance in the same way as when a goal is intentionally 
set. According to this theory, unconscious goals operate and have the same behavioural effects as 
when a person deliberately decides to pursue a certain goal. In order to test the theory, research 
has been conducted in social cognition research, using the standard method of unrelated-studies 
paradigm (Custers and Aarts, 2010). In this experimental design, a certain goal/concept is primed 
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on the participants to lead them to think about that goal/concept, which should be employed it in 
an apparently unrelated following task. For instance, to activate in the subjects’ mind the concept 
of hunger, the participants could be exposed to some words related to hunger during a sentence 
construction task. Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2003) conducted a research on the effect of situational 
norms on normative behaviour (see Table 2). Situational norms are social customs or conventions 
that prescribe a certain behaviour when a person is in a specific environment or situation. An 
example is the immediate response to be silent when one enters in a library, as this environment 
automatically activates a mental representation and therefore a specific response. In the 
experiments of Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2003), the subjects looked at pictures of library 
environments, and the researchers assessed the effects on their behaviour. The findings showed 
that behaviour is automatically activated when the participants had an active goal to visit the 
environment. They found that participants lowered their voices when they had the goal to visit the 
library; participants’ in the goal-library condition reliably talked less loudly than the subjects in 
the control condition, and in the no-goal-library condition.  
 
Phase 1: picture description task 
 
Phase 2: Pronounce 10 words 
(record voice intensity - dB) 
library (you will visit)  
‘library goal’ prime 
library-goal prime = 83.16 dB 
 
railway platform (you will visit) 
‘control goal’ prime 
control-goal prime = 84.48 dB 
 
library (you will not visit) 
‘no-goal library’ prime 
no-goal library prime = 84.62 dB 
Table 2. Illustration of the experiment conducted by Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2003). 
However, claiming that a goal can be automatically activated is different from claiming that a goal 
can continue to operate without the person’s awareness. Therefore, further experiments have been 
conducted to test for this hypothesis.  For instance, in Experiment 2 from Bargh et al. (2001), 
participants were either unconsciously primed (or not) to cooperate with their adversary in a 
negotiation game, or they were openly instructed (or not) to cooperate. The study was designed in 
that way in order to compare conscious vs. unconscious operation of the same goal. The 
participants under the prime condition cooperated more than the non-primed participants; the same 
result was true for the participants who had been openly instructed to cooperate compared to those 
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who were not. Following the task completion, participants were asked to rate their level of 
cooperation. Self-reports of the participants in the explicit cooperation condition, correctly 
reported who actually cooperated more than the others. The interesting result is that for participants 
in the unconscious prime condition, self-reports revealed that their level of cooperation did not 
match (near to zero) the actual level of cooperation. This suggests that for the unconsciously set 
goal, participants were not aware of the operation of the goal even if they were successfully 
pursuing it (ibid.)  
In the literature on automatic goal experiments, subjects were interrogated following the 
experiment to control that they were not aware of pursuing the activated goal: almost no 
participants revealed any knowledge; most were astonished or even sceptical, that the 
experimenters could have induced them to pursue a goal without their awareness (Gollwitzer and 
Bargh, 2005). However, to control that the results were reliable and to offer more convincing 
results about unconscious goal pursuit, further research employed the method of subliminal 
stimulation. In a subliminal form of stimulation, cues are presented with such a low intensity that 
it cannot reach the threshold of consciousness. In this case, it is impossible for any participant to 
be aware of the stimuli, yet participants are still subject to their influence. Schlaghecken and Eimer 
(2004) investigated if subliminal stimuli could influence participants’ choices between two 
alternatives. Before they answered, the subjects were subliminally exposed to arrows that pointed 
either to the right or to the left answer, to test whether this influenced subsequent responses. The 
researchers found that the arrows systematically affected the responses: this establishes that also 
seemingly deliberate and ‘free’ choices are not invulnerable to unconscious stimuli and biases. In 
a recent experiment, Lau and Passingham (2007), using an fMRI (functional magnetic resonance 
imaging), investigated whether offering unconscious information influences the cognitive system. 
Participants were asked to judge words in terms of their meaning or their sound, based on the 
instructions at the beginning of each task. However, in some trials, the visual cue presented 
subliminally primed the person to the opposite task, to test whether this impaired performance. 
The data revealed that the prime increased cerebral activity that corresponded to that primed goal, 
impairing the conscious judgment. In other words, the cognitive system responded to the 
subliminal prime, and the participants were not aware of being engaged in the wrong task.  
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1.6 Conclusion 
 
First, this chapter uncovered how human nature is characterised by a constant interplay of opposite 
mental processes of rationality vs. irrationality, maximisation vs. satisfying, deliberate vs. 
uncontrollable, conscious vs. unconscious, and so forth. Secondly, the discussion has been focused 
on automatic mechanisms, particularly priming, as it is relevant for the discussion in the following 
chapters. In social psychology, two paths of research reached the same conclusion that complex 
behavioural tendencies can be elicited and activated non-consciously: studies on the perception-
behaviour link; and studies on non-conscious goal pursuit. The cerebral system has a strong 
adaptive function, in fact many processes and behaviours can function automatically, which means 
more efficiently. Humans evolved to be highly reactive to the environment and to the stimuli in 
their proximity.  Research from different fields of inquiry, emphasized the important effects 
deriving from the situational activation of a mental construct, demonstrating that certain stimuli, 
even if presented is a subliminal manner, can have effects on behaviour. Through the mechanism 
of priming, simple cues can automatically activate related mental representation that is relevant 
for the individual to respond. The perception-behaviour link enables us to act in accordance to 
people around us, and the neuroscientific discovery of mirror neurons demonstrated the connection 
between perception and behaviour. The evolutionary past recorded in our human genes, guide our 
behaviour through motivation. Research on goal pursuit established the capacity of unconscious 
activity of both setting a goal, and of pursuing it for an extended period until the goal is attained. 
Research on automatic goal pursuit is particularly relevant for dietary behaviour. This stream of 
research demonstrates that “the entire route from goal activation and goal setting to goal 
completion can proceed without conscious awareness” (Djieksterhuis et al., 2005: p. 196-97). The 
implication of the finding that behaviour can unfold unconsciously is highly relevant if we want 
to influence the onset of new behaviour. To predict human behaviour seems to be quite impossible, 
as a multiplicity of internal and external variables interact and impact on the individual, making 
this task extremely challenging. Starting from this premise, rather than trying to alter people’s 
behaviour through attempts of rational persuasion of through a strategic analysis of the predicting 
variables of a behaviour (e.g. attitudes, values) we will see in the following chapter how it is 
possible to guide and orient behaviour by working on automatic and unconscious components.   
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However, since behaviour often unfolds unconsciously, and it can be oriented by choice architects, 
does that imply that people can be manipulated? The question of the presence of automatic 
mechanisms that influence and guide human perception, opens an important aspect related to the 
vulnerability of people to external forms of manipulation. The limited human capacity for 
deliberate cognitive processing is determined, as illustrated in this chapter, by the presence of a 
variety of automatic processes that proceed without the necessity of a conscious monitoring by the 
individual; this condition may leave the person exposed to the conditioning and manipulation of 
external influences. For this reason, the opacity of nudging mechanisms has been widely criticized 
and discussed in the literature, as it will be illustrated extensively in the final section of the next 
chapter. This section will explain the arguments of the nudge-sceptics as well as the counter-
arguments provided by its supporters, and a personal interpretation of the issue will be provided 
to explain why, despite the actual opacity of nudging, we should not be wary of those simple 
mechanisms that might make our lives better and improve our future.  
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2. Behavioural Economics and Choice Architecture 
 
 
2.1 The foundations  
 
The discoveries and the progresses outlined in chapter two, force us to rethink some beliefs, and 
to recognise that decision-making cannot be reduced to a logical, deductive model. Instead, 
decision-making is the incessant interaction between automatic and deliberate processes, between 
affect and cognition, emotion and reason. Behavioural economics (BE), and the acknowledgement 
of the fallibility of human behaviour, gave rise to a flourishing field of research with the work of 
Daniel Kahneman (Nobel prize for economy in 2002) and Amos Tversky, and gained further 
celebrity with the 2008 book of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. The main merit of behavioural 
economics is to have shifted the focus from a decision-making process based on the principle of 
rationality to the actual way in which decision-making occurs in the complex everyday life of 
individuals.  
BE is a discipline of the cognitive and behavioural sciences that focus on micro-level behaviours, 
more particularly, BE is concerned with the study of the cognitive, social, and environmental 
influences on behaviour: research in this discipline has developed theories and offered many 
insights on human judgment and decision-making, challenging the classical economic perspective 
on people preferences and perception of value (Samson, 2015). Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
empirically demonstrated how people systematically violate the principle of rationality, 
dismantling the cornerstone of economic theory. Evidence demonstrated that people have limited 
cognitive resources and processing abilities; that we are influenced by information stored in our 
memory and by stimuli in the environment; that present gains are more valued than future 
outcomes, and that we tend to resist change because of inertia (Kahneman, 2011). As human 
beings, our actions are also the outcome of emotional responses, and as social animals we are 
affected by social norms (Asch, 1995; Lapinsky and Rimal, 2005; Schultz et al., 2007). 
The findings of BE are the foundations of the Nudge philosophy, a multidisciplinary approach 
developed by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. The authors, in their book “Nudge” (2008) 
distinguish ‘Humans’, namely beings that are highly sensitive to the stimuli and features present 
in the environment, from ‘Econs’ theoretical beings that are always able to act rationally. Nudging 
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is the application of the findings of BE to individual, social, or political choices; the aim of this 
approach is to steer people in the directions that are possibly the less distorted from the effects of 
systematic errors and cognitive mistakes (heuristics). The application of effective nudges rests 
upon an accurate choice architecture that aims to favour individuals in making the best choices for 
themselves and for the society.    
 
2.1.1 Prospect theory 
 
Towards the end of the 1970s, two Israeli psychologists, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 
noticed that when people were faced with risky choices, they systematically violated the principles 
of expected utility. The researchers realised the necessity to develop a new theory that described 
and acknowledged the existence of these violations of the classical construct. In 1979, Kahneman 
and Tversky published an article introducing a new model known as Prospect Theory. The theory 
addresses the so-called “under risk” situations, that is circumstances in which future scenarios 
(prospects) are involved. If the theory of expected utility is a model that tells us how rational 
decision-makers should behave to take the best possible decision; prospect theory gives us a model 
that illustrates the reasons why individuals take sub-optimal decisions. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) began their studies by considering practical case studies, based on the problems posed by 
the theorists of expected utility, and verifying if the core principles were respected. To exemplify, 
they analysed the following scenarios, as illustrated in Figure 5:  
 
Figure 5. Two choice problems with monetary outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
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In problem n.7 the probabilities of winning are substantial (45% and 90%), and logically most 
people choose the scenario where the chance of winning was higher. In problem n.8, the chances 
of winning are microscopic (.001% and .002%). In this prospect, most people chose the scenario 
that offered the larger gain. These problems capture a type of behaviour that is not conceived in 
expected utility theory. Analysing the postulates of classical expected utility theory, the 
researchers realised to have discovered a grave example of blindness induced by theory 
(Kahneman, 2011). Individuals are spurred by a cognitive mechanism to prefer an almost certain 
win of inferior value, instead of a double win that has a lower probability to succeed. Problem 5 
and 6 (Figure 6) illustrate the issue with non-economic problems that violate expected utility 
theory: 
 
Figure 6. Two choice problems with non-monetary outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky,1979). 
 
A prospect is the combination of all the possible outcomes and of the associated probabilities. 
Prospect theory distinguish two phases in the decision-making process: the ‘editing’ phase refers 
to a preliminary analysis of the alternatives that leads to a simplified vision of the available 
prospects (i.e. alternatives); in the ‘evaluation’ phase the simplified versions that emerge from the 
editing phase are assessed and the one with the higher value is chosen (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979).   
1. In the editing phase, the person organizes the possible alternatives and adapts them to facilitate 
the second phase of analysis and choice. This preliminary analysis of the prospects is mainly done 
unconsciously, using a variety of mental mechanisms of simplification:  
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▪ Coding. People represent the outcomes of a prospect in terms of gains or losses 
compared to their actual condition, or to some benchmark they want to reach.  
▪ Combination. People combine outcomes that are equal, but that have different 
possibilities of being realized.  
▪ Segregation. In some cases, it may be that the person has to evaluate prospects that 
offer both factors without risks, as well as risky factors. In these cases, the person can 
separate certain (riskless) elements from risky ones.  
The previous mechanisms are separately applied to each prospect, while the following operations 
are applied to two or more prospects:  
▪ Cancellation. To simplify choice, decision-makers can eliminate the components that 
are common to all the prospects. 
▪ Simplification. People often can simplify elements of a prospect that they perceive 
more difficult to assess.  
▪ Detection or dominance. Usually, decision-makers attempt to identify some relations 
of dominance among the alternatives and eliminate those that are less significant.  
On the one hand, these processes aim to simplify choice in the successive phase of evaluation; 
however, it is during the editing phase that many errors arise. For instance, the sequence and the 
context in which the different scenarios are presented, can highly influence the selection and 
organisation of the alternatives, as in the case when some components are cancelled.  
3. In the evaluation phase, the simplified versions of the prospects are confronted. The 
evaluation is based on two functions that people employ to make the assessment: the 
weighting function, and the value function. The weighting function highlights two core 
aspects related to the subjective perception of probability: the lowest probabilities are 
overestimated (over-weighted), while the medium and high probabilities are 
underestimated (under-weighted). Hence, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed an 
asymmetric value function (Figure 7), concave for the gains and convex for the losses with 
an S shape, in which the origin of the axes represents the ‘point of reference’.  
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Figure 7. The value function (in Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
The value function has three fundamental characteristics: (a) the outcomes are assessed in relation 
to the reference point and are organised in terms of gains or losses; (b) in both quarters (losses vs. 
gains) the function is characterised by a decrease in the sensitivity to change; and (c) in the quarter 
of the losses the function is steeper. The three features of the value function are at the base of a 
series of irrational behaviours, such as loss aversion, point of reference, status quo bias, and the 
framing effect. Since the curve is steeper in the loss quarter, people has an asymmetric perception 
of the outcomes that fall above or under the reference point. Losses create almost double of the 
pain compared to the pleasure of the gains.  
2.1.2. System 1 and System 2 
 
In the 1960s, Daniel Kahneman’s psychophysical research focused on the question of how 
individuals objectively perceive the stimuli in the environment, and what subjective visual errors 
may arise in perception. In the same period, Amos Tversky’s work was concerned on an 
exploration of Bernoulli’s expected utility theory (EUT), and more specifically about how to 
formulate, in a mathematical way, individual choices in relation to probability and utility. 
Collaboration among the two commenced in the 1970s, when the researchers expanded their 
experiments to real-world settings. Studying the psychology of decision theory, the authors began 
to posit a distinction between the normative theory (i.e. what is objectively correct) and descriptive 
theory (i.e. the actual subjective responses of individuals). In their 1979 publication, Kahneman 
and Tversky transferred their discoveries to economics, arguing that EUT systematically departs 
from human real-world decision behaviour (see Heukelom, 2006). As illustrated in the previous 
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chapter, in their prominent prospect theory (i.e. descriptive theory) utility is not seen in absolute 
terms, rather depending on the individual subjective perception, and deviances from the normative 
theory are identified as errors. 
Kahneman’s (2011) fundamental contribution came with a novel conceptualisation of human 
decision-making and information processing. The Nobel prize winner built his research on the two 
types of cognitive processes identified by Stanovich and West (2000), called System 1 and System 
2. System 1 (automatic) operates fast, automatically, with little or no effort; it generates 
impressions, intuitions, sensations, that are at the base of the choices of system two. System 2 
(reflective), adopts these suggestions and elaborates thoughts in an ordered manner; it is in charge 
of the activities that require a superior cognitive effort and attention. Depending on the type of 
task, distinct areas of the brain are activated: the amygdala is mostly associated with emotions and 
automatic processes (system 2), while the pre-frontal cortex, the most evolved area of the brain, 
the one that mostly marks the difference between animals and humans, is associated with 
rationality and deliberation (system 1). On the other hand, the two systems work in interaction, it 
would be incorrect to locate the two systems in specific brain regions (ibid.). This distinction is a 
mere simplification that has the purpose of distinguishing more complex cognitive elaboration 
from automatic, intuitive responses. Figure 8 schematises the process and contents of System 1 
and 2 (Kahneman, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 8. Summary of the operations of System 1 and System 2 (in Kahneman, 2003). 
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System 1. As Kahneman (2011) illustrates, the separation of functions between these two systems 
is efficient because it reduces to a minimum the effort and the use of energy, thereby optimising 
performance. System 1 is endowed with knowledge about precise situations, its short-term 
predictions are generally correct, and it is able to rapidly suggest the most appropriate reaction. 
However, since System 1 performs automatically and cannot be deactivated, it is prone to 
committing errors, namely judgmental bias. In fact, among its functions, through an associative 
process, System 1 creates a representation of reality, to identify what is considered normal or usual, 
and what falls out of normality (ibid.). Morewedge and Kahneman (2010) identified System 1 with 
the automatic processes of associative memory, and explain its operation based on the priming 
paradigm which established the existence of links of reciprocal activation that connect verbal 
representations, ideas, emotions, goals, and behaviour. The authors illustrated three aspects of 
associative memory (i.e. associative coherence, attribute substitution, and processing fluency) that 
generate the judgment biases of System 1. First, associative coherence refers to the pattern of 
automatic activation in memory, which is the base for a coherent interpretation of reality. In this 
process, a stimulus induces a coherent and self-reinforcing pattern of associations in memory 
(ibid.). For instance, this occurred in the experiment on the priming of the elderly stereotype, which 
activated a consistent behavioural response (see Bargh, Chen and Burrows, 1996). Another 
example is the image of a hairy tarantula, which evokes a coherent expression of disgust in most 
people. Secondly, attribute substitution is the process at the base of heuristic judgments, in which 
the response to a difficult question is substituted by a simpler, more available response. This occurs 
because judgement dimensions are associated with each other, thereby the evaluation of the 
features of an object or stimulus automatically trigger related evaluations of other dimensions 
(Morewedge and Kahneman, 2010). For instance, people fail to correctly estimate the slope of a 
mountain road when carrying a heavy backpack, because their feeling of fatigue impairs their 
judgment (see Proffitt, 2006). This is a prime example of failure of System 1 and 2, as the biased 
impression of System 1 is not corrected by System 2 (Kahneman and Morewidge, 2010). Finally, 
processing fluency occurs when System 1, exposed to certain stimuli, builds a story based on the 
information available in memory and on the features of the stimuli. The more this story is coherent, 
the more the process will be considered ‘fluid’, leading System 2 to endorse the conclusions 
without further analysis. This tendency of System 1 to evaluate only certain features and to directly 
lead to an overall vision has been called WYSIATI, namely ‘What You See Is All There Is’ 
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(Kahneman, 2011). Indeed, this vision is likely to be partial and not fully correct. The limit of 
System 1 is that it cannot be deactivated; as the person cannot deliberately decide what system to 
use when facing a decision. The first collection of information, their organisation, and evaluation 
of the most satisficing option will always be carried out by System 1 (Kahneman, 2011). 
It is known that System 1 (Kahneman, 2011) is vulnerable to the biologic phenomenon of ego 
depletion (Baumeister at al., 1988), that is, a decrement in people’s functioning and in the 
capability of the self (ego) to regulate behaviour. The brain consumes more glucose than other 
parts of the body; and factors such as intense cognitive activities, self-control, inhibiting emotional 
reactions, or controlling obsessive thoughts, all participate in the reduction of the levels of 
motivation, self-control, and attentiveness. Ego depletion refers to the limited amount of willpower 
that humans possess, which functions intermittently and needs to be periodically replenished 
(ibid.). Ego depletion may for instance lead to a lesser degree of mental clarity and attentiveness, 
a poorer ability to complete a task, or an increased difficulty in resisting temptation. States of 
depletion may for instance lead the person to fail in sticking to a diet, in becoming more irritable, 
or reacting more aggressively. This aspect, as previously seen in chapter two, casts serious doubts 
on the possibility of people of being essentially rational agents. 
Baumeister et al. (1998) carried out four experiments to investigate self-control in relation to 
temptation (experiment 1), choice and responsibility (experiment 2), on the effects of ego depletion 
of performance (experiment 3), and on the interference of ego depletion with decision-making 
(experiment 4). The results of the four studies suggest that after completing a task, subjects 
demonstrated a decrement in various aspects of volition. The value of these four experiments lays 
especially in the demonstration of the presence of ego-depletion across different contexts, using 
different methods, limiting the possibility of artefacts. The existence of ego depletion, namely of 
a limited amount of internal resource available to the self to make choices and exert self-control, 
may explain the function of automatic responses (Baumeister et al, 1998). Bargh’s research (e.g. 
Bargh et al., 2001; Bargh and Morsella, 2009) has repeatedly shown the operation of unconscious, 
automatic patterns that steer human behaviour; it is plausible that these mechanisms are 
unconscious to free individuals from the burden of constantly having to respond in a controlled 
manner. If consciousness (the self) is the controller, then the realm of unconsciousness seems to 
support the self by conserving the necessary resources for its proper functioning. 
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System 2. System 2 is connected to the concept of rational deliberation; if humans were 
exclusively endowed with this system, then decision making processes would reflect classic 
economic theory. In reality, System 1 tends to prevail.  System 2 is the controller, in charge of 
commanding the impulses of System 1. The difficulty in overcoming bias and cognitive illusions 
in everyday life is that an incessant vigilance-mode is unpractical and would be extremely 
burdening for the individual. Hence, it is not always possible to avoid bias. Kahneman and 
Frederick (2002) propose that the monitoring activity of System 2 is generally quite lax, allowing 
the expression of many intuitive judgments of System 1, including some that are flawed. System 
2 is also featured by Kahneman (2011) as a lazy controller: because its operations require effort 
and energy consumption, it is wired to be ‘lazy’, to not act more that the necessary, therefore man 
actions are often guided by the intuitive system. 
 
2.1.3 Heuristics 
 
In their article “Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics and biases”, Kahneman and Tversky 
(1974) noted that “people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the 
complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. 
In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic 
errors” (1974: p. 1124). Heuristics are so-called errors, that is, deviances from the normative 
theory. Heuristics (from Greek ‘eureka’, to find) are cognitive procedures that support us in finding 
adequate but imperfect answers. Particularly, heuristic devices are used to reduce complex tasks 
such as probability assessment or value prediction. Heuristics heavily rely on primary human 
abilities (such as recognition or imitation), but do not process all available information, functioning 
with simpler computations (Kahneman, 2011). In recent years, psychologists discovered that 
heuristics and distortions emerge from the interaction between the intuitive and the reflective 
system (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). It is the failure to recognize these mental phenomena that 
limited the previous strand of theories that presumed the rationality of human thinking. According 
to the dual-mode theory of decision-making and reasoning, heuristics are attributed to the 
combined errors of: System 1, when automatic operations generate a faulty intuition; and System 
2, when its controlled operation does not detect and correct the intuition (Morewedge e Kahneman, 
2010). Primarily, heuristics have been erroneously considered to be secondary mechanisms 
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compared to rational decision-making. However, the studies of Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 
(1982) focused on heuristics, and revealed that while these mechanisms can occasionally lead to 
systematic errors and they are mostly useful psychological processes. Accumulating evidence 
demonstrates that also heuristics can perform well in inferential tasks such as judgment and 
categorization (see Kastikopoulus, 2009). As Kahneman (2003: p.1) recognised: “The study of 
biases is compatible with a view of intuitive thinking and decision-making as generally skilled and 
successful”. Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) developed and experimented quantitative models of 
heuristics focusing on their faster, more frugal and accurate features, compared to standard 
strategies. Acknowledging the double nature of heuristics, with both functionally-efficient 
properties but also susceptible to systematic errors, in the domain of this doctoral dissertation, they 
will be conceptualized as having such hybrid nature. In fact, while recognising that these 
mechanisms are economically-efficient in the sense that they require little cognitive effort, and 
may be sometimes correct; heuristics may also lead to severe errors even in the most confident 
judgements. In their 1974 article, through the study of the judgment process under risky conditions, 
Kahneman and Tversky identified three main types of heuristics (i.e. adjustment and anchoring, 
availability, representativeness), and the consequent cognitive biases that heuristics generate.  
First, the anchoring and adjustment heuristic is an error in judgement that occurs when a person 
is influenced by a selected starting point, affecting a wide range of evaluations such as monetary 
assessments, social judgements, or knowledge questions (Chapman and Johnson, 1999). In the 
process of anchoring and adjustment, starting from the available information, people assign a value 
to a certain object, and the following process of estimation departs from that first value, that acts 
as an anchor (Kahneman, 2011). In other words, a point of reference (the anchor) serves to make 
a preliminary evaluation, and that evaluation will be successively adjusted based on eventual 
additional information. This is a strategy that can produce over or under-estimations when 
quantifying information, and eventually positively or negatively influencing affective responses 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Epleyn and Gilovich (2010) note that there are different varieties of 
anchor values, which can be guided be deliberate elaboration processes (i.e. System 2), or by low-
elaboration processes (such as numeric priming). However, anchoring can also be triggered by 
subliminal cues. Mussweiler and Englich (2005) conducted a study to test whether the subliminal 
exposure (priming) to an anchor could affect subsequent judgement. In Study 1, participants were 
divided in two groups, and were asked to estimate Germany’s annual mean temperature in the time 
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of one minute. During this minute, each group of participants was repeatedly exposed to a 
subliminal prime, one group with a high anchor value (20), the other with a low anchor value (5). 
According with the hypothesis, the results showed that participants primed with the high anchor 
estimated a mean temperature of 14.89 C°, whereas the second group exposed to the low anchor 
reported an average temperature of 12.82 C°. This result shows that anchor values provided 
implicitly, outside people’s awareness, can also influence numeric assessments in the same way 
as explicit anchor values (ibid.). 
The availability heuristic is the tendency to estimate the frequency of an event, based on the ease 
we have in recalling related examples (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). We assign a certain 
frequency to an event, depending on how easily our memory evokes related events. Availability 
heuristic is connected to the ease with which we can retrieve examples in our memory, for instance 
the question “Is it more likely that A or B could occur?” would be substituted in “How many 
examples of A and B can I easily recall?”. In this way, we underestimate the occurrence of some 
events, while on the other hand, we may overestimate the frequency of others. This is more likely 
to occur with salient, dramatic events, or personal experiences that capture our attention 
(Kahneman, 2011). For instance, very salient events (such as an airplane disaster, or a violent 
robbery in our quiet neighbourhood) that produce higher emotional impact, are likely to be 
overestimated, while more statistically frequent events (e.g. a car crash) are underestimated (Thaler 
and Sunstein, 2008). Not only the feature of recency influences judgement through the availability 
heuristic, but also the feature of familiarity. The following study supports the idea that people 
judge the frequency of a class by the ease with which the relevant examples are recalled. In Study 
8, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) presented to the participants a list of 39 names of famous public 
figures or celebrities, that are usually easier to recall. Some people were very famous (such as 
Richard Nixon or Elizabeth Taylor), while others were less (such as Lana Turner or William 
Fulbright). Four lists were created, two contained 19 famous male names and 20 less famous 
female names, the other two lists contained 19 famous women names and 20 less famous male 
names. The participants were divided in two groups, and all subjects were exposed to the listening 
of all the four lists. In the first group, participants were asked to write down all the names they 
could recall. The results from this first group showed that, on average, participants recalled 12 of 
the 19 famous names, and 8 of the 20 less famous names. In the second group, participants were 
asked to determine whether there were more man or women on the list. The results showed that 
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80% of these subjects judged the gender prevalence on the list based on the more famous names. 
Research on the availability heuristic has been further extended, demonstrating that individuals do 
not exclusively consider the contents they recall in making a judgment, but also consider the 
subjective experience of ease or difficulty with which the memory came to mind as an additional 
source of information for drawing inferences (e.g. see Schwartz et al., 1991). 
Finally, the representativeness heuristic consists in classifying an object, based on its 
resemblance to the typical case (Kahneman, 2003). In fact, humans, to assess the probability of 
certain events or objects, tend to consider them in relation to a category (ibid.). For instance, if 
person A is considered shy and introverted, then A is more likely to be heuristically associated to 
a teacher, rather than a salesman. Representativeness heuristic is related to the concept of 
stereotypes, in which we evaluate something based on its similarities to a category, clearly leading 
to errors and the neglect of probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  
Whereas anchoring and adjustment, availability, and representativeness heuristics have a more 
general connotation, other heuristic devices have been identified by subsequent research, which 
are more domain specific: for instance, the Take-the-best heuristic (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 
1996); the recognition heuristic (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002); and the scarcity heuristic 
(Cialdini, 2008). Particularly, Finucane et al. (2000) identified the so-called affect heuristic. As 
seen in chapter 2, the first proponent of the role of automatic affective reactions in judgement and 
decision-making was Zajonc (1980). Later, Damasio’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis further 
established the role and relevance of emotive components in cognition. Finucane et al. (2000) built 
on these theories and expanded the study of affect for the development of a model on the role of 
affect in judgment, proposing that people may also use an affect heuristic in risk/benefit 
judgements. Evidence from two studies, confirmed the hypothesis that risk and benefit are 
connected in people's perceptions and therefore in their judgments. Results showed the presence 
of the affect heuristic and of a robust inverse relationship between the level of risk and the degree 
of benefit. For instance, Study 1 was specifically designed to limit the use of cognition, 
investigating the relationship between risk and benefit in judgements on various technologies or 
activities (e.g. nuclear energy, cellular phones, surfing, cigarettes). Participants made judgements 
based on a 7-point scale ranging from not risky at all (beneficial) to very risky (risk). The data 
revealed that when participants perceived an item as less dangerous, more benefits were associated 
to it; on the contrary, if an item was perceived as risky, the subjects tended to focus more on the 
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disadvantages. Particularly, reliance on the affective judgement appears to be more evident when 
participants were put under a condition of time pressure: the computer monitor flashed above the 
scale the phrase “You MUST click on the scale NOW”. Data revealed that when participants 
lacked the opportunity to perform an analytic deliberation, they relied on affective judgements.  
Far from a pretention of exhaustiveness, the following section integrates the heuristics framework 
by illustrating some of the most relevant biases and contextual influences involved in decision-
making. The aim is two provide the reader with an overview of the broad variety of mechanisms 
that affect human decision-making and behaviour in ways that we are not aware of. This supports 
the successive argument that an accurate choice architecture can be beneficial in supporting people 
towards making the best choices. 
 
2.1.4 Biases, cognitive errors, and contextual influences 
 
As Morewedge and Kahneman (2010: p.1) clearly put it: “Judgment biases can always be 
described as an overweighting of some aspects of the information and underweighting or neglect 
of others”. This occurs because people tend to assign more weight to the information that is 
strongly activated through mental association, while other relevant knowledge is discarded or 
underweighted. A variety of biases have been described in the literature, the following list 
illustrates some of the most relevant. 
 
▪ One of the most extensive and problematic bias in decision-making is the confirmation bias, 
which refers to a process of interpretation of the information in a way that is coherent and 
limited to current beliefs and expectations (Nickerson, 1998). People have a natural tendency 
to search for information that supports preferred hypotheses or that reflect one’s beliefs, and 
to interpret information accordingly. In the same way, information that clashes with existing 
beliefs or that supports alternative hypotheses is avoided. Furthermore, people tend to look 
for specific information that corroborate their hypotheses is a specific way, as the person is 
guided by an assumption that he/she holds to be true (ibid.)  
▪ Present bias is a human tendency to assign more weight to the payoffs that are closer to the 
present time (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). People tend to focus more on short-term costs, 
which goes at the detriment of possible long-term benefits (ibid.). 
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▪ Inertia is a human tendency wherein people prefer to comply to the current norm to maintain 
a standard behaviour or a stable state, instead of searching for a different path of action (see 
Kahneman, 2011). Psychologically, inertia exists because actively choosing is effortful, and 
can also lead to cognitive dissonance (Voyer, 2015). 
▪ The concept of hyperbolic discounting illustrates the functioning of choice over time: 
humans tend to devalue future rewards, and to prefer immediate rewards (Frederick et al., 
2002). In other words, people rationally prefer sooner, smaller rewards, rather than waiting 
for larger but distant rewards. This is due to the fact that projecting abstract, future outcomes 
is more difficult for our mind, that portrays these outcomes as less concrete (Voyer, 2015). 
The outcomes of many choices develop in the future, and this affects decision-making. 
Uncertainty about the future leads to myopic behaviours that favour early outcomes or lead to 
immediate temptations (Johnson et al., 2012). 
▪ Also related to the issue of choice over time, excess of optimism is a cognitive error that leads 
people to be overly optimistic, irrationally discounting actual probabilities (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008; Kahneman, 2011). As Kahneman (2011) points out, optimism is a highly-
valued, socially approved quality. But if optimism is normal, an attitude of irrational 
overconfidence, such as the idea of being personally immune to a certain danger, can lead 
people not to take preventive measures, as in the case when smokers underestimate their risks 
of failing ill. This phenomenon also explains why lotteries are so popular, or why 90 per cent 
of drivers believe they drive better than most of the people (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
Individuals may also be overly optimistic in relation to the future, overestimating how much 
they will accomplish, the amount of time and money, with negative implications for 
investments and financial decisions (e.g. mortgages and savings). 
▪ Loss aversion is a deep-seated phenomenon in human brains, wherein potential losses are 
perceived to be larger than gains (Kahneman et al., 1991). As Kahneman (2011) elucidates, 
this asymmetry has evolutionary roots, that is, organisms that focus on threats with more 
urgency, instead on focusing more on opportunities, have more chances to survive and 
reproduce. This has generated a reluctance to accept risks and an actual ‘loss aversion’. Loss-
aversion contributes in generating inertia, in the form of a strong attachment to what a person 
possesses (ibid.). Loss aversion acts as a force that leads people not to change, even when the 
changes are in the person’s best interest (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
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▪ Individuals are also subject to framing effects: “the large changes of preferences that are 
sometimes caused by inconsequential variations in the wording of a choice problem” 
(Kahneman, 2011: p.218). This bias in decision-making occurs when the format in which an 
option is presented, unreasonably influences subsequent choice or preference. Kahneman 
(2011) refers to this phenomenon as a perceptual illusion, and evidence showed that it can 
affect not only decisions, but also the way a person experiences an object. Unfortunately, since 
framing effects are automatic outputs of System 1 operation, they cannot be avoided, even by 
expertise.  Framing is an automatic System 1 response, which is not eliminated, unless the 
person actively engages to create another frame and observe his/her contradiction 
(Morewedge and Kahneman, 2010). In an experiment by McNeal et al. (1982) the researchers 
exposed a group of students, of patients, and of expert physicians to two frames: the outcome 
of a surgery operation was formulated in terms of a 10% mortality chance vs. a 90% survival 
chance. The researchers found that the different wording elicited different preferences even 
among physicians, who despite their expertise, could not resist the framing effect.  
▪ According to the status quo distortion, humans tend to prefer to maintain their current state, 
even if a change of circumstances could provide a superior condition (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser, 1988). One reason behind this phenomenon is the lack of attention, people 
heuristically consider that switching option would be irrelevant. In the same way of loss 
aversion, this phenomenon causes inertia (ibid.).  
▪ Sunk cost fallacy is the tendency to continue a behaviour or an endeavour as a result of 
previously invested resources (Arkes and Blumer, 1985). When a certain decision or 
commitment has been taken, people become reluctant to quit it because of the effort, the time, 
or the money they have invested in it. For instance, it may happen at the restaurant that we 
order too much food, still we feel the duty to finish our meal ending up with overeating, just 
because we invested our money and we feel we need to ‘get it worth’.  
▪ Finally, the primacy effect is a cognitive error that leads people to reach a conclusion based 
on the first information they acquire (Nickerson, 1998). This information acquired early in a 
process, is integrated in memory over time, and tends to have more weight that the information 
one acquires later. It seems that the common notion that ‘the first impression is what matters’ 
may have some truth. In fact, subsequent judgments often result to be partial to the opinions 
that the person formed early in a process of evaluation (ibid.) This effect occurs also in other 
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domains, as primacy and recency effects, are also called ‘serial position effect’ (Murdock, 
1962; Glanzer and Cunitz, 1966), referring to a phenomenon in which the first and the last 
words of a list are easier to recall. 
 
But cognitive errors and biases can also result from influences in the context: 
 
▪ Choice overload refers to the presence of an excessive number of possibilities or varieties of 
choices, that hinder the person’s ability to decide (Schwartz, 2004). While freedom of choice 
is essential for well-being, the presence of too many available paths is not necessarily positive, 
and can generate feelings of stress and of being overwhelmed (ibid.). 
▪ In the same way, too many sources of available information in the environment, can generate 
a situation of information overload. Hence, to avoid the negative effects of being overloaded, 
such as time-consuming decisions, individuals are selective on the type and amount of 
information they access (Jacoby, 1984). An additional force that shape human actions comes 
from the fact of witnessing others’ people actions.  
▪ Social influence is particularly powerful and pervasive. Growing research evidence 
demonstrates that witnessing the actions of others has a powerful effect on behavior, 
influencing individual actions and choices (see Lapinsky and Rimal, 2005; Aarts and 
Dijksterhuis, 2003; Dolan et al., 2010). Particularly, two typologies of social norms have been 
identified (Schultz et al., 2007). Descriptive norms evidence ‘how to act’, that is are the 
standard behavioural guidelines of appropriateness from which people do not want to deviate. 
Injunctive norms instead, evidence what is socially approved or disapproved, in specific 
situations or in a specific culture (ibid.). Furthermore, in line with the research on unconscious 
influences, several studies found that even in situations in which subjects are aware of the 
stimuli, these are not identified as a causal source of behaviour (Nolan et al., 2008). Hence, 
people are deeply influenced by the behavior of others, and are often not aware of this. 
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2.2 Choice Architecture for irrational humans 
 
In the research of economists Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, the difference posited by 
Kahneman and Tversky, amid the normative theory (objective) and the descriptive theory 
(subjective) continues. In the 2008 book “Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness”, Thaler and Sunstein introduced the idea of choice architecture and nudging, drawing 
on the previous findings in behavioural economics. According to Thaler and Sunstein “A choice 
architect has the responsibility for organising the context in which people make decisions” (2008: 
p.3). Choice architecture is the act of designing the social environment to influence people’s 
decisions through the use of nudges that stimulate the desired action or choice (Sunstein, 2013). 
As an architect designs the structure of a house, choice architects design situations that orientate 
people to specific behaviours. This also implies that many actors can unknowingly be choice 
architects, from the managers of a restaurant arranging the buffet, to the doctors presenting the 
available cures to patients, as well as policy makers that present choices to citizens (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008). People interact and act inside different contexts, and these actions can be studied. 
Choice architecture entails the observation of how people act in a specific setting, thereby 
structuring interventions that have an effect on the environment, or on people’s perception, to 
guide their behaviour. System 1 in particular (see Kahneman, 2011), is very influenced by the 
features of choice architecture. However, behavioural interventions do not exclusively concentrate 
on system 1, but do take into account the fact that human actions and choices are often the outcome 
of the workings of both systems (Perry et al., 2015).  
Because of an inherent cognitive laziness, individuals are prisoners of the architecture, of the frame 
they are facing. In front of a choice architecture, namely the peculiar formulation of a context of 
choice, people accept it as it is displayed, without spontaneously seeking for alternatives (Thaler 
and Sunstein, 2008; Sunstein 2014). Rather, we try to solve the specific problem as it is presented 
to us. Furthermore, rather than considering all the aspects of a problem, we tend to isolate it and 
to focus the whole attention on it. Hence, before and after a certain choice, humans do not consider 
all the pros and cons, and do not reconstruct the different potential outcomes; instead, in a myopic 
way, we only evaluate the decisions and actions that have an immediate effect on the present 
situation. Thus, nudges are useful in all those situations in which the most intuitive, emotive, 
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automatic responses of people prevail, leading them to behave or choose in ways they wouldn’t 
have if they were thinking rationally. 
 
2.2.1. A gentle ‘nudge’ 
 
Thaler and Sunstein originally defined a nudge as any aspect “that alters people’s behaviour in a 
predictable way, without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives’’ (2008, p. 6). However, Hausman and Welch (2010: p26) noted that the definition 
should be more encompassing, to move beyond the focus on economic incentives: 
 
“Nudges are ways of influencing choice without limiting the choice set or making alternatives 
appreciably costlier in terms of time, trouble, social sanctions, and so forth. […] They are called 
for because of flaws in individual decision-making, and work by making use of those flaws”. 
 
Nudges are modifications in a decision-making environment that function by means of cognitive 
biases; nudges prompt behaviours, beneath the level of our awareness, in order to orientate us 
toward the best decisions for ourselves and our society (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). The core 
objective of a nudge is to “make life simpler, safer, or easier for people to navigate” (Sunstein, 
2014: p.2), as nudges are intended to facilitate people in everyday life, and to reduce struggling in 
complex tasks (e.g. disclosure of financial or health-related information; the simplification of the 
procedure to enrol in a college).  
There is a generally shared belief that people, to safeguard their well-being in the long-run, are 
capable to make the best decisions for themselves. According to this assumption, the government 
for instance should intervene at no time to direct individual choices. However, the issue arises in 
contexts where different options are presented (that is, most of everyday real-life situations) and 
the individual cannot always choose the one that best suits his/her goals. This may depend on the 
complexity of the available alternatives; from an excessive availability and range of choices; or 
because the person has no information or knowledge and is therefore incapable to take the optimal 
decision. In such cases, choice architects can intervene to guide people towards the most 
appropriate. The purpose of a choice architect is to understand people’s decision-making process, 
and to understand how to use the systematic distortions that arise in human decision-making to 
implement measures aimed at assisting the person in daily choices. For instance, communication 
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campaigns and messages related to public health should be more ‘actionable’, by offering specific, 
simple information about how to translate the message in action, putting people in the best 
conditions to act (Sunstein, 2014a). The term ‘actionable’ signals the immense relevance of 
offering to people a clear and concise idea about the path of an action.  
Fundamentally, Thaler and Sunstein define “good nudges” those interventions developed to 
influence a behaviour, that act in harmony with the interests of the final recipient that is being 
nudged (Hansen and Jespersen, 2015). The following list illustrates the most important and 
common nudges employed by choice architects, based on two key elements that affect human 
decisions: biases in decision-making, and contextual influences. 
 
1. Default rules have a relevant influence on behaviour, and are present across different settings, 
whether explicitly or implicitly. The default setting determines how a person initially encounters 
a service, a policy, a choice (e.g. Johnson and Godstein, 2003). Configuring a default rules entails 
the identification and establishment of the standard, ideal option; the person remains free to choose 
otherwise, but this would require an active choice. The power of default rules is based on the fact 
that humans naturally tend to conform to the current option (inertia), rather than actively searching 
for an alternative (Keller et al., 2011). Sunstein (2014a) illustrated three main reasons that explain 
why such automatisms are effective. First, on consideration of the power of inertia and 
procrastination, as previously introduced, people often choose to maintain their status quo. 
Secondly, People implicitly endorse the rules, on the belief that it was created by experts with 
valid reasons, thus they believe it is not the case to depart from the norm. Finally, an automatic 
option establishes a point of reference for a decision, in the same way that the mechanism of 
anchoring works. Defaults are applicable to an extensive audience in their capacity to guide choice, 
while conserving freedom of choice, and are often considered to most prototypical tool of 
libertarian paternalism (Johnson et al., 2012). 
2. Implementation intentions are verbal prompts (e.g. “do you plan to…?) expressed in the 
direction of a desired behaviour, introduced by psychologist Peter Gollwitzer (1999). In fact, 
eliciting people’s intentions makes them more prone to activate a certain behaviour. This is a 
simple strategy that does not guarantee behaviour change, rather it supports the motivation to act, 
by eliciting an intention in the individual’s mind. Furthermore, people are often automatically 
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guided by the environment, in these cases control on actions and thoughts may be lessened, and a 
simple question can guide the person by reminding an optimal option. 
3. Framing is a strategy to present an information, or an object, in way that highlights the feature 
that the choice architect wants to be relevant (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In fact, the different 
ways in which an information is presented, can generate different effects on perception (e.g. 
McNeil et al., 1982; O’Connor, 1988). For instance, labelling a product as “75 % fat free” may be 
a better framing than a label stating “25 % fat”. Framing is effective because of our tendency to 
take decisions in an oblivious and passive manner because system 2 does not evaluate the effects 
and implications of the formulation of a certain message (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).  
4. Simplification is the tool to render programs, procedures and regulations more people-friendly, 
that is more intuitive, easier to navigate (Sunstein, 2014b). Unnecessary complexities often 
decrease the rate of participation because they create confusion to the user, and removing these 
obstacles hold a great potential (ibid.). 
5. Social norms, as previously mentioned, are implicit rules that prescribe behaviour in certain 
place, situation or circumstance. The influence that the group exerts on the individual is a decisive 
factor in understanding its beliefs and actions (Lapinsky and Rimal, 2005). To provide effective 
incentives to individuals, it is therefore important to study how society affects behaviour, as human 
beings tend to conform to others and adopt socially acceptable behaviours to feel part of a group 
to conform. People often ignore the most rational or correct choices, because of the information 
they receive from others, by the pressure received by peers, or by the desire to avoid social 
disapproval (see Asch, 1995). What is most striking, is that this process is often unconscious, as 
individuals ignore the fact that they are complying to a norm. People interiorise a norm and 
continue to adhere to it, sticking to a consolidated scheme (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). These 
mechanisms reveal that humans are influenced by other humans. Hence, social norms can be 
identified and included in an environment (e.g. in the form of posters, or by changing contextual 
elements) to inform people about others’ behaviour, thus changing behaviour by virtue of the 
human natural desire to conform (Samson, 2015). 
6. Disclosure refers to the release of information regarding relevant data or costs, typically by 
markets and the government (Sunstein, 2014b). These interventions are a form of nudge in that 
information is made more accessible and simple, with the aim to contrast phenomena of 
inattention, negligence, or incompetence (ibid.). 
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7. Reminders, in the form of letters, text-messages or e-mails, can be useful to counteract a variety 
of behaviour such as inertia and procrastination, or simply the everyday life complexities that lead 
to forgetfulness (see Altmann and Traxler, 2014; Sunstein, 2014b). 
8. Pre-commitments are strategies in which people impose a limit or a commitment to their future 
behaviour, by pledging to a certain action (see Hanks et al., 2013a; Schwartz et al., 2014). This 
strategy contrasts procrastination and is useful to support people to explicitly commit to an action 
in advance, which increase their chances to actually follow that behaviour (ibid.).  
9. Priming, as discussed in chapter 1, is an implicit memory effect that occurs when the exposure 
to a stimulus influences a person’s response (see Bargh et al., 1996; Kay et al., 2004; Holland et 
al., 2005; Bargh, 2006; Bateson et al., 2006; Vohs et al., 2006). This non-conscious effect works 
by associative activation: this mechanism entails that when a person is exposed to a specific 
concept or object (e.g. a cake), this automatically activates in the mind associated ideas (e.g. 
hunger or the idea of eating). Hence, priming - the non-conscious activation of a concept in a 
person’s mind - is powerful because it influences subsequent thinking and can trigger automatic 
processes (Bargh, 2006). A schema is a mental framework employed to categorize and understand 
the features in our world; schemes are automatically activated when we need to make a judgment 
(Bargh et al., 1996). Priming occurs when a past or present experience with a stimulus activates a 
schema making it highly accessible in the mind (ibid.). The tangible effect of priming occurs when 
the activated mental concept influences our judgments and behaviours. If carefully employed for 
virtuous purposes, choice architectures can use priming as a tool to gently activate a concept in 
people’s mind to guide successive behaviour (Walsh and Kiviniemi, 2014). It is important to note 
that, priming is not effective, unless (1) the person is actually experiencing a gap between the 
actual feeling and the primed object, and (2) the goal is something the persons feels positively 
towards (Aarts et al., 2008).  
10. Salience is a cognitive process related to priming. This mechanism increases the accessibility 
of a mental concept, which is caused by an increase in the perceived significance (i.e. salience) of 
an object (Kahneman, 2011). Therefore, perceptual salience is a nudge aimed to make specific 
features more easily recognisable. Within a complex environment, many stimuli and features can 
go unnoticed. Human attention automatically focuses on what is most relevant and designing the 
environment in order to highlight certain elements can guide people’s behaviour (ibid.). Further 
analysis of the mechanism of salience in available at paragraph 3.2.1. 
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11. Incentives. Concrete financial restrictions or penalties cannot be considered nudges, because 
they do not preserve freedom of choice. However, small economic incentives (e.g. in the form of 
a lottery) may be useful to support and encourage a specific behaviour (Ly et al. 2013; Sunstein, 
2014b). More generally, choice architecture can spur the individual to focus on an incentive, 
highlighting the benefit that follows an action or behaviour (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
12. Feedback is extremely important to assist people to correctly carry out, or to improve a certain 
behaviour. Feedback as a nudge, takes the form of a variety of systems that inform people about 
whether they are acting correctly or not, whether there is a problem, or informing on the nature 
and implications of past and future choices (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Sunstein, 2014b). Long-
term processes in particular, are more difficult to identify (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). For 
instance, a person may eat food with a high sugar content every day, before getting diabetes. In 
such cases, individuals can largely benefit from feedback. 
13. Technology tools can also be employed to support decision tasks (Johnson et al., 2012). 
Nowadays, the expanding use of information and communication technology provides an 
opportunity for the formation of new interactive tools to assist choice tasks, such as mobile 
applications (Johnson et al, 2012), to steer the individual towards the most desirable behaviour.  
As the previous list displays, nudges come in a wide range of forms, and are related to specific 
behavioural problems that occur in a specific context. To clarify the domain of action of nudges, 
Codagnone et al. (2014) developed a scheme to classify nudging strategies by distinguishing two 
dimensions: 'automatic processing vs. reflective processing' (i.e. System 1 and System 2) and 'hot 
affect vs. cold affect' (Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9. Classification of nudging strategies (in Codagnone et al., 2014). 
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First, a nudge intervention may aim to interrupt a person’s automatic or impulsive behaviour and 
to redirect the person towards a state of more reflective processing. For instance, this may be the 
case of a gambler intensively absorbed in its gambling activity. Secondly, the automatic vs. cold 
quadrant indicate nudging strategies aimed at disrupting a person’s routine, habitual behaviour, as 
in the case of default options. Thirdly, the intersection of hot affect and the reflective system 
represent those debiasing strategies based on System 2 that tackle motivation. Finally, the 
reflective-cold quadrant of the model represents the interventions that are not normally connected 
to nudging. This quadrant concerns those strategies that hit System 1 with strong emotions, with 
the aim of activating System 2 and elicit the necessary motivation for behaviour change. According 
to the authors, the model could be further improved by introducing a social vs. individual 
dimension, that is the distinction between nudges delivered in a social environment or in isolation.   
The previous discussion clearly shows that nudges have different forms, can be applied in a wide 
range of circumstances, can be employed for several purposes, and may focus on single responses 
or have more long-term effects. However, because of this variability, many authors argued that the 
definition of nudge is vague and possibly confusing, and that Thaler and Suntein’s theory lacks a 
definite, clear classification and description of nudges (see Van der Heiden and Kosters, 2015). 
What counts as a nudge has not specific, standard, defined features. Instead, nudges are perhaps 
infinite, context-specific, and subject to the creativity of the choice architects. The lack of 
homogeneity in Thaler and Sunstein’s work attracted some criticism (e.g. Hausman and Welch, 
2010; Selinger and Whyte, 2011) especially in relation to some ethical aspects that will be 
discussed more in depth in section 2.3.5. 
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2.3. Choice architecture: a new tool for health policy  
 
Equipping policy-makers with robust evidence on human cognitive and behavioural tendencies 
can improve the outcomes of policy interventions. Bearing in mind the patterns that characterise 
human natural actions, supports the design of a wide range of public policies directed to change 
behaviour in a variety of domains. This is especially relevant in the spheres related to everyday 
behaviours, such as nutrition. Interventions that stem from choice architecture employ tools that 
can revise and transform the environmental cues that automatically trigger behavioural responses, 
towards the optimal direction. 
 
2.3.1 Nudging: Libertarian Paternalism in policy-making  
 
The nudge philosophy is a revolutionary theory that is having relevant consequences for the 
definition of public policies, from fiscal plans to welfare state, environmental policies, health 
policies, educational policies, and more. Using the knowledge of the mechanisms of how people 
actually make their decisions, it is possible to put people in the optimal conditions in order to act 
in the way that is most advantageous for them. This is achieved by carefully designing the contexts 
of choice in which citizens act, in a way that is best for themselves and the society. This approach 
has been named ‘libertarian paternalism’. Seemingly an oxymoron, paternalism refers to the 
task of influencing decisions that can make our lives longer, healthier and happier, for which 
legitimacy is implicitly assumed by Thaler and Sunstein, (2008); while libertarian refers to the fact 
that while people are guided towards the performance of the optimal behaviour, maintaining their 
freedom to choose differently, that is to ‘opt out’. Furthermore, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) 
maintain that choice architects aim to ‘influence choices in a way that will make choosers better 
off, as judged by themselves’ (2008, pp. 5–6, my italic). Nudging is designed to foster the ability 
of people to behave in the way they prefer (or in a way that they do not disagree with), overcoming 
temptations or biases that affect daily decision-making. Nudges concern decisions that would be 
irrational to reject, such as healthier living, more information disclosure, or guidance in case of 
complex decisions. The purpose of a nudge is to reflect authentically the desire and preferences of 
individuals, liberating them from the influences of biases, increasing autonomy and self-
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empowerment (see Mills, 2013). This feature of working according to people’s preferences, is 
what distinguish nudging from other paternalistic interventions such as regulations. 
Nudges are more properly featured as a kind of ‘soft-paternalism’ (Sunstein, 2014a). According 
to Thaler and Sunstein (2003), paternalism does not necessarily involve coercion, as initiatives can 
be selected with the aim of improving a certain life condition or environmental feature for the well-
being of the recipients of a policy, by maintaining freedom of choice. This approach promotes 
paternalist interventions that are legitimated by their end of promoting welfare, and by the absence 
of any form of coercion. Indeed, Thaler and Sunstein recognise that when public or private actors 
deliberately attempt to alter choices to steer people in a certain direction, there is a certain degree 
of paternalism. However, nudging is regarded as a weak and non-invasive form of paternalism 
since individual choices are not hindered nor significantly burdened. Thus, the fathers of nudging 
conclude that libertarian paternalism “should be acceptable to even the most ardent libertarian” 
(2003: p. 175). 
Importantly, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) highlight the fact that the presence of some kind of choice 
architecture is unavoidable. There are so many stimuli in the environment that influence our 
choices that we cannot even recognise them all, and we are at all times ‘pushed’ but subtle 
contextual cues. Take the layout of a tablet, or any software that we download: they come with 
default features. In the same way, a department store or a supermarket predispose their products 
to encourage certain choices. The government also establish rules that inevitably define an upper 
architecture within which we live, and which influences our choices. Thus, while it is not possible 
to eliminate from our existence external influences or environmental cues, these can be altered by 
choice architects to make them more functional for our well-being. Finally, transparency is a core 
requirement of nudges: any action taken to steer people in a specific direction (e.g using a default 
rule or shaping the architecture of healthy food options) should not be covert (Sunstein, 2014a). 
Nudges must entail openness of intent, in opposition to manipulation in the sense of ‘trickery’. 
Choice architecture must be open to public scrutiny, this is especially important in the case of 
public policies, in order to prevent intrusive or harmful manipulation. Importantly, when the goal 
of a nudge is legitimate, it is less likely to have negative ethical implications.  
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2.3.2. Governments around the world are nudging  
 
“There has been the assumption that central government can only change people’s 
behaviour through rules and regulations. Our government will be a much smarter one, 
shunning the bureaucratic levers of the past and finding intelligent ways to encourage, 
support and enable people to make better choices for themselves” (Coalition 
Commitment, 2010). 
 
According to Marteau et al. (2011: p. 228) “[…] the appeal of nudging [for government] is self-
evident: it proposes a set of seemingly simple, low cost solutions that do not require legislation 
and can be applied to a wide array of problems arising from our behaviour”. Furthermore, “the 
absence of legislation holds particular appeal for governments and others wanting a smaller role 
for the state in shaping the behaviour of its citizens” (ibid.). Chetty (2015) examined three reasons 
why the application of behavioural economics (BE) can be a valuable contribution for the 
improvement of public policy. In the first place, BE and nudge theory offer innovative tools to 
influence behaviour increasing the set of potential outcomes to be attained through policies. 
Secondly, findings in BE can inform the development of the policies by virtue of the new evidence 
about phenomena such as loss aversion, inertia, and default effects. Finally, novel welfare 
implications can be generated from the studies on behavioural biases, which can produce 
discrepancies in the perception of welfare amid the policy maker’s perspective, and the perspective 
of the citizen.  
The use of nudges is becoming an international phenomenon, this strategy has been implemented 
worldwide by governments in the United States, in the United Kingdom, in Denmark, France, 
Germany, and many other countries. In 2010, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD, 2010) issued a report that recommends numerous initiatives inspired from 
the results in behavioural economics. Nudging is promising since it supports and promotes a wide 
range of objectives. Institutions and governmental agencies can do a lot to render policies simpler, 
to conform their interventions to meet what is most intuitive and automatic for people. 
Cass Sunstein served as Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs at the 
White House, from 2009 to 2012, during the Obama administration. OIRA is in charge of the 
supervision and implementation of governmental policies, and of the evaluation of draft 
regulations. The range of regulations varies widely, from the field of air quality, financial stability, 
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agriculture, energy, immigration, health care, and more. During Sunstein’s three-year mandate, 
several new regulations have been introduced, and many nudges have been employed as regulatory 
tool. For instance, the Green Button is a link that gives access to families to personal data related 
to energy consumption: users receive detailed information on prices and consumption allowing 
them to save money, and this intervention generated a reduction between 8-22 per cent in energy 
consumption levels (Sunstein, 2014a). A second application concerns smoking, which is the first 
cause of death in the US. To contrast the issue, price incentives have a marginal impact. Thus, the 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act is a 2009 law that imposed new and more dramatic 
warnings on cigarette packages. Enlarged and simplified shocking images were selected to directly 
stimulate a reaction of system one. These warnings are based on the nudge salience, and do not 
impede people to buy cigarettes, preserving freedom of choice (ibid.). Richard Thaler has also 
supported former First Lady Michelle Obama in her nudge campaign for childhood obesity.  
After Cass Sunstein’s mandate, governmental agencies continue to be advised to apply BE 
principles to improve policy outcomes, also for its low operational costs (Ly and Soman, 2013). 
In 2014, the Obama administration established the Social and Behavioral Sciences Team (SBST), 
an agency in charge of applying behavioural science insights in federal programs (White House, 
2016). The USDA created the Cornell Center for Behavioral Economics in Child Nutrition 
Program, to lead and disseminate behavioural economics research for child nutrition (Guthrie, 
2010); while the Federal Trade Commission employs BE for policy analysis, and the Department 
of Energy is trying to establish its behavioural science team. In 2015, Barack Obama concluded: 
“Adopting the insights of behavioural science will help bring our government into the 21st century 
in a wide range of ways - from delivering services more efficiently and effectively; to accelerating 
the transition to a clean energy economy; to helping workers find better jobs, gain access to 
educational opportunity, and lead longer, healthier lives" (The White House, 2015). 
The nudge theory seduced not only former President Obama, but also ex-Prime Minister David 
Cameron who supported the creation of a nudge unit in the UK Cabinet office. The Behavioural 
Insights Team (BIT) is a social purpose company partially owned by the government, in charge of 
the design of policies informed by behavioural economics. The team employed these findings to 
promote innovative important initiatives in the field of smoking, organ donation, energy 
efficiency, taxes, and more. Beyond the realisation of interventions based on scientific data, the 
team also publishes reports on its website, that are created in an accessible language, in order to 
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be understood by both experts and the public. The BIT follows the approach ‘test, learn, adapt’ 
and the behavioural hypotheses have been synthesized in the acronym MINDSPACE (see Table 
3) a non-comprehensive checklist that captures the main influences on human behaviour (Dolan 
et al., 2010). The tests occur through randomised controlled trials to compare the outcomes of a 
strategy with the control group that did not receive the treatment, or to compare several methods 
(see BIT, 2012). Furthermore, to complement MINDSPACE, the BIT developed the EAST 
framework, which focuses on the practical application of behavioural economics principles by 
identifying four core principles: Easy, Simple, Attractive and Timely (BIT, 2014).  
In France, the BVA group, one of the major market research and consultancy institutes worldwide, 
launched a nudge unit, with the aim to reinforce the efficiency of public policies. Particularly, the 
unit informed a successful governmental intervention to encourage taxpayers to adopt the digital 
service (BVA, 2016). Before the intervention, 70 per cent of French taxpayers employed the paper 
form, whose costs are 40 times higher. To accelerate the adoption of the online declaration form, 
the unit applied and tested some nudges to the email communication directed to taxpayers (reward, 
incentives, social norm, salience). Hence, a randomized controlled trial on 2,5 taxpayers allowed 
the team to identify the best intervention to be implemented in the 2015 campaign. The results 
were a 1.1 million online tax returns compared to the previous year. The team successfully 
implemented other nudges to reduce the use of the mobile phone while driving, to increase to 
consumption of generic medicines, the improve the well-being of civil servants, and to increase 
the turnout rate for the mayor election. 
Finally, in Denmark, while there is not an official unit, several governmental departments are 
affiliated to the Danish Nudging Network, which connects researchers, policy-makers and other 
experts for the application of BE in public policy. The European Union has employed BE 
principles to inform some consumer policies; New Zealand use it for a voluntary savings plan, 
while Singapore used it to develop its Lifelong Income for the Elderly Plan (see appendices in Ly 
and Soman, 2013). The growing role assigned to behavioural economics science in public policy 
led the publication of the Mind, Society, and Behavior report issued by the World Bank in 2015. 
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MINDSPACE - Summary of the main influences 
Messenger  We are heavily influenced by who communicates information  
Incentives  Our responses to incentives are shaped by predictable mental 
shortcuts such as strongly avoiding losses  
Norms  We are strongly influenced by what others do  
Defaults  We ‘go with the flow’ of pre-set options  
Salience  Our attention is drawn to what is novel and seems relevant 
to us  
Priming  Our acts are often influenced by subconscious cues  
Affect  Our emotional associations can powerfully shape our actions  
Commitment  We seek to be consistent with our public promises, and 
reciprocate acts  
Ego  We act in ways that make us feel better about ourselves  
Table 3. Summary of the main influences described in the MINDSPACE acronym (Dolan et al., 2010) 
 
2.3.4. Application of nudges in the health sector 
 
First, the aim of the following review is to illustrate some applications of the nudge approach 
across diverse settings in the health sector. There is increasing agreement in academic and 
institutional literature that to foster innovation in the domain of health care, interventions should 
be informed by findings in behavioural economics. Evidence suggests a high potential for the use 
of nudge interventions in this sector, as the application of a variety of experiments proved to be 
successful. However, the variety of nudge-type interventions imply a high variability in terms of 
outcome, quality, and actual behaviour change (Prepp et al., 2015). According to Voyer (2015), 
findings in this discipline offer a prime tool to be applied in healthcare management, particularly 
to address two issues: the issue that conventional messages based on persuasion have a limited 
effect; and the issue of the rising costs of expenditure in the healthcare sector and the mounting 
pressure to reform.  
The Behavioural Insights Team, among its operations, employs the principles of behavioural 
economics to identify novel and cost-effective interventions in this domain. In collaboration with 
the Department of Health and the Government Digital Service, the team set out a randomised 
controlled trial to increase organ donation, using the nudge of reciprocity (BIT, 2014). Reciprocity 
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is a form of social norm that entails interactions between people, in other words, to respond to a 
person’s action with another action (Samson, 2015). For one month, in the online page for the 
payment renewal of the car tax, people were asked whether they wanted to join the organ donor 
register. A number of eight different messages were selected to encourage signing up, and one 
million people visited the website during that month. The most successful message resulted to be 
the one that draws on reciprocity: ‘If you needed an organ transplant, would you have one? If so, 
please help others’ (i.e. column ‘Would you?’ in Figure 10). It has been estimated that 100.000 
new registrations would take place per year with this message. Interestingly, the message based 
on a social norm, did not perform well (column ‘People’ in Figure 10).  
 
 
Figure 10. Reciprocity nudge to increase organ donation (in BIT, 2014: p. 33). 
 
The BIT (2011) reports an initiative developed out of a collaboration between Nintendo DS and 
Bayer Healthcare. In the UK, about 3000 diabetic children are hospitalised each year following 
difficulties in the regular management of their blood sugar levels, which can be challenging for 
both children and their parents (ibid.). The two companies jointly developed a device (i.e. a 
technology tool) that assigns points to diabetic children when they regularly make their pin-prick 
blood-sugar test. The points can be used on Nintendo games and children can compare their 
performance, making the use of the device more fun and rewarding. When taking a blood test for 
diabetes, the short-term pain is juxtaposed to a long-term gain. The idea here to reduce the 
discomfort is to create an immediate gain (salience), so the pain is reduced by distracting the 
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attention from the test. Also, because the game continues after the test, the pain appears smaller in 
the memory. The nudge is the game, and the pain is discounted. 
Volpp et al. (2008) thought about a lottery, as a financial incentive to nudge people to lose weight. 
This nudge is based on people’s tendency to overestimate small probabilities of winning and the 
strength of regret. Behavioural economics illustrated the patterns of self-destructive behaviour, 
such as valuing more immediate benefits and discounting delayed benefits, such as being in good 
health. These decision errors are the base of this experiment applied to obesity. In the study, the 
participants checked their weight every day, and if the weight loss objective was reached, they 
participated to a lottery in which they had 20 per cent chances of winning 10 dollars, and 1 per 
cent chances of winning 100 dollars. The subjects that did not reach the weight loss objective, also 
participated to the lottery, but without the chance to obtain their possible reward. These patients 
could only regret of not putting enough effort towards their weight loss target. The results appear 
to be highly effective as the patients who took part to the lottery lost 6 kilos in four months, 
compared to 1 ½ kilos of the control group.  
Not only patients, physicians as well can benefit of choice architecture. A simple checklist is a 
method that proved to be effective. This entails the creation of a control list of the stages of a 
specific practice. Many complications in surgery arise because of human errors that can be easily 
avoided. The World Health Organisation published in 2009 a report on the efficiency and the 
importance of having a checklist for a higher safety in the operating room. It contains nineteen 
points, to be followed at each surgery, that systemically nudge the unit of doctors and nurses to 
prevent errors that can be fatal to patients. In the report, the WHO show evidence of several studies 
that succeeded in the decrease of surgical complications using the checklist, as in the reduction of 
in-hospital mortality, and in the reduction of overall complications. Haynes et al. (2009) examined 
the use of checklists in eight hospitals, located in eight different cities. The research revealed that 
following the introduction of the checklists, the rate of patient decease after surgery fell from 1.6% 
to 0.8%, while complications also fell from 11% to 7%.  
Arriaga et al. (2013) conducted an experiment involving 17 operating-room teams, that performed 
in 106 simulations of a surgical crisis. The team were randomly assigned to a condition, involving 
the use or not of a checklist describing the critical processes of care to follow. All teams with the 
checklist available performed better, and the missed steps dropped from 23% to 6% (see Figure 
11).  
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Using implementation intentions, a study demonstrated that for the employees of a company that 
received a specific prompt to an influenza vaccination, the vaccination rate was 4,2 higher 
compared to the control group (Milkman et al, 2015). This low-cost intervention consisted in a 
simple prompt to write down date and time of the appointment and was added to a reminder 
mailing. The 4,2 result suggests that concrete plans play a relevant role in intention to act.  
In the area of prevention, to reduce the mortality of breast cancer, mammography screening is the 
most effective available mechanism. To spur women in undergoing a mammography screening, 
Banks et al. (1995) tested the effectiveness of framing a message in negative or positive terms. 
The study illustrates that a negative frame that outlines the risks of not obtaining a mammography 
is more effective that a positive frame that highlights the benefits. Consistently with prospect 
theory, the results show that loss-frame messages can deliver higher compliance rates, in respect 
to messages that illustrate the benefits of prevention. O’Connor (1988) investigated the influence 
of probability framings on the preferences for cancer treatment options, which displayed different 
levels of survival probability. 154 cancer patients and 129 healthy volunteers designated their 
preferences for a toxic or non-toxic therapy at varying trade-offs between quantity and quality of 
life. The subjects were randomly assigned to 3 therapies: (1) a positive frame highlighting the 
probability of survival; (2) a negative frame highlighting the chances of decease; and (3) a mixed 
frame where probability of survival and decease were both displayed.  Probability framing effects 
were relevant for both of the groups. When the chances to survive were below 50 per cent, 
preferences for the toxic treatment decreased, and this was particularly evident in the negative 
frame. Furthermore, in a negative frame with 0,5 of survival probability, quality of life becomes 
Figure 11. Checklist effectiveness. Arriaga et al., 2013. 
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more salient that quantity. In a related study conducted previously, McNeil et al. (1982) had found 
that telling patients that there is a 90 per cent chance of being alive after five years from a specific 
operation, people are more likely to undergo surgery, compared to when people are told that after 
five years, 10% of patients have passed away.  
Research suggests that also reminders can be effective, across a variety of settings (see Cheung 
et al., 2009), such as improving immunisation uptake; changing the behaviour of health care 
providers, or to reduce missed hospital appointments by patients (Gurol-Urganci et al., 2013). To 
reduce missed psychiatric appointments, Sims et al (2012) tested the use of reminders in the form 
of text messages, resulting in a reduction of 25–28%. The outcome is particularly relevant 
considering that the rate of non-attendance in this field is two to three times than in the other 
medical specialties. Hallsworth et al. (2015) not only investigated the impact of reminders, but the 
importance of the content, in the domain of attendance to hospital appointments. The researchers 
tested the control message (the one currently employed by the NHS) with three other reminder 
messages (specific costs, social norms, easy call), by randomly allocating them to the 
appointments. The message “specific costs” proved to be the most successful, with an absolute 
2.7% decrease in comparison to the control message. The authors estimated that with the adoption 
of the ‘specific costs’ reminder, replacing the ‘control’ message, the missed appointments per year 
in the NHS would drop to 5,800 less. 
Probably one of the most effective nudge, default options consist in the identification of a 
predetermined choice, in which action is necessary only if the person actively chooses an 
alternative (opt-out). The aim is to facilitate the process of choice, by steering it toward a specific 
option. This intervention lays on the understanding of inertia, a phenomenon in which people tend 
to maintain the status quo rather than actively act to change a situation, even in the cases where 
this may be convenient. An emblematic experiment has been carried out by Johnson and Goldstein 
(2004) that tested the power of default options in the field of organ donation. The experiment 
confronted the percentage of organ donators in the EU regions: the core difference among nations 
was that some states demanded the explicit consent to donate the organs, while other states 
required the explicit consent if the person did not want to donate. In other words, some states did 
not assume the consent to donate the organs (opt-in option), while others did (opt-out options). 
The researchers found that with the opt-out default rule, organ donation registered almost 100 per 
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cent of participation; on the contrary, in nations where people had to actively choose to participate 
in the program, participation reached a mere 30 per cent in the best cases (see Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12. Impact of default option for organ donation (in Johnson and Goldstein, 2003). 
In the US, Kling et al. (2012) tested the effectiveness of receiving personalised information for the 
Medicare Prescription Drug Plan, a governmental health insurance program for seniors (over 65). 
In this randomized experiment, the control group only received the link to the specific section of 
the Medicare website, while the treatment group received a personalised letter, widely presenting 
information. The intervention consisted in this small nudge, namely directly providing patients 
with the information through a letter, rather than leaving them searching for it. The results show a 
28 per cent plan switching in the treatment group, compared to 17 per cent of the control group. 
Moreover, the intervention reduced the predicted consumer cost of about $100 per person a year 
among letter recipients. 
Indeed, not all of the above case studies obtained striking results. Some nudges proved to be more 
effective than others, such as the use of checklists in surgery to reduce patient complications. As 
the BIT (2014) points out, for the future improvement in the application of BE principles, 
especially three issues should be addressed:  
▪ Replication of the interventions in different settings to assess the impacts; 
▪ Segmentation of the interventions on different populations to account for group 
differences, and tailoring of future interventions to increase performance; 
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▪ Complexity requires to progressively shift the focus from simpler behaviours (that are 
easier to measure) to develop more compound interventions.   
The fundamental goal is to conduct continuous experimentation to realistically assess the impact 
of nudge-based initiatives. This is especially relevant in the domain of health policy. Preferably, 
these tests require highly specialised teams, as testified by the establishment of many governmental 
units around the world. Fortunately, most nudge interventions involve very low costs and small 
modifications or additions to existing contexts or programs, rendering it easier to incorporate them 
and carry out the trials. 
 
2.3.5. Criticism to Libertarian Paternalism and Ethical Considerations 
The discipline of choice architecture does not come without issues or ethical considerations. Critics 
to nudging are particularly intense on whether it is compatible or incompatible with personal 
autonomy, and whether nudging is a manipulative approach. The general concept of personal 
autonomy is subject to a heated debate in moral and political thought, and its value, content, and 
role in politics are questioned. Personal autonomy refers to the individual ability for self-control 
and autonomous deliberation, and to freedom from coercion or manipulation (Mills, 2013). A clear 
and definite answer to these questions, is highly difficult since the umbrella of nudging is 
composed of a subset of different interventions that address different issues and behaviour-
changing initiatives. Thus, in the following pages, both the accounts of the ‘prosecutors’ and the 
arguments of the ‘defence’ will be illustrated, to conclude with an argument that calls for a more 
nuanced perspective. 
2.3.5.1. The prosecutors: accusations to Libertarian Paternalism and nudging  
 
Employing nudges as policy tools, has been criticised with the argument that libertarian 
paternalism is a contradictory notion that conceals an attempt to change people’s choices in a 
patronising manner. The main argument against the legitimacy of nudging is that it violates 
freedom of choice, as individuals are not able to exert their free will, guided by an upper 
architecture. Some critiques went as far as invoking Big Brother-like imageries and dystopian 
nightmares, advocating that the inherent scope of using nudges is to patronise individuals, who are 
conceived as senseless and unable to make good decisions for themselves:  
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“The use of public authority to change citizens’ behaviours, even if the altered behaviours are 
better for the citizens themselves, violates spheres of privacy, integrity, and autonomy...The 
state ought not to patronise people, by singling out a subset of the population and treating 
them as if they lacked the full use of reason” (Oliver and Brown, 2010, in Rainford, 2011: p.4). 
 
Luc Bovens (2009) argues that nudging may not be an appropriate policy tool instrument because 
it may lead to a society of ‘‘fragmented selves’’. Bovens (2009) stresses that a same behaviour 
might have different outcomes, if it is performed without external influence or under the influence 
of some sort of choice architecture. For instance, food selection may vary if a person is eating in a 
lunchroom that nudges vegetables, instead of a lunchroom where no optimal behaviour is nudged. 
Bovens acknowledge that the individual may adopt improved eating choices, however, in his view, 
this external guidance impairs the development of the moral character. If policy makers act as 
nannies taking responsibility by nudging people away from negative outcomes, he argues, citizens 
are not prompted to learn. In this scenario, people will not be personally responsible for their own 
welfare, and practical common sense would be lessened because the knowledge on appropriate 
behaviour would rely on the intervention of experts. In other words, habituation to nudging would 
entail the reduction of individual control. Thus, in a long-term perspective, nudges appear 
problematic as an issue of infantilization arise: the adoption of a morally lazy and immature 
behaviour lead to a lack of commitment in the maintenance of one’s willpower and self-control 
(ibid.). In such a scenario, Furedi (2011) see citizens as becoming prime targets for a technocratic 
regime, in which the government prefer problems to be solved through the design of experts (e.g. 
choice architects) rather than by responsible citizens. A technocratic culture entails the 
diminishment of phronesis (i.e. a form of wisdom in practical things, the ability to discern why 
and how to act virtuously) that would be outsourced to professionals, with a consequent decline in 
value of the public sphere by the “behaviour management industry” (ibid.).  
According to Fischer and Lots (2015) the criticism to nudging can be divided into two main 
categories. The first objection to nudging is based on the principles of utilitarianism and concerns 
the goals that are pursued by using nudges. Nudges that favour long-term outcomes decrease short-
term utility, and this is perceived as inherently wrong because individuals should be left free to act 
to maximise their utility, whereas nudges reduce utility. The second objection to nudging is that 
they interfere with individual autonomy, that is, in the possibility to behave accordingly to an 
autonomous pondering of reasons and preferences. This objection is rooted in Kantian ethics and 
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focuses on the way that nudges influence the individual, by a manipulation that interfere with 
independency and autonomy. In other words, we could say that the first category of objection 
concerns the reduction of the “freedom to act”, while the second category of objection concerns 
the restriction of the “freedom of will” (ibid.).  
The vision of Schnellenbach (2012) pertains to the first category of objections, as he maintains 
that even though nudges can differ in the amount and type of costs sustained, they lead to the 
behaviour desired by the state. For Schnellenbach, nudges are not so different from other economic 
policy tools (e.g. taxes) that influence a person’s decision-making. The argument of Hausman and 
Welch (2010) falls in the second category. According to them, under a condition of choice 
architecture, one’s control over mental deliberation is reduced, as preferences reflect the ones of 
the choice architects, reducing individual autonomy. Hausman and Welch (2010) suggest that 
since choice architecture functions optimally when individuals are not aware of being influenced, 
Thaler and Sunstein exaggerate with the identification of nudges as non-intrusive and choice-
preserving. While it is true that the individuals maintain the same set of choices, it may not be 
acceptable to everybody, especially to those more concerned about preserving individual freedom 
(ibid.) What emerge from these critiques is that the debate on the ethical implications of nudging 
is also a debate on the very idea of man, freedom, and liberty of choice. The different authors that 
question the legitimacy of nudges from a perspective of Kantian ethics or utilitarianism are 
fundamentally concerned about the preservation of individual freedom (Fischer and Lots, 2015). 
Julian Nida-Rümelin (2005, in Fisher and Lots, 2015) notes that failing to perform behaviours that 
prevent future negative consequences (such as saving money or eating healthy) does not entail that 
people act irrationally. People may not necessarily experience remorse when faced with the 
negative consequences of their behaviour and prefer to value short-term utility to enjoy the present 
instead. Accordingly, Van der Heijden and Kosters (2015) highlight that the implicit nature of 
nudging draws critiques about a lack of transparency and accountability, as individuals are 
prompted to choose and act differently from what they would normally do. Moreover, the notion 
of good is subjective, and that the evaluations of choice architects may be susceptible to bias and 
personal motives (ibid.). Rizzo and Whitman (2008) also contest the alleged superiority of choice 
architects in their task of selecting the best behaviours to promote. Choice architects, they argue, 
select the appropriate values for ideal decision-makers, without any assurance that these 
predictions are actually in line with the desires of the final users. 
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Goodwin (2012) is opposed to the use of nudging in the United Kingdom’s politics, arguing that 
this approach in not in line with the government’s aspiration to endorse the values of freedom and 
empowerment. In his article, he claims that the notion that nudges are liberty preserving is incorrect 
and due to a reductionist definition of freedom employed by libertarians. Goodwin believes that 
libertarians cannot fully and deeply understand the concept of freedom and of the possible threats 
to it, since they focus exclusively on negative freedom, that is the liberty from external interference 
from others. Instead, by embracing a broader conception of positive freedom, one can see the 
importance of the process of self-realisation and empowerment that also derives from overcoming 
life difficulties. Positive freedom value internal factors, that is, the individual resources to fulfil 
one’s potential. In other words, while negative liberty refers to freedom as absence of obstacles, 
constraints or intrusion of others, positive liberty entails the presence of control and self-
determination. In fact, as Goodwin points out, libertarians base their case in the Lockean tradition 
of natural rights and self-ownership, rather than in Kantian conception of respect for autonomy. 
Thus, the incapacity of the nudging approach to take into account these factors reduces their 
concept of empowerment. 
 
2.3.5.2. The account of the defence 
 
A tenacious tenet in the critics’ arguments has been the claim that nudging works by manipulating 
choices, which is in contrast with the ideals of freedom of choice and public dialogue of a 
democratic society. Hence, this claim directly challenges the legitimacy of nudging in public 
policy-making. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) point out that people’s choices are consistently 
manipulated by more invasive measures, such as marketing or regulation, therefore nudging should 
be an acceptable approach. As Van der Heiden and Kosters (2015) also note, criticism to the 
alleged coercive nature of nudging, can be applied to other typical governmental interventions 
(e.g. bans and regulations); and in any case, government is always acting on behalf of the citizens. 
To guarantee that the influence of nudges in modifying behaviour is not manipulative, Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008) maintain that designed interventions must be inexpensive, transparent in their 
aims, and above all, intended to assist people in acting accordingly to their interest. Nudge 
interventions designed to steer behaviours in directions that improve health conditions (e.g. 
obesity, alcohol consumption, smoking, etc.) or societal issues (e.g. littering and waste), should be 
put into context and recognized as justifiable, provided that its objectives reflect the preferences 
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of the general population and follow Rawls’ Publicity Principle. Rawls emphasised a society in 
which institutions are governed by fairness to citizens, and fair policies are those that aim to 
maximise the general utility and well-being of the members of the society (Rawls, 1971). This 
conception reflects the idea of a system of collaboration aimed at a mutual advantage: social 
collaboration produces benefits for its members but requires obligations and costs in terms of 
obedience to the laws of the State. In other words, people are conceived as free and equal human 
beings, able to autonomously determine their ends; at the same time, the member of the society 
while enjoying the benefits also need to sustain some costs, reconciling the public and private 
interests (see Bloom, 1975). The principle of publicity is a feature of fairness. The idea behind 
publicity is that in the public political sphere nothing shall be kept hidden, and that the workings 
of the state should be open to public scrutiny (Rawls, 1971).   
A second tenet of the account of the defence, is that because a neutral design is illusory, some sort 
of architecture and influence is always present and unavoidable, so “[…] the anti‐nudge position 
is unhelpful – a literal nonstarter” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008: p. 11). Hausman and Welch (2010) 
also admit that choice architecture is inescapable and cannot be regarded as morally problematic 
in itself. The inherent nature of being a choice architect in a context, makes it impossible not to 
influence behaviours, thus the sole solution is to recognize this and take responsibility, and to use 
nudges that reflect the values of Libertarian Paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Thus, 
nudging should be more appropriately considered as an additional ‘tool in the box’ for 
governmental strategies. Cass Sunstein (2015) in his article “Nudging and Choice Architecture: 
Ethical Considerations” elaborates a thorough answer to the diverse ethical objections. Below, the 
main points are illustrated: 
 
1. The first point is that choice architecture is inescapable and cannot be avoided: ‘invisible 
hands’ exist everywhere in the marketing of products at the supermarkets, in stores and 
restaurants, in the design of a website, in the rules of the government. This entails that the 
objection to nudging on the moral grounds that it influences people is pointless, as anyhow 
individuals are constantly subject to a variety of influences and environmental cues in their 
daily lives.  
2. Moral discourses about issues such as manipulation and autonomy that take abstract drifts 
lead to confusion and to no concrete progress. Nudging can be applied in a variety of 
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domains, and each domain requires a specific ethical analysis rather than a general 
discourse. 
3. In relation to autonomy, rather than hindering it, much nudging strategies actually support 
autonomy, enabling individuals to dedicate their attention to their daily relevant concerns. 
Additionally, when a nudge corrects a behavioural bias it supports a person’s autonomy. 
However, Sunstein acknowledge that an ideal choice architecture requires active choosing. 
Therefore, nudges such as default rules might interfere with autonomy, especially if they 
do not reflect people’s actual preferences, or in the case where because of inertia, people 
may not reject a detrimental default. At the same time, default rules may be superior than 
active choosing, when people prefer not to choose for a variety of reasons. In these cases, 
a default rule acts on their behalf and in any case, it does not deprive people of the 
possibility to choose if they eventually desire to reject the default. To account for these 
issues, a reflection on autonomy in relation to default rules must be carried out in the 
planning of each context-specific intervention. 
4. As Sunstein (ibid.) notes, ethical criticism about manipulative strategies are especially 
relevant and a topic that merits careful attention. Sunstein answers to the critics that regard 
nudging as a form of manipulative influence that bypasses the person’s rational capacity 
and autonomy by distorting the decision-making process. Sunstein concede that some types 
of framing may be considered manipulative. For instance, choice architects aware of the 
influence of loss aversion may implement a ‘loss frame’ in a campaign on excessive energy 
consumption, emphasizing the great loss from not using energy conservative systems. The 
use of loss aversion may be manipulative in the sense that it does not target people’s 
deliberative reasoning process, but rather triggers a negative emotional state. This conduct 
is a form of manipulation, but it would be extreme to condemn it for this reason, as it is 
important to bear in mind that most nudges serve educational purposes (e.g. think about 
health warnings, or social norms against smoking or littering). Some degree of 
manipulation in inevitably involved when a nudge targets emotions or people’s intuitive 
thinking (System 1). But such an accusation should then be made to charities that try to 
obtain funds through heart breaking campaigns; or to our family and friends when they 
emphasize the losses or dangers that can derive from a certain behaviour by concealing 
their point with a smile. Thus, as Sunstein (2015: p. 40) puts it: “It should be emphasized 
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that any action by government, including nudging, must meet a burden of justification. But 
when nudges fall within the periphery of the concept, when they have legitimate purposes, 
when they would be effective, and when they do not diverge from the kinds of influences 
that are common and unobjectionable in ordinary life, the burden of justification can often 
be met”.  
 
Finally, in his 2013 paper, Mills directly answers to Goodwin’s (2012) concerns about nudging 
and empowerment. He notes that to promote empowerment choice architects need to reflect 
people’s rational desires and authentic choices. As long as individuals are supported to pursue their 
real objectives by eliminating sources of bias (internal or external), then nudging might actually 
promote self-mastery and empowerment. One of the tenets of nudging is to maintain and protect 
freedom to choose, hence, insofar this method is not employed in contrast to authenticity it respects 
the concept of autonomy. 
 
2.3.5.3. A nuanced perspective  
 
It is legitimate to question and severely scrutinize an approach that attempts to influence individual 
behaviour, especially through interventions that direct behaviour unconsciously. It is the role of 
researchers and experts to inform public policies and make sure that they are carried out 
appropriately without infringing individual freedom. Because nudging is a new tool in the box for 
policy-making, these critiques are necessary and beneficial in that they support the monitoring of 
governmental action. However, the question is complex, as nudging is applied to an array of 
different issues, from savings plans, tobacco use, organ donation, to health behaviour.  Each of 
these domains require caution in the definition of an intervention. However, some critiques seem 
to be merely exercises of critical thinking that often reach excessively radical drifts. For instance, 
the devaluation of the public sphere and the reduction of the ability to morally identify the best 
behaviour, such as posited by Bovens (2009) in the argument on the ‘fragmented selves’, seems 
quite an exaggeration. Moreover, many discourses are based upon ethical abstractions, using 
examples that have very little to do with reality. For instance, Hausman and Welch (2010, p. 130) 
exemplify:  
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“Suppose, for the purposes of argument, that subliminal messages were highly effective in 
influencing behaviour. So, the government might, for example, be able to increase the frequency 
with which people brush their teeth by requiring that the message, “Brush your teeth!” be 
flashed briefly during prime-time television programs. Influencing behaviour in this way may 
be a greater threat to liberty, broadly conceived, than punishing drivers who do not wear seat 
belts, because it threatens people’s control over their own evaluations and deliberation and is 
so open to abuse. The unhappily coerced driver wearing her seat belt has chosen to do so, albeit 
from a limited choice set, unlike the hypothetical case of a person who brushes his teeth under 
the influence of a subliminal message”. 
 
This example illustrates the point. Hausman and Welch (2010) introduce their case by openly 
admitting that it is made exclusively for the sake of the argument. First, since choice architecture 
interventions can take a variety of forms, therefore the ethical objection must be tailored on that 
concrete, specific form, to avoid abstractions and worthless confusion. Nudging people towards 
eating more salads at lunch or to quit smoking, is different from nudging interventions that 
automatically enrol people in some sort of economic scheme. While the latter may be more 
questionable and require context-specific observations, the first follows basic common sense. If 
our human, instinctive, irrational nature gets in the way of us eating properly, or lead us to litter 
around, or to ‘smoke our lungs off’, in these cases I believe a little nudge in the right direction 
should be welcomed. Nudges should be rather intended as forms of support to guide humans in 
the situations in which reflective thinking may be poor. This does not imply that we would be 
prevented to enjoy some junk food, rebelling against the optimal choice. It merely means that in 
some contexts, the environment will support people in carrying out the best behaviour. Nudges do 
not impose: for instance, if a starving person with a craving desire enters in a lunchroom, which 
has been structured to display the healthier meal options first, he/she will still be able to identify 
the options that most suit him/her in that moment, by selecting a rewarding calorie dense lunch.  
Secondly, there may not always be something troubling with paternalism. In my opinion, 
paternalistic policies such as the obligation to wear the seat belt, or the prohibition to smoke in 
public restaurants, are justifiable even though they infringe individual liberty. If our societies are 
characterised by some paternalistic commitments, such as respecting speed limits while driving, it 
is perhaps because experience led us to the need of establishing them. Thus, a mistake that Thaler 
and Sunstein may have committed, could be the excessive underscoring of the fact that nudge-type 
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paternalism is still libertarian. This argument implicitly suggest that paternalism has a negative 
connotation, paving the way to all the defenders of individual autonomy ‘at all costs’ for the sake 
of avoiding a dystopian society. 
Furthermore, in a long-term perspective, rather than an infantilisation and “de-responsibilisation” 
(see Bovens, 2009; Selinger, 2011) a potential phenomenon of responsibilisation of the citizens 
might take place. Speaking ideally, in a long-term perspective, living in a nudge-based society 
where all cafeterias adopt a choice architecture that favour healthy food, where all the nations have 
a default rule to organ donation, and say, where all public spaces nudge against smoking… Then 
people might develop a habituation for a series of good practices. Humans often act out of habit, 
through an automatic repetition of past behaviour with little regard to their current goals. Habits 
are behavioural responses cued by the environment, that are activated in daily life, in response to 
time pressure, ego-depletion, distraction, and so forth (Wood and Neal, 2009). Habits are learned 
and stored through repetition and experience and persist even in the absence of conscious 
motivation (see Neal et al. 2006; Riet, 2011). Thus, rather than infantilised individuals there might 
be a potential for the development of a higher degree of individual responsibility. In the same way 
that parents teach their children the behaviours and practices that are good for them, supporting 
the development of appropriate habits, choice architects can guide people towards the best path. 
Nudge interventions may promote habit formation, as the repetition of an action due to the constant 
exposure to a nudge may lead to learning outcomes (Neal et al., 2006). However, this discourse is 
also an abstraction and a merely hypothetical scenario: it is improbable that nudging will become 
so widespread to incorporate most of the environments and decision-making settings of our 
societies. The application of BE and choice architecture in public policy is still in its infancy, 
interventions have been modest, and claims of patronising interventions (e.g. such as dubbing the 
UK a ‘nudgeocracy’, see Whitehead et al., 2012) are excessive in the context of real-world 
implementation. More importantly, as also Mills (2013) points put, nudging is not so robust to be 
considered a tool able to bring about genuine transformation in society. In fact, nudges do not 
establish nor meaningfully alter existing moral or social norms. Nudges can play a small role in 
tackling many societal issues and support policy-makers in the design of policies.  
As Guala and Mittone (2015) point out, choice architects attempt to eliminate biases from 
behaviours that not only impact on the individual, but also create externalities. For instance, it is 
established that unhealthy food consumption has negative effects on individual health, but this has 
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also an impact on a larger societal scale. Negative externalities that derive from poor nutritional 
behaviour are not simple to quantify, since a variety of interwoven elements come into play. 
Overweight and obesity can lead to different health conditions, forcing the person to seek medical 
support and treatment. The issue here is clearly that the costs of a person’s poor dietary choices 
determines costs to the health cate system. A study conducted by Atella et al. (2014) shows that 
the cost of obesity in Italy is in line with the estimates of studies conducted in other countries (e.g. 
Tsai et al. 2011; Cawley et al., 2012; Bahia et al., 2012), showing that total health expenditure for 
overweight individuals is about 4% higher than the expenditure for normal weight individuals; 
whereas for obese, severely obese and very severely obese, the spending increases, respectively, 
18%, 40% and 51% compared to normal weight. Furthermore, the study measured what are the 
diseases related to obesity and how they affect the total health expenditure: most of the costs can 
be attributed to three widespread chronic diseases: hypertension, type 2 diabetes and 
cardiovascular disease. Overall, at the net of the hospital expenditure, in Italy only obesity has an 
impact of around 2.5 billion euros a year.  
Furthermore, indirect costs (due to premature deaths, reduced work productivity and relative lower 
income), even if they are more difficult to quantify in financial terms, must also be considered 
among the costs attributable to obesity (reference). For instance, illness may force the person to 
be absent from work or go on disability, which means a lower productivity of the workforce. 
Premature death also has a cost in terms of hospital care, as well as costs in terms of reduced well-
being and psychological pain from the family’s part deriving from the loss of a loved one, which 
can have enduring effects on the individuals (e.g. take for instance the premature loss of a parent 
that has young children). Obesity determines a faster process of aging of the human organism: 
Fontaine et al. (2003), showed that the reduction of life of a severely obese young male can reach 
22% of his life expectancy, equivalent to a premature death of about 13 years. According to Sassi 
(2010), overweight increases the risk of premature death by about 30% for every 15 kg of 
additional body weight, due to the development of chronic diseases and a wide range of tumors. 
Other intangible costs include for instance lower academic performance, job discrimination, 
psychosocial problems and poor quality of life. For instance, obese children are more exposed to 
psychosocial problems, as they are prone to social stigmatization and exclusion, resulting in lower 
self-esteem, a greater risk of abandoning school, lower academic performance, reduced 
occupational stability and lower income (Gortmaker et al., 1993). 
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According to Guala and Mittone (2015) the existence of these externalities, explain why nudges 
should be more properly justified from a political, rather than a welfaristic standpoint. The authors 
argue that preferences should not be such a matter of concern, as a fundamental reason why nudges 
should be in place is that they help to prevent future negative consequences that will affect our 
children and the children of others. A political justification of nudging is closely connected to a 
moral perspective: nudges are necessary because the consequences of irresponsible behaviour are 
often, because of social ties or ethic principles, shared by others. This is the case of children that 
once adults, have to economically support and take care of their parents that did not save and have 
lost their fortune, or that lay ill in hospital after years of heavy smoking: the children of these 
parents are likely to feel morally obliged to look after them. In the author’s (ibid.) example, let’s 
say that Europe in one decade will be plagued by an obesity epidemic. As previously explained, 
an initially private behaviour of many citizens could turn into a monumental social problem; and 
because the European mentality is that everybody is entitled to cures as public healthcare is a 
strongly established institution, people would feel that it is a moral duty to cure and support all 
those who are ill. In this scenario, nudges to steer people toward a healthy nutrition, could have 
prevented this situation, preventing the larger majority from feeling morally obliged to share the 
costs of other’s poor nutritional choices. Hence, because nudge policies confront issues in a less 
intrusive manner than traditional methods, they should be accepted and employed in all the 
occasions that require them, to prevent future costs to be shared by the adults of the future and 
allowing the creation of an improved society. Therefore, the label ‘libertarian paternalism’ should 
be avoided, as it seems uncapable to express the core reasons why choice architects should be 
entitled to nudge people towards the optimal behaviour. 
 
Indeed, a fault in Thaler and Sunstein’s work was not to provide a clear method to develop and 
implement nudge strategies by choice architects. In practice, considerable interpretations must be 
made when designing interventions, about the impact, benefits, and ethical acceptability of a 
nudge. For instance, Blumenthal-Barby and Burroughs (2012) developed an ethical framework for 
the responsible management of different types of nudges (see Table 4), by identifying the most 
ethically relevant dimensions to ensure an appropriate use of each principle. 
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Finally, if a more nuanced view is required in the ethical debate on nudging, a relevant contribution 
can be found in the analysis carried out by Hansen and Jespersen (2015). The Danish authors argue 
that Thaler and Sunstein do not sufficiently address the responsibility of policy-makers in charge 
of intentionally designing interventions to change behaviours. Rawls’ Publicity Principle is 
deficient in that it does not guarantee legitimacy in the manipulation of people’s choices. Hence, 
after reviewing both sides of the dispute, they propose a third way to conceptualise choice 
architecture and nudging. The authors develop a distinction among transparent and non-transparent 
nudges, namely between non-manipulative forms to others, resulting in a framework of four main 
typologies of nudges. The argument of Hansen and Jespersen (2015) can be summarised by 
Nudge  Ethically relevant considerations 
Incentives - The amount and kind of incentives used. 
- Whether the incentive plan will disadvantage those most in need or result in the group that fails 
to meet criteria for receipt being treated unfairly (e.g., cost-shifting to those who fail, leaving those 
who fail by the wayside). 
- Whether the incentive plan will harm the patient–physician relationship (e.g., through actual or 
perceived monitoring). 
- Whether the incentive is fairly directed (e.g., at patients as opposed to or in addition to their 
physicians if the patients themselves are the ones who improved their health). 
Defaults - Whether people are aware of the existence of the default and whether it is fairly easy for people 
to opt out. 
- Whether the expected benefits of the default outweigh any anticipated harms, where harm is 
construed not just physically but also psychologically, socially, and financially. 
- Whether there are injustices or harms brought about to vulnerable or marginalized populations 
by the default (e.g., presumed consent for organ donation exploits the homeless who do not have 
easy opportunities to opt out/dissent) and whether attempts have been made to mitigate those 
effects. 
Salience and 
affect 
- Whether what is being represented saliently is true and accurate, as opposed to exaggerated or 
misrepresented. 
- Whether the use of salience and affect techniques will be perceived negatively by those it is 
directed toward. 
- Whether bypassing people’s capacity for reason is done for good ends (e.g., not selfish ones) and 
for good reasons (e.g., people are harming themselves). 
- Whether there is a justification for using salience and affect instead of rational argument. 
Norms and 
messenger 
- Whether the information about what “most people are doing” is true and accurate. 
- Whether the use of comparisons and norms will do more good than harm because “what most 
people do” is often unwise. 
- Whether the power differentials between messenger and recipient have been considered. 
Priming - Whether it is fairly easy for people to go in a direction other than the one in which they are primed. 
- Whether subconscious priming is done for good and evidence-based ends. 
- Whether there is a justification for using subconscious priming instead of rational argument. 
Table 4. Summary of ethical concerns identified per each typology of nudge (Blumenthal-Barby and Burroughs, 
2012) 
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following three main points. In the first place, the authors acknowledge that the feature of 
intentionality in choice architecture interventions ascribe responsibility to policy-makers, an issue 
which is insufficiently considered by Thaler and Sunstein who minimise the question observing 
that nudges preserve liberty of choice. Secondly, and related to the first point, the authors contest 
the assumption that choice architecture is inescapable and that a neutral decision-making context 
does not exist, by deeming this premise “an attractive line of defence” (2015: p. 10). In fact, there 
is a distinction to be made between a context that influences behaviour accidentally and a context 
designed to intentionally influence behaviour. Overlooking such a distinction means to discard the 
concept of responsibility. In the third place, the authors argue that the characterisation of nudging 
as a manipulation of choice is a simplification since nudges are not necessarily about influencing 
choice. Hansen and Jespersen (2015) distinguish two typologies of nudge, that both aim at 
influencing the automatic, intuitive system:  
▪ Type 1 nudges are meant to influence those behaviours that are guided by the automatic 
system, and do not involve any reflective thinking. An example is the manipulation of plate 
or utensils size in a lunchroom, or footprints to guide people towards recycle bins. 
▪ Type 2 nudges are meant to impact on attention and deliberate choices by influencing the 
automatic system.  An example would be framing, or Amsterdam’s fly in the urinal to 
direct deliberate attention.  
Evidently, while type 1 nudges involve only the intuitive system and no deliberation or choice, 
type 2 nudges concern behaviours that involve deliberation, judgement, and choice. Thus, it is 
plausible to conclude that it is imprecise to state that nudges always entail a manipulation of choice.  
Furthermore, to account for the ethical dimension of nudges, the researchers adopt an epistemic 
dimension to evaluate when a nudge involves a manipulation: 
▪ Transparent nudges are such when the person can easily identify the intention behind, 
and the aims that are pursued. 
▪ Non-transparent nudges are those in which the person is not able to recognize the 
intention or the expected behavioural change.  
Given the definition of type 1 vs. type 2 nudges, and transparent vs. non-transparent nudges, it is 
possible to create a matrix (Table 5) to guide responsible choice architects in the development of 
the interventions: 
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Table 5. Summary of typologies of nudges in Hansen and Jespersen, 2015. 
Finally, Figure 13 illustrates the combination of the four dimensions and positions a variety of 
nudges available in the literature in the four axes. Indeed, there may be some grey areas and 
difficulties in precisely locating all the nudges due to their peculiar nature, however the matrix 
proves to be a useful tool for future guidance.  
 
Figure 13. The four nudge dimensions (in Hansen and Jespersen, 2015).  
 
 Transparent Non-transparent 
System 2 Transparent, facilitation of choice Manipulation of choice 
System 1 Transparent influence and 
manipulation of behaviour 
Non-transparent, manipulation of 
behaviour 
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2.4 Conclusions 
 
Even today, it is tempting to consider humans as rational and reasonable beings, who logically 
plan the most functional actions for their interests. Indeed, human beings are greatly skilled and 
capable of monumental achievements, think about the advances in physics or technology, or to the 
cultural production. However, as this chapter proposed, human behaviour is also susceptible of 
cognitive errors, to the interference of emotions, and of a series of biases that influence perception, 
judgement, and decision-making. 
The next chapter analyses the issue from the perspective of nutrition behaviour. If we assumed 
that humans were perfectly rational, with limitless cognitive abilities, then conveying calorie 
information and offering nutrition education would do the job. Instead, many of the daily decisions 
only consider the reward of the moment, leading to weight gain, which can determine obesity, and 
a series of related health issues. Truly understanding the nature of human decisions is crucial for 
interventions in the domain of nutrition, and the sole available option to avoid failure. 
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3. Automatic and Mindless Food Choices 
 
3.1 Environmental Cues and Food Consumption 
 
“Only a limited number of choices are based on conscious information processing 
strategies. The rest of the variance left to explain is caused by unconscious effects of 
all kinds of subtle cues in the environment” (Djieksterhuis et al., 2005: p. 200).  
 
As the previous chapters illustrated, studies in behavioural economics, psychology, neuroscience, 
consistently demonstrated that human beings often act irrationally, as our choices are also the 
product of automatic, unconscious processes. Since we cannot fully control our perceptual 
processes, this entails that we cannot ignore environmental factors, which we are evolutionarily 
wired to respond to. The motor neurons in our brains automatically transmit information from our 
senses, enabling us to quickly respond to contextual stimuli, without the need of lingering in 
conscious deliberation (Libet et al., 1991). When people rely on heuristic reasoning, we function 
more efficiently, liberating our limited cognitive capacity from the burden of answering to the 
innumerable stimuli and information around us.  
How does these findings relate to eating behaviour? Automaticity is a crucial component of human 
behaviour, and it appears to be deeply involved in food choices. For instance, a striking paper 
reported how rapidly consumers can make value-based choices about which product they prefer 
with above chance accuracy. In study 1, Milosavljevic et al. (2011), first ranked the participant’s 
preferences among 50 snacks and candies, and consequently exposed the subjects with a sequence 
of random pairs of images of two snacks/candies, each of the duration of 20 milliseconds. The 
results, obtained through a measure of Minimum Reaction Times (MRT), showed that the subjects 
were capable of indicating which snacks they preferred from each pair in less than 1/3 of a second 
(313 ms) and their answers, compared to the previous ranking, were correct in more than 50% of 
the times (i.e. more than chance). In study 3 and 4, the researchers provided additional 
computational time to verify the changes in choice accuracy, and the results improved to 73 %, 
with the average decision being taken in less than half of a second (404 ms). This paper 
demonstrates that to conduct simple cognitive computations in relation to a food product, 
consumers are surprisingly fast in identifying their preferred option. The latter study demonstrates 
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that people can rapidly carry out food choices, without the need for systematic considerations. 
When such a fast decision-making occurs, people rely on heuristic strategies, such as familiar 
objects and features like shapes, colours, logos, brands (Cohen and Babey, 2012). Research on 
eating behaviour amply demonstrates that food consumption decisions often take place 
automatically, as people eat without carrying out rational considerations regarding the quality or 
the quantity of food to consume (Wansink, 2004). Classic accounts of consumer behaviour and 
choice that are rooted in cognitive psychology and posited a conscious elaboration of information 
when people choose and evaluate an item (see Chaiken, 1980; Petty et al., 1983). Contemporary 
psychology is now aware that people’s choices are often made unconsciously, and that consumer 
behaviour is particularly predisposed to the influence of environmental cues. For instance, when 
grocery shopping in a supermarket, many products that end up in our basket are the product of a 
transitory moment of awareness (e.g. “Oh yes, I need tuna”) and often our minds are occupied by 
other thoughts, such as tomorrow’s meeting or our evening date, so much of our buying behaviour 
may rely on automatic mechanisms and habit. Indeed, the weighting of pros and cons is often 
required, especially when a product is expensive or important for us, yet at the same time, we are 
automatically and unconsciously perceiving the environmental stimuli around us. As Cohen and 
Babey (2012) elucidate, automatic responses often lead to poor food choices and excessive calorie 
intake. Particularly, because people are inherently cognitively limited, we often cannot recognise 
or resist the influence of contextual food cues. The situation is worsened by the myriad of 
opportunities to eat, snack, or drink, offered in the environment. In our consumerist societies, the 
offer of palatable food is spread everywhere, in almost any context, and this encourages repeated 
decisions about what, when, and how much to eat (my italic). The situation is worsened by the fact 
that commonly, when people eat, they do not do it out of genuine hunger. In a study to investigate 
the correlation between hunger and food consumption, Mattes (1990) invited the subjects to write 
a food diary to take note of their level on hunger during different times of the day. The study 
revealed a lack of correlation between actual hunger and eating behaviour. In fact, people ate even 
when their level of hunger was low. This leads to the conclusion that people eat also without 
necessarily experiencing hunger, and another research suggested that people often stop eating only 
when they feel physically full but also physically uncomfortable (Poothullil, 2002). 
As Chance et al. (2014) elucidate, making healthy food choices is particularly difficult, as many 
factors challenge the individual. These choices forcibly generate compromises between present 
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benefits that are certain and immediate, and future potential costs that are indeterminate and 
distant. Actively choosing to prevent future costs is difficult, because System 1 responds to 
immediate pleasure generating a sensation of craving. To maintain one’s healthy purposes, System 
2 needs to be engaged, and an act of self-control makes the decision-making process more effortful 
(ibid.). It is typically when a person is hungry or in a condition of depletion (Baumeister et al., 
1998) that System 1 prevails on conscious deliberation. Many behaviours are often impulsive or 
guided by the heat-of-the-moment. Present-biased preference is the propensity to assign greater 
weight to the temporary fulfilment of a desire, discounting future costs and benefits (see Ainsle, 
1975; Frederick et. al., 2002; O’Donohogue and Rabin, 2000). For instance, when one recognises 
the necessity to diet for a certain period, the deliberate intention may periodically fail when self-
control issues, hunger, or attractive food lead the person towards indulgence, violating one’s own 
desired behaviour. In this way, a person ‘forgets’ to behave accordingly to self-interest, guided by 
the lure of a momentary gratification. The environmental availability of unhealthy, calorie-dense, 
tasty food is likely to influence the person towards the fulfilment of an immediate pleasure, and 
the optimism bias worsens the situation (Buehler et al., 1994). This bias can lead the person 
towards false predictions that entail an underestimation of the present costs and an overestimation 
of one’s future ability to control behaviour (ibid.). This occurs for instance when we say that we 
will begin our healthy diet from ‘tomorrow’. The consumption of unhealthy food carries a 
considerable cost when this behaviour is regularly repeated. Thus, because the long-term 
consequences of poor food decisions are treated as negligible, people are inclined to undervalue 
these costs because they fail to aggregate the episodes of consumption, by considering each 
episode as separate (Kyrby and Guastello, 2001). Finally, the habitual nature of food decisions is 
a fundamental element to bear in mind: when a frequent action has become encoded in memory 
and represents a context-specific response, it can be triggered automatically by the environment 
(Wood and Neal, 2007 and 2009). This might be a barrier especially for those who are habituated 
to consume unhealthy food options. 
Before the 1960s, it was commonly acknowledged that food intake regulation occurred through 
physical indicators of satiation, which gave the indication of ‘feeling full’. In the last decades, 
researchers challenged this assumption, by identifying a set of variables that influence individual 
consumption, ranging from cultural features (e.g. Rozin, 1996), social influence (e.g. Herman et 
al., 2003), environmental cues (e.g. Wansink, 2004), and the toxic impact of the food industry (e.g. 
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Brownell and Horgen, 2004). Leaving the domain of scientific literature, people on the other hand, 
tend to explain their food consumption levels based on personal assumptions, with some focusing 
on internal factors such as hunger regulation, while others pay attention to portions, and still others 
explain behaviour in terms of self-control or free will. In these cases, people ignore any kind of 
social, cultural or environmental influence. Given the frequency of food-related decision-making, 
it is paramount to: (1) investigate and understand how these decisions occur by taking into account 
the intrinsic nature of cognitive limitation and the presence of automatic processes; and (2) to 
develop effective strategies to be implemented to promote and support people towards healthy 
nutrition behaviours. For researchers, it is crucial to redirect attention on the environmental 
processes that impact food consumption, to raise the profile of research and deepen the knowledge 
in this domain. This entails offering crucial information for health professionals, to highlight how 
minor structural changes in the environment can support the reduction of the unknowing (and often 
unwilling) overconsumption of food. The following section is based on the studies conducted by 
Brian Wansink, an academic who provided outstanding research in the investigation of the relation 
between eating behaviour and environmental cues. 
 
3.1.1. Wansink’s studies on eating behaviour and environmental cues  
 
How does the food environment influence consumption, and how is it possible to nudge people 
towards the optimal choice for their personal well-being? Eating behaviour is a unique context 
characterised by specific features, as people respond to food cues in manners that are different 
from other environmental cues. It is important to dig into this specificity and to debunk myths such 
as ‘people know the quantity of food they want to consume’ or ‘people know when they are 
satiated’ (Wansink et al., 2009). Since the 1960s, academics have been busy classifying a variety 
of relevant factors linked with food consumption. Wansink in particular, focused on the 
development of explanatory models of the drivers and variables that impact on food intake volume. 
While food choice decisions determine which food we select, food volume decisions determine the 
amount of food we consume (my italic). Wansink (2004) devoted his studies to look at the 
environmental influences (such as plate size and shape, package size, variety, or the influence of 
others) on the less researched area of food consumption volume.  
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Wansink (2004) divides the environment (see Figure 14) in two spheres: the eating environment 
includes elements that are independent from the food itself, such as the atmosphere, social 
interaction, and so on; the food environment instead, includes the elements directly related to the 
way food is offered, such as its salience, structure, package or portion size. Both environments 
influence consumption choices and consumption volume; and the two spheres also contribute 
indirectly by conveying consumption norms and hindering consumption monitoring. 
 
  
Figure 14. Antecedents and mediators of food consumption volume, in Wansink (2004). 
 
 
3.1.1.1. The mediators of consumption: consumption norms and consumption monitoring  
 
“Consumption norms and consumption monitoring partially mediate or explain 
why many seemingly unrelated environmental factors consistently influence 
eating behaviour in predictable ways” (Wansink, 2004: p. 458)  
According to Wansink (2010), environmental features have a relevant effect on food-related 
behaviours because they influence consumption norms and decrease consumption monitoring. 
Individuals often engage in “mindless eating” (Wansink, 2006), an unconscious process in which 
people are not aware of the effects of the environment on the quantity consumed of food or 
beverage. Wansink highlighted two ways in which environmental cues influence consumption, as 
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schematised in Figure 15: one way is by suggesting the amount of food that is appropriate to 
consume; the second way is by altering our perception of satiety. The concept of consumption 
norms refers to the fact that the environment around us, tell us how much it is accepted and 
appropriate to eat (see Blundell et al., 2010). During meals in different settings, our behaviour 
towards consumption can change, take for instance a meal consumed with a large group of friends, 
or a formal business meal consumed with a client. But the serving size of a restaurant dish, the use 
of large portions in grocery stores, or the use of large cooking utensils at home, can also implicitly 
influence our perception and thereby determine the quantity of food consumed (see Wansink and 
van Ittersum, 2007). As Wansink (2010) illustrates, all these factors offer a normative benchmark 
that the person is drawn to conform to. What is more problematic is the fact that the environmental 
norms that subtly influence the person’s consumption norm in a specific situation, may be 
perceived automatically and unconsciously. Research amply demonstrates that environmental cues 
outside of conscious awareness can have an impact on behavior (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), on 
goal pursuit (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Troetschel, 2001), and on self-regulation 
(Papies and Hamstra, 2010). As previously pointed out, people mostly do not recognize that 
environmental features hold an influence upon behaviour, and even if they are made aware of 
them, they do not accept that such insignificant elements may be influencing them (see Pronin et 
al., 2007; Wansink and Sobal, 2007).  
  
Figure 15. Selected environmental antecedents of consumption volume, in Wansink, 2010. 
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The concept of consumption monitoring refers to the difficulty in estimating the correct number 
of calories that one is consuming, and in monitoring when one is actually satiated. Generally, 
eating is a multifaceted behaviour that is difficult to control, and people are particularly biased in 
contexts with large consumption norms. For instance, Chandon and Wansink (2007) showed that 
people of all weights, and even dietitians and nurses, are imprecise when it comes to estimate the 
calories of larger portions, leading to unintended overconsumption. A further bias occurs with the 
so-called ‘health halos’ where labels deceptively indicate products as ‘healthy’ or ‘low-fat’ leading 
people to consume these products (Wansink and Chandon, 2006). 
To illustrate, I will take the case of portion and package size. Individual perception is influenced 
by large plates, bowls, glasses, or utensils, increasing food intake. It is established in literature that 
the size of a package, or the size of portion servings at home and out-of-home settings have a 
considerable influence on consumption (see for instance Edelman et. al., 1986; Rolls et al., 2003). 
Interestingly, portion and package size also influence consumption in the case of unpleasant food, 
as in the experiment of Wansink and Kim (2004). When the researchers offered medium or large-
size buckets of 14-day-old popcorn to moviegoers, the subjects ate 33.6% more popcorn from the 
larger buckets regardless of the dubious taste of the product (Wansink and Kim, 2004). According 
to Wansink (2004), this detrimental effect (for our BMI) is due to the fact that portion sizes suggest 
consumption norms (see Fig. 15). Furthermore, serving containers truly create perceptual illusions; 
this occurs, once again, because these tools implicitly suggest to the person the amount of food 
that ought to be served and consumed (i.e. consumption norm). In a well-known experiment 
(Wansink et al., 2005), 54 subjects were assigned to two conditions: (1) subjects who ate from 
normal soup bowls, and (2) subjects who ate from self-refilling bowls (biased visual cue 
condition). Participants of the latter condition ate up to 73% more soup than participants eating 
from a normal bowl. However, these subjects had no perception of consuming more soup, and did 
not perceive themselves as more satiated. These findings support the assumption that a serving 
container offers a consumption norm, lessening self-monitoring. Therefore, the presence of 
accurate visual cues can be a relevant factor for the prevention of unintended overeating. 
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3.1.1.2. Food intake and the lack of awareness of external influences  
 
Wansink et al. (2008) examined in two laboratory studies the extent to which people recognised 
the influence of external cues on their behaviour. In study 1, 122 undergraduate female students 
were paired to watch television together, and some pizza pieces were offered. To control for their 
hunger level, participants were asked how many hours were passed since their last meal. At the 
end of the session, subjects were asked to respond to the question “which factor or factors led you 
to eat as much as you did, and not more or less?”. Out of 122 participants, only 3 stated that they 
were influenced by the quantity of pizza consumed by the other person. Instead, they reported 
reasons such as hunger, or imminence in time with the other meals. While study 1 was based on 
the spontaneous ability of the students to report the elements that influenced their food intake, 
study 2 employed a survey format. Twenty of the participant’s responses in study 1 were selected, 
and added to a questionnaire aimed to explore to what extent students (75 sbj) assigned to the list 
of specific factors an influence on their food intake. Factors were rated on a 7-point scale (1 no 
influence, 7 a lot of influence). Before the task of eating, participants were told about the amount 
eaten by imaginary previous participants, which varied from 4 to 14 cookies. The results showed 
that without a clear consumption norm concerning the correct amount to eat, participants intensely 
increased consumption. As in study 1, the students reported that hunger/satiety and taste were the 
main determinants of intake; also, the subjects did not acknowledge any eventual influence of the 
information about the quantity consumed by previous participants.  
The result of both experiments highlight that subjects did not notice the specific external 
influences. While failing to recognize them, the subjects generated alternative accounts for their 
consumption behaviour, particularly common-sense explanations such as internal states of 
hunger/satiety, taste, and food preferences. Indeed, these factors may be actual influences on food 
intake, however the fact remains that there are other elements that can influence food intake 
without the person being aware of it (ibid.). 
There is wide consensus in literature (e.g. see Guthrie et al., 2015; Ratner and Riis, 2014) that the 
common approach of merely engaging in communication activities about nutrition, aimed to 
increase awareness or to offer information, is disappointingly unproductive in changing people’s 
food choices. In most cases, people are not fully able to report why they made a certain choice, 
reporting simply that they liked a certain product, or that they were hungry, or that they chose a 
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specific food because it was healthier. On the contrary, they deny the possibility that environmental 
features may have influenced their choice (Wansink and Sobal, 2007). Furthermore, people may 
recognize that environmental features may hold an influence, but on others, not themselves (Pronin 
et al., 2007). As Wansink stresses (2010), it seems that some of the factors that influence food 
choices cannot be explained with the classical theories if rational reasoning. Many of the elements 
that guide our choices occur at a perceptual or preconscious level, and it is at this stage that the 
sight of food, smells, and the feeling of hunger, influence behaviour more than rational 
considerations. In a nutshell, “For many individuals, determining how much to eat or drink is a 
mundane and relatively low-involvement behaviour that is a nuisance to monitor continually and 
accurately” (Wansink and Sobal, 2007: p.108). This means that people instead count on 
environmental cues or norms to determine the food to select and the appropriate amount of food 
to eat. Evidence has been primarily gathered through artificial laboratory experiments; however, 
in order to generalize the results, these processes should be observed in real-life settings. This is 
what Wansink and Sobal (2007) have done, conducting two studies to investigate the process of 
consumption monitoring and the effect of consumption norms in natural contexts, to understand 
to what extent we efficiently monitor our food consumption. Study 1 provided a first investigation 
on the number of food-related decisions a person makes in one day, compared to the number of 
food decisions a person believe to make in one day. In average, the participants (139 sbj) estimated 
a number of 15 food and beverage decisions made per day. However, after more interrogation and 
further reflection from the participants, the researchers aggregated the total number of decisions 
and found an average of 219 decisions made in one day. The research offers evidence that people 
severely underestimate the number of food-related decisions, and this result is discouraging given 
the interests we all have in accurately monitoring our food intake. Study 2 investigated the 
awareness of participants of overconsuming, and of the impact of environmental cues on 
overconsumption. The study was based on the content-analysis of seven controlled field studies, 
in which 749 participants were randomly assigned either to the control group or to a treatment 
condition that involved exaggerated environmental cues. In the treatment group, the researchers 
investigated the impact of cues such as large size bowls, spoons, and glasses. In the treatment 
group, the average increase in consumption was 31%, nonetheless, about 73% of the subjects did 
not have the perception of eating more than usual. Even when the researchers explained to 
participants the impact of the environmental cues, 52% still denied that they had eaten more, while 
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31% said that if they did eat more, it happened because they were hungry. Only 2% of the 
participants acknowledged the plausible influence of the specific environmental cue that had been 
employed. It is interesting to note that participants were not aware, or not willing to admit, their 
susceptibility to the food environment manipulations. This is in line with research that illustrates 
the presence of flawed self-assessments, the bias to be overconfident, and the overestimation o 
personal capabilities (see Dunning 2005). 
 
In the majority of the cases, when participants are 
questioned after an experiment, few identify that 
environmental features may have influenced their 
consumption behaviour. Most people fervently 
refute that other elements than their personal 
preferences influenced their behaviour, even when 
provided with clear evidence (Pronin et al., 2007; 
Wansink and Sobal, 2007; Vartanian et al., 2008). 
Indeed, people generally lack the capacity and the 
knowledge to evaluate the hidden causes that 
influenced their decision-making process (Wansink and Chandon, 2014). As outlined in chapter 
1, the mental forces at work are mostly unavailable to our consciousness (Kahneman, 2011; Wilson 
and Nisbett, 1978). When humans carry out rapid decisions, they frequently create a reasonable 
explanation for their behaviour and choice, which may be correct at times, but not always (Wilson 
and Nisbett, 1978). The habitual and repetitive nature of nutrition, the speediness with which 
humans are able to take decisions, and the limited cognitive resources that lead to states of 
cognitive depletion and loss of self-control, reveal the difficulty in consistently carrying out the 
optimal food choices (see Levitsky, 2005; Levitsky et al., 2005). Studies also demonstrated that 
people on a diet, worried on having to pay scrupulous attention to their food choices, developed 
problems in executive control and functioning because of this burdening activity (see Bryan and 
Tiggeman, 2001; Vreugdenburg et al., 2003). The issue of food consumption is complex, and 
solutions need to be found to address human’s inherent difficulty in monitoring food choices, and 
most importantly to eat healthily.   
Figure 16. Wansink and Sobal (2007). 
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3.2 Nudging: using environmental cues to improve food decisions 
 
For the aims of the present dissertation, it is important to determine the impact of nudge initiatives 
in the domain of nutrition. Hollands et al. (2013) grouped research evidence on choice architecture 
interventions aimed at altering the environment of shops, restaurants and workplaces to cue health 
behaviour. The result of their study evidenced that most of the research has been conducted in the 
domain of nutrition (70% of the studies). Arno and Thomas (2016) built on the preliminary study 
of Holland et al. (2013), completing a meta-analysis on the outcomes of the 42 studies identified 
in that paper. Their work provides one of the most comprehensive meta-analyses to form an 
evidence base on the impact of nudging in the domain of healthy nutritional choices. The 
population of the assessed studies was comprised of adults only (i.e. from 18 years to 65 years); 
they include both men and women; and were not focused on a subset (e.g. obese people, diabetics, 
etc.) but on the generic population. The results of the analysis demonstrate that globally, nudge 
interventions positively increase healthy nutritional behaviour. On average, nudges determine a 
15.3 % increase in healthier food consumption choices, as measured by choice frequency or by 
total intake (Arno and Thomas, 2016). The results of the review are showed in Figure 17. Indeed, 
even though the review assessed a significant amount of data, the evidence would be reinforced 
with the addition of further experimental results. The literature could take advantage from the 
replication of choice architecture initiatives on broader populations and in additional cultural 
contexts, which is one of the contributions of this research project.  
In a review on the role of contextual influences on eating behaviours, Cohen and Babey (2012) 
illustrate a selection of environmental cues that influence dietary choices in away-from-home food 
settings (i.e. restaurants, lunchrooms). These settings are especially relevant, because in these 
situations food choices are generally more rapid and prone to the influence of heuristic processes, 
as people are influenced by the variety of stimuli in the environment. Particularly, the researchers 
listed the set of environmental cues that are most common in the literature on out-of-home dietary 
behaviour: menus and signboards, menu calorie labelling, other nutritional labelling schemes, 
order of presentation, portion sizes, variety, pricing, accessibility, music, waitress behaviour, and 
health rating systems (ibid.). To illustrate, some examples of nudges developed to deal with these 
external variables are provided here. 
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Dayan and Bar-Hillel’s (2011) belief that nudging interventions can be a useful tool for dealing 
with the growing problem of obesity, led them to study the effect of positioning in a menu. The 
researchers conducted two studies to investigate whether the order in which foods are presented in 
a menu affects people’s choices.  
 
 
Figure 17. Meta-analysis of the impact of nudging strategies in the domain of healthy food choices (Arno and Thomas, 2016). 
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Their hypothesis posited that the options at the beginning and at the end of a menu are remembered 
more easily and increase the choice of these items. In study 1, based in the University campus, the 
menu consisted of four categories: cocktails; appetizers; alcohol free drinks; and desserts. The 
authors proposed four different menu versions, which differed only in the order in which the items 
were presented within the categories. The prices were not shown, and since the menu categories 
were only four, not all items covered each position in their category. However, arrangements were 
made so that in each menu, the first and last position of each category was always covered by a 
different item. Participants were given a menu and were simply asked to choose an item from each 
category. In study 2, the experiment involved real customers inside a café in Tel-Aviv. In this case 
the prices were shown, and the study was based on three categories: coffee with alcohol; soft 
drinks; and desserts. Two menus were presented (the original menu; and two variations) that 
differed only in the disposition of the items within the three categories. Only one type of menu 
was offered each day, and each was tested for fifteen days. In both experiments, the researchers 
found that the popularity of an item increased at least by 15% when it was positioned at the 
beginning or at the end of its category (Figures 18 and 19). The authors, through the experiment, 
conclude that food order in a menu affects choices. This experiment is useful for choice architects 
that want to guide people towards the selection of the healthier items which should be presented 
at the beginning or at the end of their category. 
   
Figure 18 and Figure 19. The mean percent of choices made when an item was on the top or bottom vs. in the middle 
of its food category. 
 
Another experiment investigated order effects. To understand how to guide consumers towards 
the healthier food options, Wansink and Hanks (2013), conducted a field experiment to investigate 
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how the food presentation in a buffet influences people’s food selection. Two different breakfast 
buffet lines were arranged in opposite orders: one offered the healthiest food first (fruit, low-fat 
yogurt, low-fat granola), the other displayed the least healthy food first (cheesy eggs, bacon, 
potatoes). The results revealed that people were biased by the different presentation of food: more 
than 75% of diners chose the first food displayed in each line. Interestingly, another effect was 
observed, as people in the least healthy food first line selected more total food choices, boosting 
the calorie content of their plates. When eggs, bacon and potatoes were offered first, 66.2% diners 
also served themselves fruit, yogurt, or granola; whereas when fruit was offered first, only 39% of 
diners also chose eggs, potatoes, or bacon. This paper illustrate what Wansink calls the ‘‘first foods 
most’’ principle, as people is more likely to choose what they see first. Secondly, the food order 
also influenced successive choices, as people indulged selecting additional food products, 
particularly those products that are more appetizing. Therefore, a choice architecture intervention 
that simple entails the presentation of healthier food first seems to be a low-cost and potentially 
promising strategy. 
A final example is the study conducted by Schwartz et al. (2012), whose research in a fast-food 
restaurant had the purpose of activating people’s self-control by nudging towards the choice of 
smaller portions, reducing calorie intake. Evidence suggests, as previously illustrated (Wansink 
and Sobal, 2007), that people tend to overconsume because they eat “mindlessly”; moreover, when 
people rely on visual cues such as the amount of food on a plate, their perception of portion is 
biased. Behavioural economics tells us that environments can be altered to facilitate self-control 
and activate healthier behaviour. In their pilot study, Schwartz et al. (2012) noticed that customers 
perceived restaurant portions to be too abundant. People reported that if they were offered the 
option to select smaller portions, they would prefer them. Therefore, the authors conducted three 
experimental studies to test whether it was true that individuals would accept smaller food portions. 
In the experiments, the customers who ordered high calorie dishes (400+ calories) were invited to 
take only half a portion and informed that, by doing so, they would reduce the caloric intake by 
half. In study 1, during the baseline phase, when it was not explicitly proposed, only 1% of the 
restaurant customers spontaneously asked a reduced portion of food. Instead, in the offer phase, 
33% of customers accepted a reduced portion of food. The nudge that presented customers with 
an opportunity to exercise self-control by reducing portion sizes was successful. In a second offer 
phase, researchers tested whether a discount of 25 cents for a downsized portion could also be an 
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effective strategy. However, the discount did not encourage customers towards portion reduction. 
Researchers also monitored if those who downsized their portion compensate by choosing other 
higher-calorie entrées. This effect did not occur, and downsizing led to a decrease in total calorie 
intake, approximately 100 (ibid.).  
The following sections focus specifically on salience and labelling, illustrating the most prominent 
research experiments carried out involving alterations to the food environment. Some of these 
studies were conducted in laboratory, but mostly in field settings, especially lunchrooms. This 
evidence provided the basis for the development of the empirical study developed for the present 
research project. 
3.2.1. Salience 
 
To understand why salience and priming are effective nudging strategies, a fundamental concept 
in the domain of intuitive thinking needs first to be illustrated: the accessibility dimension. As 
Kahneman (2003) explains, a core feature of System 1 is that many intuitive thoughts and ideas 
arise automatically and effortlessly. The reason why some contents arise in the mind more easily 
is because they are more accessible. Both cognitive mechanisms and environmental cues are the 
determinants of the degree of accessibility of a thought or stimulus (ibid.). Some features called 
natural assessments (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1983) are regularly and repeatedly recorded by 
System 1 or by the perceptual system without any awareness nor intention from the person. In a 
specific environment, the term accessibility refers to diverse features in an environment, such as 
the objects that are present and their different attributes that can be more or less accessible. The 
accessibility of an object or stimulus is determined by the process of selective attention, by priming 
(Bargh et al., 2001; Kahneman, 2011), by physical salience (e.g. properties such as such as size, 
distance, brightness, variety), by similarity (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1983), causal inclination 
(Kahneman and Varey, 1990), affective valence (e.g., Zajonc, 1980; Bargh, 1994; Slovic et al., 
2002), and mood (Schwarz and Clore, 1983). Evidently, as we can realise from the previous list, 
there is much knowledge on the determinants of accessibility, however, a general theory of 
accessibility does not exist. As Kahneman (2003) points out, in the milieu of the research on 
decision-making, the great usefulness of the concept of accessibility compensates the absence of 
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a theoretical account. Considering the role of accessibility in the decision-making process of food 
consumption can be a starting point for the development of effective nudge interventions.  
In the domain of eating behaviour, the concept of saliency refers to the accessibility (i.e. 
convenience, visibility) of food items and their attributes, which can influence consumption. For 
instance, factors such as availability and the facility of access to high-calorie products have been 
associated to the risk of an increase in food intake (Brownell, 2005). The mere sight or smell of 
food can elicit unplanned consumption (Wansink, 2004; Painter et al., 2002). Chandon and 
Wansink (2002) confirmed through data analysis, laboratory and field studies, that the strategy of 
stockpiling food products (and thereby increasing their salience) increases consumption. Another 
study by Cornell et al. (1989) investigated the elements that encourage food craving when people 
are satiated and not energy depleted. In Study 1, 40 participants were tested under conditions of 
either hunger or satiety. The subjects were first exposed to pizza or ice cream (the primes), and 
then offered more of that food to eat. The results showed that also satiated participants consumed 
pizza or ice cream, and that the mere sight of these palatable foods enhanced their desire for them 
(self-report data). Faith et al. (2007) published a leading review on different environmental 
strategies that involved changes to food accessibility aimed at decreasing food intake. The studies 
in this review generally focused on healthy food, since the consumption of fruit and vegetables 
(and other healthy food items) is the core of a healthy diet, and the first step towards the reduction 
of overweight and obesity (see chapter 4.1.). Different dimensions of accessibility were evaluated 
in the review: the role of access to transport to reach retailers; the degree of variety of specific 
foods; the extent to which a product is ready to eat; and the spatial distance to food. The authors 
concluded overall that in the context of this wider spatial distance, the ease of access to healthy 
food holds an influence on food purchases, which is likely to influence food intake and weight. 
While a focus on healthy food items is fundamental, the same is true for high-calorie, unhealthy 
food options. Therefore, researchers investigated whether increasing the physical distance from 
unhealthy products could be a promising strategy to decrease their consumption. For instance, a 
study by Painter et al. (2002) involving adult employees, evaluated the influence of visibility and 
spatial distance on the consumption of a bowl of chocolate candies. The study involved a three-
week condition: in the first week, the candy bowl was located on a visible and accessible location 
on the top of a desk; the second week the bowl was placed in the desk’s drawer, where it was 
accessible but not visible; finally, the bowl was placed at a two-meters distance on a shelf, so the 
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subject needed to actively stand up and reach for the candy. The results demonstrate that 
convenience and visibility influenced consumption (Figure 20). When the candies were on the 
desk, participants ate 2.9 more candies compared to the participants who had the container in the 
drawer, and 5.6 more than the subjects whose bowls was on the shelf. Following the experiment, 
the subjects were asked to estimate their consumption of candies when the bowl was in each of the 
three placements. Interestingly, when the candy bowl was in the desk people overestimated their 
consumption, while they underestimated it when the bowl was inconveniently located on the shelf.  
 
 
Figure 20. Differences in actual and estimated number of candy consumption among different 
locations of a candy container (Painter, Wansink and Hieggelke, 2002). 
 
In another laboratory experiment, Maas et al. (2012) assessed the effects of the physical distance 
(i.e. accessibility) on the intake of unhealthy snacks. The researchers manipulated the accessibility 
of food options, by placing healthy products distant from unhealthy choices and - in accordance to 
the previous studies - they found that increasing the distance of unhealthy products reduced the 
probability that these products were selected. The visibility of food items on a “tablescape” (Sobal 
and Wansink, 2007) facilitates consumption because they attract attention and provide signals to 
eat. The salience of food increase when it is visible in a room, influencing potential consumers; at 
the same time no other cues that act as stopping signals to the consumption process are available 
(ibid.) Two main effects are responsible for the effect of distance: the physical dimension and the 
psychological dimension of distance (Maas et al., 2012). The physical dimension refers to spatial 
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distance, and it is plausible that larger distances are cognitively perceived by people as more 
effortful. When items are located at a greater distance rather that nearby and easy to reach, people 
may be less motivated to look for the object, and the probability that the person selects the item 
decrease. Secondly, distance may influence the consumption of unhealthy food items also because 
those tempting items become less salient from a psychological point of view (ibid.). Psychological 
distance entails a distancing between the person and the object, therefore the self perceives the 
object and its properties in a more abstract, less vivid way. A higher psychological distance from 
unhealthy products can be a tactic to facilitate a process of ‘cooling down’ that enables the person 
to avoid the temptation (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999).   
 
Convenience is a strong environmental factor that influences food choice: if a food item is easy 
to reach, if it is already prepared, or if it is easy to grab and eat, people are more likely to choose 
it rather than if they have to use extra time or effort to obtain it. Convenience can take many forms. 
Hanks et al. (2012) conducted a four-month experiment (8 control weeks and 8 experimental 
weeks) to test the effects of changes in convenience in a lunchroom. The cafeteria originally had 
two lines to purchase food; the researchers for the experiment left one of the two lines unaltered 
(standard line) and transformed the second line into the ‘convenience line’. At the convenience 
line students could pay only for the healthier food options: salad, sandwiches, and fruit. The 
purpose of the experiment was obviously to make healthier foods choices less costly. The authors 
evaluated both the choice of the food items, as well as the actual intake. The researchers found that 
after introducing the convenience line, the number of healthier foods choices increased by 18.8%. 
However, there is a substantial difference between the chosen food and the food being consumed: 
the increase in healthier food consumption after the introduction of the convenience line was 
approximately 0%. On the other hand, less healthy food consumption had dropped dramatically 
by 27.9%. When the convenience line was introduced in the canteen, students chose a greater 
amount of food and increased the choice of healthier foods. However, the food chosen was not 
actually consumed, but mostly wasted. Convenience, therefore, seems to push people towards the 
choice of healthier food options, but food preferences may be responsible for actual consumption. 
On the bright side, providing students with healthier food, may increase the degree of familiarity 
with healthier food options. Furthermore, while the intervention did not lead to an increase in the 
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actual healthier food consumption, it led to a relevant reduction in the consumption of less healthy 
items. 
Hanks et al. (2013b) conducted further research in high school lunchrooms to test the total 
makeover impact of nudge interventions that targeted fruits and vegetables. Multiple nudges (i.e. 
convenience, visual salience, verbal prompts) were simultaneously activated. First, one of the two 
serving lines was transformed into a ‘healthy convenience line’ for healthier sandwiches and fruits 
and vegetables; salad was presented in single portions in transparent plastic; and fruit was offered 
in a basket near the cash register. Secondly, signage was increased by the display in the menu the 
images of the food items in the lunch menu; the sign “Last Chance for Fruit” was added to the fruit 
basket; and staff employed verbal prompts to recommend fruits and vegetables. Finally, the lunch 
line was altered to be more attractive by placing colourful linens under the pile of trays and 
removing the garbage bins from the service area. Data was collected recording tray waste for each 
student, and researchers marked whether the target food items were ‘not eaten at all’, ‘half eaten’ 
or ‘completely eaten’. The researchers found that with the total makeover, 13.4% of the students 
were more likely to select fruit, and 23% were more likely to select vegetables. More specifically, 
the intervention increased the probability that students consumed at least half portion of fruit by 
18% and vegetables by 25%; furthermore, students were 10% more likely to consume the whole 
portion of fruit and 16% more likely to consume the whole portion of vegetables. Thus, the overall 
choice architecture successfully nudged students towards healthier food choices. 
It is striking to see how small changes may unknowingly affect individual choices. Rozin et al. 
(2011), started from the premise that a higher accessibility of low-calorie food along with a lower 
accessibility of high-calorie food could lead to significant weight loss over a prolonged period. 
Over a three-years period, they conducted four studies in a cafeteria, ranging from different 
questions in relation to customers' purchasing choices. In each study, the average consumption of 
the food items was monitored. In study 1, the researchers investigated whether the proximity of 
food affects the quantity selected. They compared the selection of food items placed either at the 
middle of the more unavailable row, with the selection of those that were easily accessible at the 
edges (Figure 21).  
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Figure 21. Layout for Study 1 (Rozin et al., 2011). 
For two months, the location of eight ingredients - broccoli, cheese, chicken, cucumbers, eggs, 
mushrooms, olives, tomatoes - were rotated and compared in consideration of each arrangement. 
The researchers found that when food items were placed in the middle, they were consumed less 
than if the produce was divided into 2 smaller trays and placed at the central edge lines. More 
specifically, comparison between positions led to the conclusion that placing food in an 
unreachable position reduces the average choice of a product by 13.4%, compared to when the 
same product is placed in an easy to reach position. This result was valid for all ingredients. 
However, this outcome may depend on the fact that in the second arrangement, food was placed 
in two trays rather than in one, so customers had more opportunities to reach and select the item. 
Thus, study 2 (Figure 22) analysed to what extent the opportunity to reach for a food item affects 
the choice of the product itself. In this second experiment, a food item was placed either on a large 
tray in a central position or divided in two smaller trays placed at the end of the same row. The 
results showed that placing the same item in two smaller side trays rather than in a large and central 
position reduced consumption of that product by an average of 1.13%. Consequently, this result 
implies that the outcome of the first study did not depend on the double opportunity to select a 
product, but on the convenience of its positioning. 
 
Figure 22. Layout for Study 2 (Rozin et al., 2011). 
 However, there is still the possibility that, having two convenient accesses and only one 
inconvenient access influenced the choice of food. Therefore, in Study 3 (Figure 23), food was 
presented to the customers with two inconvenient positions and one convenient position. The 
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authors found that the average consumption of all item decreased when food was placed in the 
middle line, compared to when it was positioned at one of the edge.  
 
Figure 23. Layout for study 3 (Rozin et al., 2011). 
The final study assumed that accessibility is not only a function of proximity. Instead of testing 
the influence of the diverse positioning, the group tested if the ease of use of a utensil could affect 
intake, specifically confronting two types of tools, spoons versus tongs. Four types of food were 
observed: tomatoes, artichoke hearts, cheese cubes, and mandarins. Alternatively, two categories 
were served with spoons and the others with tongs. All items were consumed less when the tongs 
were available, 16.5% in average, as these tools are likely to be less handy to use. Finally, the aim 
of these four experiments was to examine the influence of minimal changes in the accessibility of 
food in real life contexts. The results suggest that poor food accessibility decreases food 
consumption, an insight which may have substantial implications for people in terms of weight 
loss. 
Finally, Van Kleef et al. (2012) verified that the effect of increasing the accessibility of healthy 
snacks located in a shelf near the cash registers (while maintaining the presence of unhealthy items) 
can be a promising strategy. First in a lab and then in a field study in a hospital canteen, the 
researchers tested the effect of manipulating the shelf arrangement of a counter displaying both 
healthy and unhealthy snacks. The display was modified by placing healthy snacks at higher 
shelves versus lower shelves (i.e. accessibility), while assortment (i.e. availability or variety) was 
changed by offering either 25% or 75% of healthy snacks. Both experiments demonstrated that a 
higher availability (75%) can alter consumer perception and choices increasing the selection of 
healthy snacks. Probably, this effect occurred because a higher availability of healthy snacks 
increased their attractiveness and prominence. Interestingly, both the laboratory and the field study 
reported that locating healthy items at the most accessible top shelf did not influence consumption 
choices. In fact, a decrease in the visibility of the unhealthy snacks did not decrease sales. This 
lack of efficacy was not expected by researchers, who hypothesized that their manipulation was 
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not sufficiently strong to change the perception of convenience. Overall, the study supports the 
proposition that increasing the availability of healthy snacks, while maintaining the possibility to 
choose unhealthy items, is a successful strategy to increase the selection of healthy items, pointing 
to the relevance of nudging interventions (ibid.).  
Variety is also a property related to salience. The number of available alternatives can influence 
consumer choices in multiple ways and different assortment sizes have different effects on the 
kind of product consumers select (Sela et al., 2009). The first studies were conducted by Rolls et 
al. (1981) who found that when participants were presented with an assortment composed of three 
flavours of yogurt, they were likely to consume an average of 23% more yogurt than if they had 
only one flavour available. The elementary concept that a higher degree of variety of a food 
product can lead to an increase in the consumption volume of that product (Rolls,1986) has been 
demonstrated in individuals of different ages and genders (Rolls and McDermott, 1991). But actual 
variety is not necessarily required: in fact, increased availability is sufficient to alter consumption 
patterns. In 2004, Kahn and Wansink demonstrated that merely altering the structure of an 
assortment can lead to an increase in the perceived variety and thereby to an increase in 
consumption. In one study, participants received a bowl of 300 M&M candies that were offered 
either in seven or in ten different colours. Despite the different colours, the taste of the M&Ms is 
always the same, however the participants with the ten colours bowl ate up to 43% more. In a 
second study on variety, participants received either a bowl with an organised assortment of 300 
jelly beans in six different flavours, or a bowl with a confused assortment of the same product and 
flavours. The participants who ate from the confused assortment reported a greater degree of 
variety and consumed 69% more candies (22 jelly beans vs. 13) compared to the other group. 
These research studies reveal that simple changes in an assortment’s structure and organisation 
change people’s perception and have an impact on consumption. As Figure 24 illustrates, one 
explanation for this phenomenon is that the perception of a higher variety is automatically linked 
by the person to a higher level of enjoyment; a second explanation is that higher variety also 
changes the consumption norm and therefore might suggest a different appropriate amount to 
consume in the given context (Kahn and Wansink, 2004; Wansink 2004). 
105 
 
 
Figure 24. Influence on actual or perceived food variety on consumption volume (Wansink, 2004). 
 
Sela et al. (2008) conducted five studies to observe the effect of assortment size on option choice, 
and discovered that when more healthy options were available, the selection of these products 
increased. In laboratory experiment 1a, the researchers presented participants with ten alternatives 
of ice cream, five standard ice-creams and five low-fat ice creams. The authors hypothesised that 
participants who chose from a wider range of alternatives, would be more likely to select the 
reduced-fat ice cream: as predicted, the group who chose from a larger assortment selected the 
low-fat ice cream more often (37 %) compared to the other group (20 %). In field experiment 1b, 
one group of people could choose one item among six types of fruit and six types of cookies and 
cakes, while the second group had a reduced set of two options from each category. As 
hypothesized, in the larger assortment 76 % of the participants selected a healthy fruit over the 
inviting alternatives, while in the smaller assortment 55 % of the participants chose fruit. These 
findings suggest that the ratio of availability of different food options determines what product is 
chosen. This insight is relevant since in most food environments the availability of unhealthy foods 
exceeds the volume healthy options such as fruits and vegetables, and therefore a greater 
availability of these options can be beneficial.  
 
3.2.2. Labelling  
 
The interest towards priming effects (Bargh 1994; 1996; 2005) has led many researchers to test 
whether healthy eating behaviour could be increased by using priming nudges. Cues can be either 
visual, verbal or sensational, and can be altered to nudge individuals towards a certain choice 
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(Forwood et al., 2015). These priming studies (see Figure 25) are varied in their design; however, 
they suggest the potential validity of using contextual cues as primes to improve food choices, 
mainly by decreasing the selection and consumption of snacks and junk foods. The literature 
review conducted by Wilson et al. (2016) on the use of priming to guide people towards healthier 
food options, shows that research is still limited but growing.  
 
Figure 25. Summary of studies that investigate the impact of priming on food choices, from Forwood et al., 2015. 
Research has demonstrated that priming can encourage people to eat more healthily. Priming is a 
powerful nudge because as Wilson and Brekke (1994) explain, protecting oneself from this 
unconscious influence is not easy. First, the person should be aware of the influence of the prime; 
secondly, the person should be motivated to evade the influence; and finally, engage actively in a 
different response. For instance, Giner-Sorolla (2001) found that priming negative emotions such 
as guilt increased self-control reducing the consumption of snacks, while priming negative hedonic 
emotions increased the consumption of snacks. In one of the five experiments conducted by 
Fishbach et al. (2003), participants were primed with the goal of dieting, and this increased their 
choice of an apple instead of a Twix bar, however, it did not influence their deliberate intentions 
to sacrifice fatty, high-calorie food. Mann and Ward (2004) primed participants in a room with 
cues to reduce intake (such as diet books) decreasing their intake of a milkshake they were asked 
to taste, particularly when they were in a state of limited attention. 
Labelling is a type of nudge based on the mechanism of priming. Experimental results from the 
provision of labelling schemes have been mixed, especially from the studies employing labels with 
numeric information. Most of the studies on menu calorie labels found a limited or no impact 
before and after the intervention (see Harnack et al., 2008; Ebel et al., 2011; Finkelstein et al., 
2011; Vadiveloo et al., 2011). Nevertheless, one real-world experiment found that in a group of 
restaurants, the participants who noted the calorie labels ordered 100 less calories (Dumanovsky 
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et al. 2011). Holdsworth et al. (1998), in a review of twenty different labelling interventions, most 
of which based on the provision of calorie information, also found some moderate short–term 
positive outcomes. In a successful nudge intervention conducted by the Danish Cancer Society 
(Vase, 2015), calorie labels were added on a coffee machine, indicating the calorie index of each 
beverage (plain; with sugar; with sugar and milk). Additionally, close to the coffee machine, two 
posters were added providing information for men (80kg) and women (60 kg), that included 
physical activity level and the time necessary to burn calories. The signage completed the 
intervention to offer a clearer idea to those who had no knowledge about the recommended daily 
calorie intake. This experiment still employed numeric data, however the numbers on the coffee 
machine were unequivocal, and supplementary information regarding daily total calorie needs was 
provided through the signage. This experiment also differs because when people head to a coffee 
machine, they are generally on a break, and therefore have more time for reading and processing 
information.  
In the United States, using labelling to warn consumers about the calorie index of food products is 
a growing policy strategy (Ebel et al., 2011; Finkelstein et al., 2011; Vadiveloo et al., 2011; 
Thorndike et al., 2012). Information-based policies are employed based on the notion that 
consumers will act more rationally by selecting lower calorie products if they are equipped with 
information. However, research evidence about the effectiveness of numeric labels listing calorie 
information mostly reports negative outcomes (see Downs et al., 2009; Dubbert et al., 1984). The 
issue is that for several reasons consumers can hardly interpret nutrition data correctly: this 
presupposes having a knowledge of one’s total daily caloric needs; not being in a condition of time 
pressure to consider the information; and requires numeracy skills (Thorndike et al., 2012). System 
1 guides many of our food decisions, however health communication still employs numeric data 
(e.g. Body Mass Index, recommended calorie intake, nutritional indexes on the labels) that are 
processed by System 2 (Roberto and Kawachi, 2014). Peter et al. (2006; 2007) indicate a series of 
reasons that explain the lack of effectiveness of these indicators: these indicators are abstract, and 
people have difficulty in processing them; the numeric indicators are not absolute values but vary 
depending on the person (e.g. daily calorie intake); data does not successfully influence the 
perception of risk; finally, people may be more influenced by emotional factors and moods (Peters, 
2009). Finally, as Downs et al. (2009) point out, overeating frequently depend from self-control 
issues that can occur regardless of a person’s complete knowledge of the consequences. Hence, 
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these findings should inform future policies and communication campaigns for the development 
of more effective labelling systems, which should be developed to hit System 1. 
Eye-tracking research on nutrition labels show that individuals tend to focus more on images rather 
than numbers. In a study conducted by Jones and Richardson (2007), the efficacy of two forms of 
nutrition labels was assessed, through the measure of eye movements and healthiness ratings. The 
researchers recorded the eye movements while the subjects completed healthiness ratings for two 
types of labels: standard nutrition labels vs. traffic light labels. The results revealed that the traffic 
light labels were more effective as they steered the participant’s attention on the important 
nutrients and enhanced the accurateness of the healthiness ratings. Temple et al. (2011) compared 
the impact on food selection and intake of standard nutrition labels versus traffic light symbols 
that used red, yellow and green colours to indicate respectively high-calorie items, moderate 
calorie-items, and low-calorie items. The researchers calculated the total energy intake, the energy 
intake of each product, and the number of items purchased from each traffic light category. The 
intuitive colour scheme led to an increase in the consumption of “green” items and reduced the 
consumption of “red” items, while numeric nutrition labels reduced energy intake only in lean 
females. Stutts et al. (2011) in another laboratory study, tested the impact of standard calorie labels 
versus labels with the picture of a heart. The experiment involved 236 children, and labels were 
added to a fast food menu. Evidence showed that children exposed to the heart pictogram preferred 
healthier food options, compared to those exposed to the classic calorie label, or to menus without 
labels. 
The previous studies were all conducted in a laboratory setting. Thorndike et al. (2012) conducted 
a renowned experiment to assess the impact of a labelling intervention followed by a choice 
architecture intervention, to nudge people towards healthy food in a real-world setting. They 
employed a labelling scheme to communicate to the consumers of a hospital cafeteria the 
‘healthiness’ of the items. Like preceding researchers, Thorndike et al. (2012) opted for an intuitive 
semaphore strategy, with green, yellow, and red labels. The study had a duration of nine months. 
In the first three months, baseline data was collected, while in the following six months a two-
phase choice architecture intervention was implemented: phase 1 added a labelling scheme; phase 
2 added a choice architecture intervention to alter the accessibility of selected healthy items. Phase 
1 employed semaphore labels on all the food and beverages, with the aim to offer immediate visual 
cues that hit System 1 to stimulate implicit associations and orient people’s choices. The green 
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label indicated “consume often,” the yellow label “consume less often,” and red label “there is a 
better choice in green or yellow”. The meaning of the labels conveys a positive message, as green 
solicits towards an optimal choice while red is not punitive, and signage was posted to explain the 
labelling scheme. Phase 2 added a choice architecture intervention to alter the convenience and 
salience of three target products. Cold beverages were rearranged to display green beverages at 
eye level, while yellow and red beverages were placed beneath eye level. The same intervention 
was applied to the sandwich counter and to chips. Data showed that the labels increased the 
purchase of all green label food by 4.5 %, and green label beverages by 9.6 %. The salience 
intervention the selection of all green items slightly decreased by 0.8% compared to phase 1, but 
the purchase of green beverages further increased by 4.0%. The labelling scheme decreased the 
purchase of all red label food items (by 9.2 %) and of all red label beverages (by 16.5 %). The 
salience intervention further decreased the purchase of red label food products (by 4.9 %), and of 
red label beverages (by 11.4%). Overall, the project was successful to improve people’s 
consumption choices, and it is the first experiment that tested a combination of both a labelling 
nudge with a salience nudge.  
In a study by Ensaff et al. (2015) the researchers tested a labelling intervention in a secondary 
school dining setting. Two secondary schools (1 intervention and 1 control school) were selected, 
that operated with the same menus and meals. The target of the intervention were plant-based 
options, namely fruit, vegetarian dishes, and sandwiches containing salad. The experimental 
design followed three phases: baseline (twenty-nine weeks); intervention (six weeks); and post-
intervention when the cafeteria was reinstated to its baseline state (three weeks). The nudges 
selected were:  
▪ Yellow stickers with a smiley face on the packaging of the sandwiches containing salad;  
▪ A window sticker in the vegetarian display unit promoting the freshness of the meal: “Today’s 
SPECIAL - Make a fresh choice”;  
▪  “GOOD for YOU” stickers on fruit pots and whole fruit. 
 
The labels employed a simple signal code (i.e. smiley face), descriptive names (‘todays’ special’) 
and verbal prompting (i.e. ‘good for you’). These choices are in line with past research that 
demonstrated the effectiveness of using attractive names (Wansink et al, 2012) and verbal prompts 
(Schwartz, 2007). The results show that at the intervention school, purchase of fruit products 
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increased significantly during the intervention (4.2%) and post-intervention (3.7%), compared to 
the baseline (2.9%). The selection of sandwiches with salad also rose from 0.06% to 1.36%. 
Overall, the students were 2.5 times more likely to select one of the target items. Interestingly, 
data also revealed an increase in the selection of salads (from 0.2% to 1.6%) during the intervention 
period, even though the product was not among the targets of the intervention. 
Kiviniemi et al. (2007) labelled ‘affective associations’ the feelings that people associate to a 
certain behaviour, which in turn influences decision-making. Affective associations have been 
demonstrated to be involved in dietary behaviour (see Kiviniemi and Duangdao, 2009; Keer et al., 
2010). People develop affective associations with food products, that is a mental association 
between a behaviour (in this case, the intake of a certain food) and an affective state (pleasure or 
repulsion for a certain food). For instance, people are able to identify the food products that they 
associate with positive feelings such as happiness and warmth (Wansink et al., 2003). On the other 
hand, food can also have negative affective association, such as the instant reaction of repulsion 
when a child eats spinach or brussels sprouts at its first exposure (Birch and Marlin, 1982). 
Knowing that feelings influence food choices, has key implications for interventions that aim to 
guide and change people’s food intake. Kiviniemi and Duangdao (2009) investigated whether 
more positive affective associations with fruits and vegetables determined higher levels of 
consumption of fruit and vegetables. The researchers assessed adults’ perceptions of the positive 
(benefits) and negative (barriers) factors in relation to the consumption of fruits and vegetables; 
their affective associations; and the actual level of current fruit and vegetable consumption. 
According to the hypothesis, the results confirmed that affective associations are a predictor of 
fruit and vegetable consumption. Walsh and Kiviniemi (2014) also demonstrated that the 
manipulation of affective associations can change behaviour. In a laboratory study, the affective 
associations towards fruit and vegetables were first altered through a priming intervention, and 
then the subjects were asked to choose a snack between fresh fruit (apples and bananas) or a 
granola bar. The results showed that the priming task significantly influenced the subject’s snack 
choices, those who were primed with positive affective associations for fruit were more likely to 
select it, whereas subjects primed with neutral or negative affect were less likely to select fruit 
(ibid.).  
The results of these studies are consistent with the theories on the role of affect in decision-making, 
such as the somatic marker hypothesis that postulates that affect serves as an indicator to the 
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possible expected reward or loss that is associated with a behavioural choice (Bechara et al., 1997; 
Damasio, 1994; Bechara and Damasio, 2005). Such automatic signalling might have an adaptive 
function, allowing people to decide quickly and without conscious deliberations; this might be 
particularly true for recurrent behaviours such as eating fruit and vegetables, for which minimizing 
cognition can be an optimal strategy (Kiviniemi and Duangdao, 2009). The limit of Walsh and 
Kiviniemi’s (2014) study is the artificial laboratory setting, which leaves open the question of 
whether an intervention on affective associations could be effective in a real-world setting. This 
question will be addressed in the empirical study of the present research project, as outlined in 
paragraph 4.2.4.2. (chapter 4). 
 
3.3 The role of habits in food choices 
 
Repetition of behaviour is a core feature of everyday life, in fact up to 45% of behaviour is repeated 
on a daily basis and in the same setting (Wood et al., 2002; Quinn and Wood, 2005). A brief 
discussion about habits is fundamental in this domain because habits are a specific type of 
automaticity, in which behaviour is directly prompted by environmental cues. Habits are sequences 
of behaviour learned after past experiences, that occur without conscious deliberation and 
awareness (Van T’Riet, 2011). Aarts and Custers (2010) defined habits as stable responses to 
specific stimuli, that result from social and biological processes that determine strong associations 
in memory. Habits are performed principally because they represent the path of lowest resistance 
in the person’s current course of action. As Wood and Neal (2009) point out, the tendency to 
behave guided by habits derives by the multiple daily demands, time pressure, distraction, or ego 
depletion. These are the occasions in which people are more likely to rely on habits. Furthermore, 
acting on habit reduces people's research for relevant information in the environment, as 
individuals tend to direct their attention towards information that is in line with their past behaviour 
(i.e. confirmatory bias). As Klockner and Prugsamatz (2012) illustrate, once a habit is established, 
it affects information research and the way information is processed. Habit determines a condition 
of behavioural stabilisation, which leads the person to unconsciously exclude counter-information. 
Indeed, this mechanism represents a barrier for behaviour change (ibid.). However, this does not 
imply the absence of deliberation in the process, since initially habits are the product of 
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preferences, intentions, or learned processes that enable goal pursuit; moreover, a habit can be 
interrupted by an act of deliberation and willpower (Wood and Neal, 2009).  
Thus, if habitual behaviour is not guided by conscious intentions or information research, what 
triggers its operation? Findings in the literature suggest that habitual behaviour is mostly guided 
by situational cues. Verplanken and Aarts (1999) maintain that habits are types of automatic 
behaviours that are represented as goal-action associations in the mind, and according to this 
approach, goal-directed behaviour is automatically activated by environmental cues. Instead, 
Wood and Neal (2007) maintain that habitual behaviour can be triggered by external stimuli also 
in the absence of the mediating role of goals. They define habits as follows: “[…] a specific type 
of automaticity characterized by a rigid contextual cuing of behaviour that does not depend on 
people's goals and intentions. Habits develop as people respond repeatedly in a stable context and 
thereby form direct associations in memory between that response and cues in the performance 
context” (Wool and Neal, 2009: p. 580). What is most important for the present purposes, is that 
both theories recognise the influence of environmental stimuli over habitual behaviour (see also 
Verplanken and Wood, 2006).  
Neal, Wood and Quinn (2006), illustrate three ways in which habits develop and are activated: 
direct context-cuing, implicit goal, and motivated goal contexts. First, in direct-context-cuing, the 
recurrent co-activation forms associations in memory between a context (or stimulus) and a 
response pattern. In this way, associative learning determines a specific response when perceiving 
a certain context or stimulus. Secondly, habitual responses can be the product of an implicit goal 
that has been repeatedly pursued in a specific context. Thus, when the goal is accessible, the person 
automatically activates the behavioural sequence of action. Finally, motivated context goals refer 
to the habits that evolved after rewarding past behaviour. This form of habit can be activated 
without the operation of goal, but simply by associated responses that predict rewards (ibid.).  
But whether habits are the product of direct cues, implicit goals, or motivated, and after the process 
has been automatically triggered by a cue, all forms of habit share the feature of having a rigid 
performance. This phenomenon has important implications in the domain of nutrition behaviour 
and food choices. For researchers interested in the promotion of specific behaviours, it is important 
to bear in mind the effect of habit. Eating is a daily behaviour often characterized by recurrent 
patterns, such as eating in the same context or at the same time, which leads to the assumption that 
eating behaviour is likely to become largely habitual and tend to be stable over time (Riet, 2011). 
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For instance, this assumption is true in relation to food purchases, as studies on household panel 
data display a repetition of the same food purchases (see Carrasco et al., 2005; Naik and Moore, 
1996). Whether an action is performed in a stable context is determinant for the establishment of 
a habit. A recurrent action in a same setting facilitates automaticity because over time, the 
cognitive process that guides the behaviour can be performed more rapidly, even multi-tasking on 
other activities, and with the deployment of minimal cognitive monitoring (Wood et al., 2002; 
Posner and Snyder, 1975). When an action is repeatedly performed in a same context, intentions 
do not guide the process; instead if an action is less frequently performed, or in variable contexts, 
intentions and cognitive monitoring is likely to guide behaviour (Danner et al., 2008). For instance, 
preparing a cup of tea at home in the morning may be a strong habit not governed by intentions; 
whereas making coffee at our mother’s in law apartment may be a performance guided by 
deliberation and intention. The importance of the stability of a context is an important aspect to 
take into account when planning interventions to change behaviour, as in the case of the lunchroom 
experiment that will be illustrated in chapter four.  
The dependency of habits on environmental stimuli is an important point of vulnerability; 
changing the cues that prompt and maintain habit performance leave behaviour open to change 
(Wood et al., 2005). Verplanken and Wood (2006); Neal et al. (2006); as well as Riet et al. (2011), 
discussed the role of habits in food choice settings, arguing that interventions directed at changing 
eating behaviours would increase in effectiveness if habitual behaviours were considered. The 
authors propose a strategy to break existing habits, which is in line with Wansink’s studies and 
with the nudging approach: the alteration of the physical features in food choice setting, changing 
the exposure to environmental stimuli. Indeed, studies suggest also other available strategies to 
guide behaviour by changing existing habits: the use of implementation intentions, or strategies 
that promote the exercise of self-control (see Wood and Neal, 2009). Such suggestions have not 
been done in vain, as implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999) have actually become a tool in 
the box of choice architects, along with nudges that promote self-control.  
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3.4. Conclusions 
 
People are often unaware of their consumption volume and poor dietary choices, and 
dissatisfaction among people who wish to improve their diet and reduce their weight is common. 
Italian policy-makers and institutions are concerned with the rising costs of health care and the 
growing rate of overweight and obesity in the population. Food consumption is an area in which 
an understanding of behaviour is paramount and has direct implications for consumer welfare.  
The notion that environmental stimuli influence consumption might not be new, but only in the 
last decade research piled up and new intervention strategies are being tested. Communication 
campaigns that convey information or interventions aimed to increase people’s willpower and 
vigilant monitoring produced insufficient results and are unrealistic. Food consumption and 
heuristic mechanisms are closely related since eating is a habitual and daily behaviour. For this 
reason, to support people’s adoption of more appropriate nutrition practices, choice architects and 
professionals involved in this task should bear in mind the influence of heuristics and employ them 
for the creation of new interventions. The adaptation of the environment is an important tool for 
overweight and obesity control, facilitating people in selecting healthier options.  
A wide literature has examined the environmental architecture that influences dietary decisions, 
such as placement location; the order in menu options; or semaphore labels. Small and totally free 
changes in the layout of food in lunchrooms (e.g. accessibility or perceived variety) can 
unconsciously drive individuals to a healthier diet. The evidence presented in this chapter on the 
nudging interventions in cafeterias and lunchrooms, represents proof of the validity of this concept. 
However, further research is required to establish the generalisability of the results and evaluate 
the impact across different settings and national contexts. Therefore, the aim of this project is to 
extend this field of study by testing similar nudges in two lunchrooms of a public hospital in Milan. 
To date, choice architecture interventions has never been tested in an Italian hospital and, if 
successful, the intervention has the potential to be replicated and extended to other health care 
structures at local, regional or national level. 
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4. Nudging healthy food choices in a hospital  
4.1. Context of the research 
 
“With health, everything is a source of pleasure; without it, nothing else, whatever it may be, is 
enjoyable...Health is by far the most important element in human happiness.” 
Arthur Schopenhauer, 1851 
Health Promotion is a key component of health policy, stemming from the recognition that 
lifestyles are the primary cause of the chronic conditions that constitute a grave burden for the 
individual and for society. In the past, the approach was to motivate people to change their 
behaviours, trying to influence their values, attitudes and beliefs. The present doctoral research 
project aims to enhance individual well-being shifting the focus away from a narrow attention on 
individual behaviours, towards the environmental factors that influence food choices and 
behaviour. The prevalence of overweight and obesity in the world is constantly and worryingly 
increasing. Overweight and obesity are commonly defined as an abnormal or excessive 
accumulation of fat in the body's fat tissue that poses health risks. The underlying cause is an 
energy surplus that results in weight gain; in other words, the calories introduced are higher than 
the calories burned. Many factors include hereditary predisposition, environmental and 
behavioural factors, aging and pregnancy (Rapporto Osservasalute, 2016). Overweight and obesity 
are among the major risk factors for non-communicable diseases such as ischemic heart disease, 
stroke, hypertension, type 2 diabetes, osteoarthritis and some cancers, and their ever-growing 
diffusion entails major impacts on the national health systems and is currently a public health 
priority issue worldwide (ibid.).  
In Italy, the issue attracted the interest of different research groups, and increased the necessity for 
population surveys to provide useful information on people's lifestyles to early monitor the positive 
or negative trends. From the results of the multi-scope survey of Istat "Aspects of daily life" it 
emerges that in Italy, in 2015, more than one-third of the adult population (35.3%) is overweight, 
while just over one in ten people is obese (9.8%) (Table 6). Overall, 45.1% of Italians aged 18 
years and over are overweight. The fact that just under half of the adult population (45.1%) is 
overweight (or obese) is undoubtedly an alarming figure, and the trend has maintained steady in 
the last years (Istat, 2015). 
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Table 6. Prevalence of people aged 18 and over that are overweight and obese by region of residence (Istat, 2015). 
 
Table 6 report data on the different regional situations: in Lombardy 40.6 % of the population is 
overweight or obese, which is not an irrelevant figure. The most affected are the southern regions 
of Molise (52.7 %), Campania (51 %) and Basilicata (50.5 %). Further data is offered by 
Sorveglianza Passi (2017a), a tool for gathering information on lifestyle and behavioural risk 
factors associated with the onset of chronic non-communicable diseases, and for gathering 
knowledge on the adherence to programs that Italy is implementing for prevention. According to 
the data on weight and height, estimates confirmed that about 4 adults out of 10 are overweight: 3 
are overweight (with a body mass index between 25 and 29.9) and 1 is obese (BMI ≥ 30). Table 7 
shows the prevalence of overweight by region: according to these data, Lombardy reaches 36.1 %; 
while the worst situation is confirmed to be found in southern Italy yet with different results from 
Istat’s report (Campania 52.2; Sicily 48,7 %; Molise 41.7 %). 
In nutrition, the typology of food we eat can truly make the difference for our health. The World 
Health Organization estimates that globally 1.7 million deaths are attributable to a poor 
consumption of fruit and vegetables (WHO, 2017). It is also estimated that 14% of deaths for 
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gastro-intestinal cancer, about 11% of deaths for ischemic heart disease, and 9% of stroke deaths 
are attributable to poor consumption of fruit and vegetables (ibid.). 
 
Table 7. Data on overweight per region of residence (Sorveglianza Passi, 2017a). 
The Italian guidelines for healthy nutrition (National Research Institute for Food and Nutrition, 
INRAN 2003) assign a central role to the variety of foods, and especially to vegetables and fruits 
that stand out for their strong association with the reduction of the risk of cardiovascular disease 
and, more generally, for their ability to transport antioxidant substances within the human body. 
The guidelines for healthy nutrition (INRAN, 2003) point out that adequate amounts of fruit and 
vegetables, in addition to protecting against cardiovascular, neoplastic and respiratory diseases 
(asthma and bronchitis), also provide a significant supply of complex carbohydrates, nutrients 
(such as vitamins, minerals, and organic acids), and antioxidant protective substances; 
furthermore, thanks to the fact that these foods are rich in fibres that give a feeling of satiety, they 
help reducing the caloric intake of the diet.  
The 2013-2016 data of Sorveglianza Passi (2017) show that in Italy, less than 5 adults out of 10 
consume no more than 2 servings per day of fruit or vegetables, that less than 4 adults out of 10 
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consume 3-4 portions daily, while only 1 out of 10 adults consumes the recommended quantity of 
fruit or vegetables (i.e. five servings a day). Consuming at least five servings of fruit and vegetables 
a day, as recommended, is a habit that grows with age, and it is more common among women and 
people without economic difficulties. The geographical gradient is clear and shows that the 
adherence to the ‘five a day’ drops significantly in the central and southern regions compared to 
those in Northern Italy. Since 2008, the share of people who follows the ‘five a day’ rule remained 
substantially stable, it has been observed a slight increase since 2013, yet it is not sufficient to 
achieve statistical significance (ibid.). 
The Osservasalute Report annually observes the health of the overall Italian population and 
compares the regional situations in relation to several health areas, including a section on “risk 
factors, lifestyles and prevention”. As the Osservasalute Report (2016) recommends, it is 
important to promote the adoption of healthy patterns of consumption that include fruit and 
vegetables as an integral part of the diet, also with the help of producers and restaurateurs. A 
continuous monitoring of food consumption and lifestyle variables is also necessary to verify 
whether awareness-raising policies towards balanced and proper nutrition can produce the desired 
changes. The evidence that overweight and obesity are preventable has been driving national and 
international actions to promote a healthy lifestyle on an individual level. The Lombardy Region 
supports a variety of programs that are currently at work in different areas to promote healthy 
lifestyles, as in schools with the Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) program, or 
with the Workers Health Promotion (WHP) program in public and private companies.  
 
4.1.1 Health promotion and the role of hospitals 
 
This section is dedicated to the illustration of the Workplace Health Promotion (WHP) program, 
a World Health Organization project developed to support workers to gain health in a series of 
areas, through a process that brings workers to consider their health as a resource to protect, and 
to improve their lifestyles and choices. Workplaces represent microcosms in which people spend 
most of their life, thereby it is intuitive to identify those contexts as privileged places to realise 
interventions aimed to adjust detrimental habits or behaviours.  
The nudging intervention developed for the empirical research of the present dissertation, was 
activated as a WHP initiative by the public hospital Niguarda Cà Granda in Milan. Below, a brief 
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history of health promotion is provided to contextualise the project and to highlight the change of 
paradigm that occurred in European health policy that shifted the focus from cure to prevention. 
In 1988, based on the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion, the World Health Organisation created 
an international project to establish a network of Health Promoting Hospitals (HPH), engaged in 
the implementation of related programs. The HPH is a tool to spur hospitals to add more emphasis 
on the promotion of health to prevent chronic disease, instead of narrowing the action by merely 
exerting activities of diagnosis and cure. This represents a shift to an improved vision in the 
concept of health that is no longer exclusively intended as ‘absence of illness’. The vision of health 
is holistic, accounting also for the psychological and social well-being that represent an essential 
part in determining the health of an individual (Groene and Garcia-Barbera, 2005). This vision 
established in the Ottawa Charter (WHO, 2009: p. 1) defines health promotion as: 
“(…) the process of enabling people to increase control over, and to improve, their health. To 
reach a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, an individual or group must be 
able to identify and to realize aspirations, to satisfy needs, and to change or cope with the 
environment. Health is therefore, seen as a resource for everyday life, not the objective of living. 
Health is a positive concept emphasizing social and personal resources, as well as physical 
capacities”.   
Two concepts emerge from the Ottawa Charter: the concept of enabling people means offering 
new incentives and opportunities to facilitate behaviours; which is in turn connected to the concept 
of empowerment, namely making people more responsible for the actions and decisions that 
influence their health (Groene and Garcia-Barbera, 2005). To these aims, the HPH movement has 
been divided into four areas of intervention: the promotion of patients’ health; the promotion of 
workers’ health; the transformation of the organization into a setting of health promotion; and the 
promotion of the health of the community present in the hospital area (ibid.). As Faviretti and 
Ricciardi (2002) note, to reorient health services, the HPH program is committed to: 
▪ The development of initiatives of health promotion in the hospitals; 
▪ To extend the interest of the hospital management beyond care, towards a broader concept 
of health; 
▪ The development of good practices, that are reproducible and transferable to other 
structures; 
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▪ The facilitation of cooperation and exchange among the hospitals that adhere to the HPH 
network; 
▪ The identification of common areas of interest, of codified programs and common 
procedures of evaluation. 
In Italy, the regional HPH network is active in several regions (Lombardy, Piedmont, Emilia 
Romagna, Veneto, Liguria, Tuscany and Trentino-Alto Adige). Several strategies of health 
promotion have been implemented, along with a variety of programs that range from informative 
interventions to more structured initiatives. Among the most relevant HPH programs, Workers 
Health Promotion (WHP) aims to build within hospitals, contexts that facilitate the emission of 
healthy behaviours and choices, to reduce the onset of chronic disease among the workers. 
The political activity that determined a higher level of cohesion among EU member states, 
accelerated the ability of the Union to work jointly on some crucial themes, such as health 
promotion (Burton, 2010). The European Network for Workplace Health Promotion (ENWHP) 
founded in 1996 and ratified in 1997 with the Luxembourg Declaration on Health Promotion in 
the Workplace, reflected the consensus of the group in the definition of workplace health 
promotion, namely the “the combined efforts of employees, employers and society to improve the 
health and well-being of people at work” (Burton, 2010: p. 12). Workplace Health Promotion is a 
concrete program that serves as a guide and methodological support for public (e.g. hospitals) and 
private organisations that wish to transform their workplace environment. It is nowadays 
ascertained that a healthy environment at work is critical for a good quality of life and for the well-
being of the individual and the community (ibid.). A healthy workplace is the result of the 
interaction of a variety of elements, of the action of a variety of subjects, therefore a multivariate 
social process. The WHP program has the purpose to offer workers the opportunity to improve 
their health conditions as well as their mental well-being, by developing projects for the reduction 
of the risk factors implicated in the genesis of chronic disease.  
In Lombardy, the WHP program was developed with the Regional Plan of Prevention (Piano 
Regionale della Prevenzione 2010–2013), formalized in the legislative decree n. 11861/2012, 
related to the promotion of lifestyles that are favorable to health in the workplace through the 
creation of sustainable and efficient programs (Regione Lombardia, PNR, 2015). The aim of the 
Lombardy WHP Network (Rete WHP Lombardia) is to improve workplace settings to make them 
suitable for the workers’ well-being, and to prevent the major risk factors to health, particularly 
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those determined by individual behaviours. It is clear how prevention can contribute to the 
avoidance of a relevant quote of deceases that derive from predictable causes. As Dahlgren and 
Whitehead (1991) point out, individual lifestyles are substantial determinants of health up to about 
50%, while 20% is attributed to genetics and environmental factors, and 10% to the health service. 
Research demonstrates that many behavioural, modifiable, risk factors are responsible for a series 
of disabilities, as synthesised in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Adapted and translated from Report ASL Lodi (2014, modified from World Economy Forum, Pricewaterhousecoopers - 
Health Research Institute Analysis 2007 and WHO Report 2004). 
 Much work must be done to improve the health and well-being of workers. The objective of the 
WHP program is to enable employers, associations, civil society and other stakeholders to 
cooperate toward the creation of workplaces where workers can enjoy more health and well-being 
as a result of their occupation. The action of the WHP program is oriented to offer all workers the 
same health opportunities through changes in the work environment, while the company and the 
workers themselves become responsible for the activation (i.e. they are empowered) of health 
processes. In this sense, implementing an intervention that is efficient in meeting the needs of 
workers, requires more than the mere knowledge of the issues to consider. Companies need to take 
an extra step, with the activation of interventions that envisage a continuous improvement, 
conducting research and activating processes of knowledge transfer. Currently, the WHP network 
in Lombardy involves both public and private companies in the realisation of functional 
interventions to promote health among the workers, following the set of ‘good-practices’ identified 
by the WHP program, whose validity is also guaranteed by the experts of the Local Sanitary 
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Agencies of the region. The network is characterized by the presence of a variety of stakeholders 
and actors from different sectors: professional organisations, Assolombarda, Confindustria 
Lombardia, public bodies, non-profit institutions, Fondazione Sodalitas, unions, scientific groups 
and Universities. The scientific program is coordinated and guaranteed by a regional panel 
composed of experts of the provinces of the region. The companies that respect the requirements 
and that realise the minimum number of practices required by the program, receive an annual 
accreditation in the name of the European network ENWHP. This accreditation assigns an annual 
logo as “workplace that promotes health”.  
The strength in the development of the network derives from a series of regional measures that 
defined the objectives and the procedure of the territorial sanitary agencies for health promotion. 
Particularly, the Regional Plan for Prevention 2015-2018 (Piano Regionale della Prevenzione 2015 
– 2018) defined the path for the extension and enrichment of the WHP Program, through the 
identification of precise objectives. In 2015, the network of private and public companies in 
Lombardy reached 36% of the workers’ population, 6% more than expected (ATS Brianza, 2016). 
Table 9 shows the data of 2014, first year of activity, in relation to both public (i.e. hospitals) and 
private companies that activated good practices, and the number of workers involved. 
Insofar, the path in Lombardy has been to develop specific programs, as the first step of an 
evolutionary process. Overall, the results in terms of efficacy of the WHP interventions have been 
mixed, depending on the typology of the intervention and the characteristics of the target 
population. The major results pertain to the area of smoke cessation, particularly for groups 
programs and individual counselling (Regione Lombardia, 2015). The activation of the initiatives 
in the hospitals show a concrete shift from the concept of curing the pathologies, toward a broader 
strategy of health promotion and prevention. In Lombardy, the success of the initiatives can be 
seen in the number of workers involved, and in the high degree of participation registered from 
the first year of activity. Undoubtedly, the transformation of the whole hospital in a setting that 
promotes health, is an ambitious landmark, far from the present picture. To this end, to guarantee 
the efficacy of the interventions in the long-term, the promotion of health needs to be anchored to 
the organisational culture and its structure (Groene e Garcia Barbero, 2005).  
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Table 9. Data from ASL LODI (2014), on the first year of activity of the WHP program in Lombardy. 
 
4.1.2 The activation of the WHP program at the hospital Niguarda Cà Granda  
 
The commitment of the hospitals that adhere to the WHP Network is to develop interventions in 
one or more of the six macro-areas identified by the program, providing a set of good practices 
(evidence-based or recommended) for projects in the areas of (1) food and nutrition, (2) contrast 
to tobacco use, (3) physical activity, (4) contrast to alcohol and drug use, (5) well-being and life-
work conciliation, and (6) safe and sustainable mobility. In Lombardy, the territorial sanitary 
agencies (Agenzia di Tutela della Salute, ATS) oversee the interventions implemented by the 
single hospitals through annually produced documentation, with the final aim of releasing a 
certificate of “Health Promoting Agency – ENWHP network”.  
The Niguarda Cà Granda hospital first adhered to the WHP program in 2015, planning to 
implement a set of good practices in the areas of nutrition and smoking. The same year, the project 
began with a workplace health assessment, to understand the key issues affecting employees’ 
health, and a series of analyses were conducted to measure the level of obesity, physical activity, 
and smoking. The Employee Health Surveillance Service gathered the epidemiological data to 
assess the presence of overweight and obesity among the employees, through the body mass index 
(BMI) and the waist circumference measurement. Table 10 illustrates the data collected on a 
population of 2414 employees divided by gender (out of a total population of 4244 workers, of 
which 2794 females and 1450 males). The data reveal the necessity of an intervention: even in a 
health structure, where employees might supposedly be more aware of the importance of health 
GOOD PRACTICES N° COMPANIES  N° WORKERS % COMPANIES % WORKERS 
1   Area FOOD and NUTRITION 161  82.478  57%  59%  
2   Area CONTRAST TO TOBACCO USE 64  37.117  23%  27%  
3   Area PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 100  32.272  35%  23%  
4   Area SAFE MOBILITY 32  12.937  11%  9%  
5   Area CONTRAST TO ALCOHOL-DRUGS 26  5.984  9%  4%  
6   Area WELL-BEING 83  39.969  29%  29%  
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and nutrition, the level of overweight (39,4 %) and obesity (13,4 %) is relevant. Interestingly, the 
data on the prevalence of overweight and obesity at Niguarda are in line with the national statistics, 
revealing the representativeness of the sample (Istat, 2015).  
 
Table 10. Prevalence of overweight and obesity among the workers of the hospital Niguarda Cà Granda. 
Thus, in 2015, for the first initiative to promote a proper nutrition, two good practices were adopted 
in the lunchrooms:  
1. Presence in the menu of all the meals served in the lunchroom of fruit and vegetables 
(without additional payments, and non-exchangeable with dessert or other products); offer 
of bread with a low content of salt; and offer of whole bread. 
2. Informational campaign in the lunchrooms with a poster to indicate the optimal servings 
of food (food pyramid), posters on salt reduction, and posters on whole bread. 
The realization of point 1 entailed that it was no longer possible to substitute the selection of fruit 
and vegetables with one or more portions of yogurt, pudding, or fruit juices, which remained 
available in the lunchroom as extras. In fact, Niguarda’s employees have a mandatory full menu 
comprised of first dish + second dish + side dish + dessert (fresh fruit, yogurt, pudding, or fruit 
juices) + water + bread. If the person does not want to eat one of the options, each item can be 
substituted with another fresh fruit, yogurt, pudding, fruit juice, by extra bread of bottles of water. 
This arrangement is problematic because people instead of eating vegetables or fresh fruit, often 
substitute these items with tastier puddings, yogurts, or fruit juices. This means that often a person 
ends up eating more carbohydrates and simple sugars that necessary, which is a direct cause of 
weight gain. The new arrangement started in early September, and after only five days, the project 
 
VISITED WORKERS 2414  F 1636  M 778 TOTAL 
OVERWEIGHT 657 27,20% F 346 21,10% M 307 39,40% 
OBESITY 1° CLASS 221 9,10% F 135 8,25% M 85 10,90% 
OBESITY 2° CLASS 68 2,81% F 54 3,30% M 13 1,60% 
OBESITY 3° CLASS 34 1,40% F 30 1,88% M 3 0,90% 
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was suspended. Employees had turned to labour unions denouncing the situation, outraged that the 
management tried to “save money on them”, by preventing them from freely selecting yogurts, 
puddings and juices and by reducing their choice, obligating them to eat cheaper, less tasty, fruit 
and vegetables. This reaction came despite a previous communication campaign on the WHP 
initiative, which provided information through the publication of news and video interviews on 
the intranet (providing also the link of a questionnaire on lifestyle and habits); emails; and pop-
ups. The intervention had been highly misunderstood, pushing the WHP team to step back and 
stop the initiative. After just one week, the menu in the lunchrooms went back to its previous form. 
It is interesting to dedicate a few words about the peculiar characteristics of the context at 
Niguarda. Since the first meeting with several directors and doctors, I learned that the nature of 
the relationship with the general population of workers was difficult. In fact, many employees have 
an antagonistic attitude to any policy proposed in the lunchroom, which seems to be due to a shared 
level of dissatisfaction with the food quality and the meal options. I also had the opportunity to 
talk personally to the cafeteria workers (managers, cashiers, food servers), many of whom have 
been working in the two lunchrooms for many years (some up to 20 years). From their accounts, 
it seems that the dissatisfaction of the public has been always present, even under the previous 
managements. Clearly, this situation does not facilitate the introduction of new initiatives that need 
to be carefully developed and communicated in advance, in order to prevent or at least to reduce 
any eventual protest. It is for this reason that the members of the Niguarda WHP team welcomed 
the idea of a nudging intervention, as a soft approach that preserves people’s freedom of choice.  
Thus, the first failure spurred the WHP team to learn from the past mistakes and to change 
perspective on the way to change employees’ eating behaviour, which led to the development of 
the nudging initiative. This project is the outcome of a one-year series of meetings held with the 
Niguarda WHP team members and the representatives of CIR Food (Cooperativa Italiana di 
Ristorazione), the food service company in charge at Niguarda. The first meeting with the doctor 
in charge of the WHP Food Area took place in May 2016. More than a year was necessary to 
successfully implement the project, in June 2017. The aim of the present research project is to 
promote the consumption of fruit and vegetables, and more generally of a healthy nutrition among 
the workers of the Niguarda Hospital. The final objective is to offer a successful case to provide 
results that might be transferable in terms of policy, namely expandable to the 90.000 workers of 
the regional healthcare system in Lombardy. The evaluation, implementation, and the development 
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of effective interventions for health policy, need to be based on solid scientific data that include 
an appropriate use of behavioural sciences. The theoretical assumption is the scarce awareness and 
the presence of systematic cognitive errors at the base of many human decisions. The project 
envisages an intervention of choice architecture based on the use of nudges to orient food 
consumption in the two lunchrooms of Niguarda. The project has been developed and implemented 
in collaboration with the Nudge Team of the European Institute for the Study of Human Behavior 
(IESCUM). The Nudge Team is a research group dedicated to the application of the tools of 
behavioural economics in a variety of real-life settings. The group is member of the European 
Nudge Network (TEN). Before illustrating the empirical research and its results, the following 
Table 11 provides a timeline of how the present PhD project was developed and realised. 
 
PERIOD ACTION 
Pre-experimental period 
Dec. 2015 –
April 2016 
Meetings with actors that could be potentially interested in the activation of 
a choice architecture project in the area of food. Meetings were held with 
several actors, among others, with the Director General of the Welfare area 
of the Lombardy Region; with the Socio-Sanitary Director of the Niguarda 
hospital; and with the Director of the Diet and Nutrition area at Niguarda. 
 
May 2016 Meeting and presentation of choice architecture and nudging strategies to 
the Director General of the Niguarda hospital. 
May 2016  First meeting at Niguarda with the WHP team member in charge of the food 
area. 
 
June 2016 ▪ Second meeting with the WHP team members to understand the 
characteristics of the context, learn about the previous WHP initiative, 
discuss about the issues, and illustrate possible choice architecture 
strategies; 
▪ In-depth exploration of the existing literature related to nudge 
interventions in the area of food and nutrition; 
▪ First observation of the lunchrooms’ environment. 
 
July 2016 Presentation of the first project proposal to the Director General of the 
Niguarda hospital, who approved the activation of a choice architecture 
initiative in the domain of the WHP program. 
 
Oct. 2016  General meeting with all the WHP team members and CIR Food 
representatives, to present the project, discuss possible choice architecture 
strategies, and discuss the feasibility of the initiatives.  
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Dec. 2016 – 
Feb. 2017 
▪ Monthly update meetings with the WHP team 
▪ 14/12/2016: presentation of the choice architecture project at the annual 
Workers Health Promotion conference held at Università Statale di 
Milano. 
▪ Observations in field (footpath, behaviour of the customers, habitual 
pattern, staff behaviour) and photographic documentation; 
▪ Completion of the literature analysis; 
▪ Finalisation of the research project: selection of the nudges, 
experimental design and research hypotheses.  
 
March 2017 General meeting with all the WHP team members and CIR Food 
representatives to present the final project, discuss the new arrangements in 
the lunchrooms and the idea of the video cameras, select the date of the 
initiative.  
 
April 2017 ▪ Ideation of the posters and the label to be employed in the lunchrooms; 
▪ Graphic development of the posters and the label by a professional 
graphic designer;  
 
May 2017  ▪ Collaboration with the lawyer in charge at the Legal Office 
Administration of Niguarda to verify the legal requirements and ensure 
the protection of the privacy of the workers during the video recordings 
in the lunchrooms; 
▪ Development of the written communication to inform the workers at 
Niguarda about a renewed WHP initiative, about the presence of the 
video cameras and the privacy procedures; 
▪ Test for the positioning and set-up of the action cameras in each 
lunchroom. 
▪ Communication to the workers (emails, intranet) about the renewed 
WHP initiative; and about the presence of the video cameras and the 
privacy policy;  
▪ Meeting with the staff of the canteens. 
 
Experimental period 
June 2017  
 
▪ Daily set-up of the video cameras at the cash registers in each cafeteria 
and download of the videos after each recording session; 
▪ Daily presence of one researcher in each lunchroom to monitor the 
functioning of the video cameras and to offer explanation for eventual 
questions or privacy concerns. 
 
▪ Start of the experiment: control condition (5th –9th June); 
▪ Display at the entrance of each lunchroom of a placard to inform the 
customers about the presence of the video cameras; 
▪ Creation of the excel database and observation of the recorded videos. 
 
▪ Implementation of the communication initiative (12th–16th June): display 
of the posters at the entrance of each lunchroom. 
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▪ Implementation of the nudge interventions (19th – 23th June): 
application of the Like sticker and its explanatory poster in the northern 
lunchroom, and re-arrangement of the southern lunchroom for the 
salience nudge. 
 
Post-experimental period 
July – August 
2017 
▪ Completion of the excel database with the observations from both 
lunchrooms; 
▪ Statistical analysis. 
 
September 2017  ▪ Completion of the research chapter and discussion of the findings. 
 
Follow-up activities 
October 2017 – 
onwards 
▪ Presentation of the results of the initiative to the WHP team members, 
CIR Food representatives, and the Director General; 
▪ Writing of the research papers and submission to scientific journals; 
▪ Activation of new nudging initiatives in the lunchrooms in the following 
areas: salt reduction and portions control; 
▪ Meeting with the WHP team member in charge of the area “contrast to 
smoking”, to discuss the potential activation of a choice architecture 
initiative in this area. 
 
Table 11. Timeline that illustrates the process of development and realization of the research project and the future activities 
that are envisaged.  
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4.2 The research 
 
This section is entirely dedicated to the pre-experimental phase of the study, illustrating: the 
purpose of the research; some data on the population of workers at Niguarda; the process of 
preliminary observations; the experimental design and the research hypotheses; how the 
intervention has been measured; and finally, the ultimate steps for the implementation of the 
project. 
 
4.2.1. Purpose of the research  
 
What is a key health issue affecting the employees of the Niguarda Cà Granda hospital? As 
indicated in the previous paragraph, overweight (39,40%) and obesity (13,4%) are a spread matter 
among the workers, with data that reflect the Italian national statistics, revealing the 
representativeness of the sample. A key element involved in the employees’ health safety concerns 
is their daily dietary patterns. The WHP team members were concerned over the employee’s poor 
nutritional choices, therefore, the objective of this intervention is to support people in making 
improved food choices and eat more balanced meals. The target behaviour is poor nutrition choices 
that often lack the key components such as vegetables and fruits, and in line with the Good 
Practices of the WHP program, the category of whole wheat bread was added. The goal behaviour 
is to increase the customer’s selection of vegetables sides or salads and fruit, and the selection of 
whole bread instead of white bread.  
 
4.2.2. Population 
 
The Niguarda Cà Granda Hospital has a total population of 4244 employees, divided in 1450 males 
and 2794 females. The lunchrooms serve food primarily to the employees, nonetheless since the 
cafeterias are open to the public, some students and visitors are also present. In average per week, 
and only at lunch hours, the cafeterias together serve meals for about 2600 employees, and for 
about 450 other clients (mostly students or visitors). In order to pay for their meal, the employees 
have to scan their badge at the cash registers, which implies that each person is registered each 
time it attends the lunchroom. However, due to the requirements of privacy protection, it was not 
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possible to have access to the personal data of the population. The only available information 
regarding the sample of the study is provided in paragraph 4.3.  
 
4.2.3. Preliminary observations: mapping the context 
 
The first step before launching a behaviour change initiative is to comprehend existing behaviours 
and the context in which they occur. The surrounding environment and its characteristics have a 
relevant influence on our perception determining choices and behaviour (Zajonc, 1984; Bargh, 
1997; Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Kahneman, 2011). Therefore, it is 
crucial to understand the environmental elements that shape food-related behaviour: to observe the 
context and its features identifying the elements that trigger choices, the presence of behavioural 
patterns and the influence of habitual or automatic internal mechanisms (Wansink, 2004; 2006; 
2010). Several preliminary observations were conducted in each lunchroom, both when the 
cafeteria was closed and during its opening hours. Photographs and notes were taken at each time, 
and questions were asked to the cafeteria staff (e.g. “which shelves need to be replenished more 
often?”). Summer menus were also studied to analyse the available daily offer and to verify if the 
type of vegetables present every day were comparable. Cir Food plans in advance the daily menus 
that will be available for the coming month, the menu offer is repeated the successive month and 
remains the same for a whole season. 
The footpath. In both cafeterias, the environment was carefully observed, walking in the same 
footpath that people use and trying to get a sense of people’s experience in the space. 
In the southern cafeteria, the overall walking path is that people arrives and line up at the hot 
dishes, or directly goes to the cold dishes in the central area (see Figure 29 for a map of the space). 
At the hot food serving area, the counter display first courses (the daily selection of pasta and/or 
rice), second courses (meat, fish or omelettes), and vegetables. The central area is composed by 
four counters, two on each side: on the left side, the first counter contains the “Complete Meal” (a 
single complete dish) while the second counter displays cheese and cured meat; on the right side, 
two counters display a selection of fresh salads. From there, the flow of people equally splits in 
one of the two corridors that display the same products on each side. Customers display the habit 
of walking directly to one of the aisles and toward the fridge counters, mostly ignoring a central 
counter that displays desserts (syrup fruit and cake slices) that require an extra fee to be purchased 
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(sales of this category are the lowest). This observation led to the decision to focus on the fridge 
counters, and to work in the area where people already has the habit to go, instead of disrupting 
the existing order. The fridge counters display a selection of fresh fruit, yogurt, pudding, fruit 
juices, and water. I observed if there was a shelf that needed replenishment more often, and which 
shelves were at eye-level and tray-level. Finally, people head toward the cash register where white 
bread, whole bread, and cracker/grissini are available, along with cutlery (see Figure 3 in the 
Appendix for a large map of the southern lunchroom). There is a further aisle that serves pizza, 
but it is located at the exit of the space, on the right of cash register n.1.   
The northern cafeteria has a simpler layout (see Figure 1 in the Appendix). The space opens with 
the hot meal area, structured in the same order of the southern cafeteria. Proceeding on the right 
side of the hall room, the first counter displays the ‘complete meal’ followed by the fridge counters 
with fruit, yogurt, pudding and juice. On the opposite (left) side of the space, a series of counters 
display food in this order: first desserts (those purchasable for an extra fee), cheese and cured 
meats, fresh salads, and there is a pizza counter close to the cash registers. 
Photographic documentation. Several photographs were taken and divided in two folders of 
about 25 photos per each lunchroom (see Appendix for a selection of the images). Photos were 
reviewed in group meetings in which we discussed the current layout and where improvement 
could be made. Photos were taken to represent both the overall view of the area (‘the first 
impression’) and the eye-level perspective, aa well as the areas of interest: 
▪ Overall view of the area 
▪ Eye-level and tray-level perspective 
▪ Wall space, signs and posters    
▪ Menu blackboard 
▪ Where people line up at the hot food area 
▪ Hot food serving area   
▪ Cold food self-service area  
▪ Salad bar 
▪ Refrigerators displaying fruit 
▪ Dessert area 
▪ Bread basket 
▪ Cutlery storage 
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This auditing phase of the consumption decision-making process allowed the identification of the 
environmental elements that did not favour people’s optimal food choices, and the areas that would 
have benefited from a nudging strategy were identified. For instance, fresh salads were offered 
only in the counters located on the right side of the cafeteria, and since the corridors are separated 
by a metal barrier, many individuals who walked in the left corridor did not walk back to observe 
the offer of salads on the other side, or just did not notice them. Whole bread was also offered in 
a non-salient area, just close to the cash registers and displayed next to white bread. In the same 
way, the disposition of the fruit was not very noticeable, as shown in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26. View of the fridge counter displaying from the right: yogurt, pudding, water, fruit in a corner, and fruit juices. 
 
4.2.4. Experimental design 
 
The experimental design is a before-after design in two separate lunchrooms; the research was 
structured to follow three phases each of the duration of a week (working days only), as 
schematised in Table 8. The duration of the experimental period was defined based on the necessity 
of having a significant span of time to measure the choice behaviour (i.e. five days in each 
condition) and increase the sample size. At the same time, the three-weeks length seemed to the 
WHP team a fair and not excessively long period that they agreed upon. First, to have a control 
condition, the current situation in each lunchroom was monitored, therefore no changes were made 
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in the cafeterias during this week. The patterns of choice observed during phase 1 of the study 
represent the baseline that will be compared with the data gathered successively in the intervention 
weeks, to verify the desired changes in consumption. In phase 2 three posters were positioned at 
the entrance of each cafeteria, evoking the food categories to encourage, with the slogan "Your 
best choice". This phase has been distinguished from the following to control for its eventual 
influence, to isolate this variable and maintain a more accurate experimental design, even if we 
did not expect classic persuasion-based communication to have a relevant effect.  
Lastly, in phase 3, the nudges were activated, namely labelling in the northern cafeteria, and 
salience at the southern cafeteria. The experimental research was carried out for three weeks 
(Monday to Friday), with weekly video recordings (see paragraph 4.2.5) during the lunch opening 
hours (from 11.00 to 14.30 at the northern cafeteria, and from 12.00 to 14.30 at the southern 
cafeteria). The following two paragraphs provide more detail on phase 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Experimental design of the study. 
4.2.4.1. Communicating the best choice 
Following the requirement of the WHP program (see the Good Practices outlined in Regione 
Lombardia, 2014), a communication initiative was included in the intervention. This phase was 
added to comply with the requirement of the program and thereby to meet the needs of the 
Niguarda WHP team. However, we did not expect relevant results from this phase, since 
communication targets System 2 and therefore requires deliberate, conscious information 
processing (Stanovich and West, 2000; Kahneman, 2011). Rather than conducting a general 
communication campaign on healthy nutrition, we took advantage of the communication phase by 
connecting it to the nudge intervention. Therefore, the communication materials were developed 
to focus explicitly on the key food items that were at the heart of the nudge intervention. Three 
posters were developed to convey the concept of healthy nutrition and to explicitly indicate the 
categories of food to select: fruit, vegetables (generic poster), and whole bread. The layout of the 
PHASE DURATION NORTHERN LUNCHROOM  SOUNTHERN LUNCHROOM  
1 Five days Baseline Baseline 
2 Five days Communication: 3 posters Communication: 3 posters 
3 Five days Nudge: labelling Nudge: salience 
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posters was kept very simple and neat to facilitate immediate cognitive processing, and the 
headline was “Your best choice” (i.e. in Italian “La tua scelta migliore”) to encourage goal pursuit 
(see Custers and Aarts, 2010). To improve the visibility of the target items, the images were 
especially large, in the attempt to use the posters to prime people activating the idea in their mind 
of healthy food (see Bargh, 1990; Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2003; Bargh, 2006; Bateson et al., 2006). 
   
 
4.2.4.2. Selection of the nudges  
 
Environmental support for nutrition entails the design of a space that encourages proper nutrition, 
where healthy food options are appropriately displayed for easy identification. Two simple 
strategies were identified to be suitable for the context, especially in a long-term perspective of 
maintenance of the intervention. Niguarda Cà Granda hospital is a public structure and keeping 
low costs is a top priority as funds are limited. Therefore, we developed an initiative that entailed 
an exclusively initial and low-cost expenditure, which was totally sustainable in the long run. 
Indeed, one of the tenets of the nudging discipline is also its low costs, which facilitated the 
acceptance of the project by Niguarda’s executive director and by the representatives of CIR Food. 
Two were the nudges selected: labelling and salience. As discussed in the previous chapter, these 
strategies have proved to be successful, and maintain the public’s freedom of choice by making 
non-intrusive changes. Given the presence of two lunchrooms, we decided to test only one nudge 
in each canteen, in order to have a clearer experimental plan and separate the variables.  
Figure 37. The posters that evoke the key food categories to nudge. 
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Labelling. Labelling was the selected nudge for the northern cafeteria. Because of the simpler 
disposition of its spaces, labelling seemed to be more appropriate to be employed in this 
lunchroom. The initial idea was to replicate the traffic light intervention (see Jones and Richardson, 
2007; Temple et al., 2011; Thorndike, 2012) to test its effectiveness in a new cultural context. 
However, the challenging nature of the circumstances at Niguarda, casted doubts on the potential 
issues that could have arisen from the use of the red and yellow labels. The members of the WHP 
team worried that especially the red label could be perceived as punitive and easily trigger hostile 
reactions by the already discontent public of the lunchroom. Therefore, the 'Like' label was created: 
a green label to positively support the decision-making process and guide people towards the 
selection of the key food categories (fruits, vegetable sides, salads whole bread). The smiley face 
has been added to positively connotate the target items, in the attempt to influence peoples’ 
affective associations (Kiviniemi et al., 2007; Kiviniemi and Duangdao, 2009; Keer et al., 2010). 
The Like label was accompanied by a poster displayed at the entrance, providing brief instructions 
(i.e. “The Like label suggests you what are the best food items for your health. It has been 
developed to help you increase your consumption of vitamins, minerals, and fibres”). The 
instructions concluded with the prompt “Follow it!” (Figure 28). An image that illustrates the 
layout of the northern lunchroom before and after the intervention is available in the Appendix 
(Fig. 1 and 2, pag. 176). 
 
Figure 28. The Like label and the explanatory poster with the prompt “Follow it!”. 
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Salience. Salience was the selected nudge to be employed at the southern cafeteria. The purpose 
of this nudge is to change the layout to make the key food categories more salient, immediately 
more visible, and easier to select. Several actions (Table 13) were designated for each category: 
Whole wheat Bread  Fruit Salads Vegetable sides 
Make it more salient and 
a sort of ‘default option’ 
by offering it right at the 
entrance close to the 
trays; and on a table in the 
central area. 
Place fruit in all the 
lower shelves (tray-
level) and in all the 
mid shelves (eye-
height) to make it 
more visible and 
convey the impression 
of increased variety. 
Offer the salads on 
both sides of the 
hallway and display 
them in the first 
counters of the central 
space. 
Make vegetable side-
dishes more salient by 
moving them in the 
first position in the hot 
food line. In this way, 
vegetables are the first 
food that people see 
when they reach the 
hot food counter. 
Table 13. The healthy items to nudge and the actions planned. 
To attract people’s attention and guide choices, the key food items were positioned in a strategic 
manner: vegetables were displayed first in the hot food line (i.e. according to Wansink and Hank’s 
rule “first food most”); fresh salads were finally more visible; the offer of fresh fruit was increased 
in size; while whole wheat bread was made available in different locations in the lunchroom.   
The following page provide two images that show the layout of the southern lunchroom before 
and after the intervention (Figure 29; see Appendix for a larger image). It is important to point out 
that the change in the positioning of the vegetable side-dishes entailed a change also in the 
disposition of the second and first courses. In fact, the cafeteria staff pointed out that because they 
primarily serve vegetables to accompany the protein-based option (i.e. meat, fish, eggs), in order 
to avoid hopping from one side to the other behind the counter and maintain the service fast, the 
two options should be located close to one another. Their opinion was backed by other members 
of the WHP team, so we accepted this alteration in the arrangement, quite unconvinced but 
interested about the outcomes. Hence, the new arrangement displayed vegetables first, followed 
by protein-based options, and first courses. Basically, the order of the hot meal counter was 
reversed.  
In the fridge counters, the salience of fruit was altered by simply increasing the quantity of the 
produce displayed, and by filling the lower and two central shelves of the fridge counter (see 
Figures 30 and 31). The variety of the fruit offered remained the same, however the layout was 
more appealing, and it conveyed the impression of an increased variety. 
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As illustrated in chapter 4, increasing the perceived variety of an assortment can induce a person 
to consume more, even if the real variety of the assortment is not increased, the mere alteration of 
the layout can increase consumption. According to Wansink (2004) reasons behind this may be 
that perceived variety is associated with a higher level of enjoyment; or that perception of an 
increased variety suggests a consumption norm. 
 
 
 
Figure 29. Maps of the southern lunchroom: above during the baseline and phase 2, and below during the nudging intervention. 
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Figure 30. The new arrangement of the fridge counter located on the left side of the hallway. 
 
 
Figure 31. The new arrangement of the fridge counter located on the right side of the hallway. 
 
While yogurts, puddings and fruit juices were not the direct target of the intervention in the fridge 
counters, the alteration to the display of fresh fruit impacted on these products. Thus, we took the 
opportunity to make these items less noticeable by positioning them in the upper shelves. During 
the observations, we noticed that people often selected fruit juice instead of fresh fruit, or added 
yogurt or pudding to their tray already rich in carbohydrate such as pasta and bread. That snacks 
are rich in sugars is well-known. However, many sugars are also hidden in unsuspected foods such 
as yogurt, especially those enriched with fruit. If we are to comply with the invitation to contain 
sugar consumption launched by the World Health Organization and the scientific community, we 
must take this fact into account. According to the latest indications of the World Health 
Organization (2015), total daily sugar intake should be maintained within 10% of the total intake 
of ingested calories, and possibly less than 5%. Yogurt is certainly not junk food, yet it contains a 
fair amount of simple sugars. Fruit yogurt jars, generally - apart from some exceptions - are 
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prepared with a fruit puree that makes the sugar content about 14/16 grams per unit. In the yogurt 
available in the Niguarda lunchrooms (125 grams jar from a known brand), the sugar content was 
15.6 g per unit. The same is true for puddings that are loaded with simple sugars: the pudding pots 
available in the cafeteria contained 17.25 grams of sugar per unit. Therefore, it is preferable to 
consume fresh fruit, which in addition to its natural sugary content provides vitamins and minerals, 
along with fibres that modulate the absorption of sugar.  
 
4.2.4.3 Research hypotheses 
 
Based on the experimental design, the following research hypotheses have been formulated:  
Hypothesis 1: The use of the communication materials during the second week may prime the 
idea of healthy food increasing the choice of the target items compared to the baseline, but relevant 
results are not expected because the intervention targets System 2. 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of the manipulation of the environmental stimuli through the labelling 
intervention will be greater than the effect of the communication intervention and increase the 
selection of the target items.  
Hypothesis 2a: The use of a green label in the northern lunchroom to indicate the healthy 
options, will positively prime people and guide choices, increasing the consumption of the 
target items, compared to the baseline. 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of the manipulation of environmental stimuli through the nudge of 
salience will be greater than the effect of the communication intervention and increase the selection 
of the target items. 
Hypothesis 3a: Manipulating the salience of whole bread by offering it in several points in the 
southern lunchroom will increase the choice of this item, compared to the baseline.  
Hypothesis 3b: Manipulating the salience of fresh fruit in terms of perceived variety will 
increase the choice of this category, compared to the baseline. 
Hypothesis 3c: The manipulation of the display of fresh fruit in the fridge counters entailed the 
relocation of fruit juices, yogurt, and pudding on the higher shelves, making these items less 
salient. This manipulation may decrease the choice for these items, compared to the baseline. 
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Hypothesis 3d: Manipulating the salience of salads by displaying them in the first counters 
located on each side of the central area will increase the choice of this category, compared to 
the baseline. 
Hypothesis 3e: Manipulating the salience of vegetable sides by offering them at the beginning 
of the hot food counter will increase the choice of this category, compared to the baseline.  
4.2.5. Measuring the intervention 
 
The issue about how to calculate the results of the intervention has been a matter of discussion for 
some time. Initially, the idea was to carry out systematic observations in field, with three 
researchers per cafeteria standing at the exit of the cash registers, observing people’s trays and 
writing down their choices. However, in two cafeterias in which each serve up to 700 meals only 
at lunch hours, classic observations in field would have been fairly burdening, and the risk of errors 
occurring in the process of rapidly reporting the observed data was not indifferent. Furthermore, 
the presence of three researchers observing each day for three weeks the passing trays, was likely 
to be perceived as invasive or annoying by the public. Therefore, we decided to employ small 
action cameras to capture the passing trays, one for each cash register, with no interruption during 
the lunch hours. The video cameras ensure a continuous and error-free observations of the meal 
compositions and are less salient than the physical presence of human observers. A further 
advantage of these cameras is their small dimension and ease of use, so they could be easily placed 
and removed every day (see Figure 32).  
The lawyer in charge at the Legal Office Administration of Niguarda supported us in this process, 
since Art. 4 par. 2 of the Workers’ Statute provides that control systems and equipment that are 
required by organisational and productive needs or work safety, which also result in the remote 
control of the workers, can only to be installed through prior agreements. One month was necessary 
to develop and sign an agreement and define the appropriate indications to attach to the employee 
communications. To protect the privacy of workers and visitors of the hospital, in the lunchrooms 
the action cameras were accurately positioned at the cash registers, and the zoom was adjusted to 
frame exclusively the trays to observe the meal composition. No faces nor full body figures were 
ensured to be filmed. A trained field researcher was daily present at each cafeteria to set up the 
video cameras and remove them at the end, to monitor their correct functioning, and to answer any 
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eventual questions from the public in relation to privacy or the scope of the initiative. Three action 
cameras were employed in each lunchroom, since only three lines of payment are open and the 
fourth cash register is permanently closed. 
 
Figure 32. A video camera at the cash register and a frame from the recorded video displaying a ‘healthy tray’, 
 in which whole bread, salad and fruit are present. 
   
4.2.6. Implementation  
 
For the success of the initiative, and the prevention of any issue or complaint, especially regarding 
privacy, a communication plan was defined in agreement with the WHP team members. 
Communication was carefully written by us to avoid influences and without revealing anything 
about the nudging intervention. During the month preceding the initiative, employees received 
information through intranet posts and emails of a renewed start of the WHP program in the 
domain of nutrition. Communications informed about the presence for three weeks of the video 
cameras in the lunchrooms, underlying that measures had been taken to protect the privacy of the 
workers and the public, and that the experimental intent was merely to observe the patterns of 
consumption. Communication stated that “The data will only be processed by the research team, 
who will to delete any material or frame containing elements that could be associated to the 
person, such as badges left on the tray”. 
Presenting communication in the right way can be crucial in determining the perception, and 
therefore the behaviour of people. Aware of the criticisms received the first year of implementation 
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of the WHP project, and of the former lack of an effective communication, we took extra care in 
defining this phase’s activity. In 2015, the WHP intervention that failed was more paternalistic as 
people were required to add a portion of vegetables and fruit in their meal composition, and fruit 
was no longer non-exchangeable with other products (yogurt/pudding/juice). Therefore, the 
communication stressed that the purpose of the new WHP initiative was not to modify the food 
offer or the menu composition, but to generally promote healthy eating by maintaining freedom of 
choice. In addition, the first day of the initiative an information plaque was positioned at the 
entrance of the cafeterias to immediately indicate the presence of the video cameras. To avoid 
influencing people about the purpose of the search, the placard contained simple and generic 
information:  
 
 
 
 
 
Indeed, despite the accuracy devoted to preventing people from being influenced by the 
communication, some effect may have occurred. On the one hand, communication was mandatory 
because of the hospital requirement to protect the privacy of its workers; on the other hand, it was 
also necessary to prevent the harsh complaints that caused the first WHP project to fail in 2015.   
The week before the start of the experiment, cafeteria staff was informed about the project. Staff 
was not informed about the purpose of the research to prevent the diffusion of any information 
that may have influenced people’s behaviour and thereby the outcome of the project. Instead, staff 
received information about the video camera and the privacy policy, that no faces or bodies were 
going to be filmed and neither the cashiers. We told them that if a person had issues with their tray 
being observed, cameras could be obscured at any time by simply putting the hand in front of the 
camera lens. This actually happened a few times. Staff was also invited to simply answer that 
consumption choices were being observed by the researchers of an external university, and that 
further questions could be answered by the researcher present in the lunchroom. Finally, staff was 
also asked to make sure that the food items were always available and continually replenished.  
Dear employees and visitors, 
 
A research is currently underway in the context of the Workers Health Promotion program. To see if we 
are doing a good job, we will film the trays using GoPro video cameras located at the cash registers. 
We will not be able to trace back to users, so your choices will remain anonymous. 
 
We thank you for your collaboration, 
WHP team and IULM research team 
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4.3 Presentation of data and findings 
 
The data in Figure 33 shows the daily number of employees eating in the lunchrooms during the 
three weeks of the study. The label ‘employees’ refers to all the workers with indefinite and 
temporary contract; the label ‘external workers’ refers to the workers with fixed-term contract (e.g. 
freelance or similar).  
 
 
Figure 33. Daily number of employees who ate at the lunchrooms during the three weeks of the intervention. 
 
Data in Figure 34 shows the daily number of external visitors in that ate lunch in each cafeteria 
during the three weeks of the intervention: 
Figure 34. Daily number of visitors who ate at the lunchrooms during the three weeks of the intervention. 
 
 
JUNE 5 6 7 8 9  12 13 14 15 16  19 20 21 22 23  TOTAL 
External W. 
(Southern) 
107 99 95 120 101 120 97 130 119 107 114 111 96 117 109 1.642 
Employees 
(Southern) 
523 568 553 517 522 538 523 543 537 532 536 536 526 523 508 7.985 
TOTAL 
SOUTHERN 
LUNCHES 
630 667 648 637 623 658 620 673 656 639 650 647 622 640 617 9.627 
External W. 
(Northern) 
152 166 187 152 158 166 171 163 165 145 153 159 160 151 151 2.399 
Employees 
(Northern) 
707 725 679 666 655 668 693 688 656 641 667 695 694 642 606 10.082 
TOTAL 
NORTHERN 
LUNCHES 
859 891 866 818 813 834 864 851 821 786 820 854 854 793 757 12.481 
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Because of the large amount of data, a sampling procedure was conducted by observing only 1 out 
of 5 trays in the video. In this way, in the Northern lunchroom, we observed: 789 trays in week 1; 
791 trays in week 2; and 670 trays in week 3. The presence of less observations during the third 
week is due to a functioning error, for which we lost the recordings of two cameras on Wednesday.  
In the Southern lunchroom, we observed: 673 trays in week 1; 702 trays in week 2; 690 trays in 
week 3. Since the purpose of the experimental research was to increase the consumption of healthy 
foods (whole bread, fruit, salads, vegetable sides) and to test the effectiveness of the nudge, a score 
of 0/1 was assigned to indicate the absence or the presence of each target item on the tray (see 
Figure 35). The exact point in time (hour: minute: second) of appearance of the observed tray in 
the video, was also recorded in the file. Additionally, to verify if the intervention determined any 
drop or increase in the choice of substitute products, the 0/1 score was also assigned the following 
items: fruit juice, yogurt, puddings that may substitute fresh fruit; white bread and grissini/crackers 
(one category) that are the substitutes for whole bread. Since salads and vegetables sides had no 
direct substitutes, no other products have been added to the present analysis.  
 
 
Figure 35. Excerpt of the database collecting the observations. The number 1 near each item indicates the baseline condition. 
The score 0 indicates that the item was not selected, the score 1 indicates that the item was selected. 
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Weekly food choice patterns in both lunchrooms were examined using Chi-Square tests (χ²). The 
test is adequate to observe whether the subjects have or do not have a certain behaviour; all the 
results are reported in contingency tables. In this section, the results of each research hypothesis 
are provided. Note that there is one hypothesis to assess the impact of the labelling intervention 
(H2a), whereas since the salience intervention came in many forms, the food items have a specific 
research hypothesis. 
4.3.1 Comparing the populations of the two lunchrooms  
The first analysis conducted on the data have the primary purpose of comparing the two 
populations that belong to the northern lunchroom and the southern lunchroom. These two blocks 
represent the two groups of observations on which the analysis is based: with such a separation, 
the first necessity is to consider the existence of a distributive independence between the eating 
behaviours of the two samples, justifying a separate study in each lunchroom and understanding 
whether they are comparable. 
In order to determine an adequate index of independence between the two distributions, a Chi-
Square test was conducted to compare the dietary behaviour of the two populations. 
 
Table 14 shows the contingencies related to the distribution of the food choices in the two different 
lunchrooms, while Table 15 illustrates the results of the relative Chi-Square test. From this 
preliminary analysis, it emerges that the set of choices analysed in the baseline weeks in the 2 
Whole 
Bread
Fruit Salads
Vegetable 
Sides
Fruit   
Juice
Yogurt Pudding
White 
Bread
Grissini/  
Crackers
Count 211 244 236 335 113 124 67 67 242 1639
% of GROUP 12,9% 14,9% 14,4% 20,4% 6,9% 7,6% 4,1% 4,1% 14,8% 100,0%
% of FOOD 53,8% 54,8% 59,1% 51,1% 60,4% 55,6% 50,8% 56,8% 62,9% 55,8%
% of TOTAL 7,2% 8,3% 8,0% 11,4% 3,8% 4,2% 2,3% 2,3% 8,2% 55,8%
Count 181 201 163 320 74 99 65 51 143 1297
% of GROUP 14,0% 15,5% 12,6% 24,7% 5,7% 7,6% 5,0% 3,9% 11,0% 100,0%
% of FOOD 46,2% 45,2% 40,9% 48,9% 39,6% 44,4% 49,2% 43,2% 37,1% 44,2%
% of TOTAL 6,2% 6,8% 5,6% 10,9% 2,5% 3,4% 2,2% 1,7% 4,9% 44,2%
Count 392 445 399 655 187 223 132 118 385 2936
% of GROUP 13,4% 15,2% 13,6% 22,3% 6,4% 7,6% 4,5% 4,0% 13,1% 100,0%
% of FOOD 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
% of TOTAL 13,4% 15,2% 13,6% 22,3% 6,4% 7,6% 4,5% 4,0% 13,1% 100,0%
FOOD ITEMS
Total
BLOCK Northern 
Lunchroom
Southern 
Lunchroom
Total
Table 14. Contingency Table – Blocks/Food items. 
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blocks are substantially different. In fact, the significance value of Cramer's V is significantly 
lower than 0,05: this allows us to reasonably reject the null hypothesis, that is, the independence 
of the two blocks given the sufficient difference between the theoretical frequencies and the 
observations. 
 
Table 15. Chi Square test - Blocks/Food items. 
 
Hence, it is possible to conclude that the two blocks (i.e. lunchrooms) are characterised by two 
populations that display different eating behaviours. This supports the necessity of a separated 
analysis of the pattern of food choices occurred in the second week of the experiment. 
4.3.2 Effect of the communication initiative 
Hypothesis 1: The use of the communication materials during the second week may prime 
the idea of healthy food increasing the choice of the target items compared to the baseline, 
but relevant results are not expected because the intervention targets System 2. 
Once the separate study in the two lunchrooms has been justified, the first hypothesis to verify is 
whether the posters added in the lunchrooms during the second week were effective in 
communicating the concept of the healthy food categories to the public, thereby increasing the 
choice of target items. In order to do that, for each lunchroom the distribution of frequencies of 
the food choices has been analysed, by cross-checking the data on the choices of both the target 
and the non-target food items compared to the presence or not of the communication intervention. 
Table 16 shows the data for the northern lunchroom, while Table 17 displays the relative Chi-
Square test: 
Value df
Asymp. Sig..       
(2 tailed)
Pearson Chi- Square 19,166 8 ,014
Likelihood Ratio 19,260 8 ,014
N. of valid cases 2936
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi ,081 ,014
Cramer's V ,081 ,014
2936
Chi-Square
Symmetric Measures
N. of valid cases
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Table 17. Chi Square test – Northern Lunchroom Communication/Food items (northern lunchroom). 
 
In the following page, Table 18 shows the results for the southern lunchroom, while Table 19 
shows the results of the relative Chi-Square test. 
Northern Lunchroom
Whole 
Bread
Fruit Salads
Vegetable 
Sides
Fruit    
Juice
Yogurt Pudding
White     
Bread
Grissini/    
Crackers
COUNT 211 244 236 335 113 124 67 67 242 1639
% of TYPOLOGY 12,9% 14,9% 14,4% 20,4% 6,9% 7,6% 4,1% 4,1% 14,8% 100,0%
% of FOOD 49,9% 45,8% 51,9% 55,5% 51,6% 46,3% 51,9% 54,9% 54,4% 51,3%
% of TOTAL 6,6% 7,6% 7,4% 10,5% 3,5% 3,9% 2,1% 2,1% 7,6% 51,3%
COUNT 212 289 219 269 106 144 62 55 203 1559
% of TYPOLOGY 13,6% 18,5% 14,0% 17,3% 6,8% 9,2% 4,0% 3,5% 13,0% 100,0%
% of FOOD 50,1% 54,2% 48,1% 44,5% 48,4% 53,7% 48,1% 45,1% 45,6% 48,7%
% of TOTAL 6,6% 9,0% 6,8% 8,4% 3,3% 4,5% 1,9% 1,7% 6,3% 48,7%
COUNT 423 533 455 604 219 268 129 122 445 3198
% of TYPOLOGY 13,2% 16,7% 14,2% 18,9% 6,8% 8,4% 4,0% 3,8% 13,9% 100,0%
% of FOOD 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
% of TOTAL 13,2% 16,7% 14,2% 18,9% 6,8% 8,4% 4,0% 3,8% 13,9% 100,0%
TOTAL
FOOD ITEMS
Total
TYPOLOGY BASELINE
COMMUNICATION
Table 16. Contingency table – communication intervention/Food items (northern lunchroom). 
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Table 19. Chi-Square test – Communication intervention/Food items (southern lunchroom). 
 
The significance of the two Chi-Square tests shows that in both lunchrooms there is a tie of 
dependence, albeit not very high (p = 0,040), between the choice behaviour of the target foods and 
the presence of the communication initiative.  
The changes in choice is illustrated in Figure 36, which shows the positive or negative variation 
of each target food items as well as the non-target products. 
Southern Lunchroom
Whole 
Bread
Fruit Salads
Vegetable 
Sides
Fruit 
Juice
Yogurt Pudding
White 
Bread
Grissini/ 
Crackers
COUNT 181 201 163 320 74 99 65 51 143 1297
% of TYPOLOGY 14,0% 15,5% 12,6% 24,7% 5,7% 7,6% 5,0% 3,9% 11,0% 100,0%
% of FOOD 51,7% 46,3% 42,6% 52,2% 47,1% 49,3% 50,8% 39,2% 46,7% 48,0%
% of TOTAL 6,7% 7,4% 6,0% 11,8% 2,7% 3,7% 2,4% 1,9% 5,3% 48,0%
COUNT 169 233 220 293 83 102 63 79 163 1405
% of TYPOLOGY 12,0% 16,6% 15,7% 20,9% 5,9% 7,3% 4,5% 5,6% 11,6% 100,0%
% of FOOD 48,3% 53,7% 57,4% 47,8% 52,9% 50,7% 49,2% 60,8% 53,3% 52,0%
% of TOTAL 6,3% 8,6% 8,1% 10,8% 3,1% 3,8% 2,3% 2,9% 6,0% 52,0%
COUNT 350 434 383 613 157 201 128 130 306 2702
% of TYPOLOGY 13,0% 16,1% 14,2% 22,7% 5,8% 7,4% 4,7% 4,8% 11,3% 100,0%
% of FOOD 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
% of TOTAL 13,0% 16,1% 14,2% 22,7% 5,8% 7,4% 4,7% 4,8% 11,3% 100,0%
TOTAL
FOOD ITEMS
Total
TYPOLOGY BASELINE
COMMUNICATION
Value df
Asym. Sig.         
(2 tailed)
Pearson Chi- Square 16,082a 8 ,041
Likelihood ratio 16,138 8 ,040
N. of valid cases 2702
Value Approx. Sig.  
Phi coefficient ,077 ,041
Cramer's V ,077 ,041
2702
Nominal by nominal
N. of valid cases
Chi-Square
a. 0 celle (.0%) hanno un conteggio atteso inferiore a 5. Il conteggio atteso minimo è 61.44.
Symmetric Measures
Table 18. Contingency table – Communication intervention/Food items (southern lunchroom). 
149 
 
 
Figure 36. The changes of food choices for the target and the non-target items. 
 
 Whole Bread Fruit Salads Vegetable Sides 
Northern Lunchroom 0,2% 8,4% -3,8% -10,9% 
Southern Lunchroom -3,4% 7,4% 14,8% -4,4% 
 Fruit Juice Yogurt Pudding White Bread Grissini/Crackers 
Northern Lunchroom -3,2% 7,5% -3,9% -9,8% -8,8% 
Southern Lunchroom 5,7% 1,5% -1,6% 21,5% 6,5% 
Table 20. The exact percentage in the changes of food choice.  
In the northern lunchroom, only the selection of fruit increased (+ 8,4%), whole bread did not vary 
(+ 0,2%), while the selection of salads (- 3,8%) and vegetable sides (- 10,9%) oddly decreased. 
Among the extra items observed, yogurt was selected more compared to the baseline (+ 7,5%), 
while the selection of the other non-target items decreased.  
In the southern lunchroom, the selection of fruit (+ 7,4%) and salads (+ 14,8%) considerably 
increased, while the selection of whole bread (- 3,4%) and vegetable sides (- 4,4%) decreased. 
Among the extra items, the selection of white bread, fruit juice, and grissini/crackers increased. 
The outcome of this analysis is in line with hypothesis 1, in which some results were expected – 
demonstrated in the case of fruit and salads - but not relevant results because the intervention 
targets System 2. 
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4.3.3. Effect of the labelling nudge in the northern lunchroom   
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of the manipulation of the environmental stimuli through the 
labelling intervention will be greater than the effect of the communication intervention and 
increase the selection of the target items. 
 
Hypothesis 2 considers the effect on food choices of the labelling nudge, compared to the 
communication initiative. The results show, during week 3 compared to week 2, a positive 
variation in the selection of salads, a slight increase in the selection of fruit, and a negative variation 
in the selection of whole bread and vegetable sides. The selection of fruit juices, yogurt, pudding, 
and grissini/crackers decreased, while the selection of white bread increased (accordingly with the 
decrease in the selection of whole bread). 
 
 
Table 21. Results of the labelling intervention/communication initiative. 
 
 
Table 22. The relative Chi-Square test. 
 
Whole 
Bread
Fruit Salads
Vegetable 
Sides
Fruit    
Juice
Yogurt Pudding
White 
Bread
Grissini/ 
Crackers
COUNT 188 300 262 244 58 109 34 58 168 1421
% of TYPOLOGY 13,2% 21,1% 18,4% 17,2% 4,1% 7,7% 2,4% 4,1% 11,8% 100,0%
% of FOOD 47,0% 50,9% 54,5% 47,6% 35,4% 43,1% 35,4% 51,3% 45,3% 47,7%
% of TOTAL 6,3% 10,1% 8,8% 8,2% 1,9% 3,7% 1,1% 1,9% 5,6% 47,7%
COUNT 212 289 219 269 106 144 62 55 203 1559
% of TYPOLOGY 13,6% 18,5% 14,0% 17,3% 6,8% 9,2% 4,0% 3,5% 13,0% 100,0%
% of FOOD 53,0% 49,1% 45,5% 52,4% 64,6% 56,9% 64,6% 48,7% 54,7% 52,3%
% of TOTAL 7,1% 9,7% 7,3% 9,0% 3,6% 4,8% 2,1% 1,8% 6,8% 52,3%
FOOD ITEMS
Total
Northern Lunchroom
TYPOLOGY LABELLING
COMMUNICATION
Value df
Asym. Sig.         
(2 tailed)
Pearson Chi-Square 30,822a 8 ,000
Likelihood Ratio 31,109 8 ,000
N. of valid cases 2980
Chi-Square
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Hypothesis 2a: The use of a green label in the northern lunchroom to indicate the healthy 
options, will positively prime people and guide choices, increasing the consumption of the 
target items, compared to the baseline. 
Hypothesis 2 takes into account, for the northern lunchroom table, the labelling intervention and 
its influence over the selection of target and non-target items. The contingency table displays a 
positive variation (or change in the relative frequencies) of the choice behaviour for fruit and 
salads. However, the selection of whole bread and vegetable sides has decreased compared to the 
baseline. 
 
Table 23. Results of the labelling intervention/baseline. 
The relative Chi-Square test indicates that the level of significance is maximum: 
 
Table 24. The relative Chi-Square test. 
 
The positive effect on consumption choices of the target foods following the activation of the 
labelling intervention is driven mainly by the 9% increase in salad selection (see Table 21). Since 
Whole 
Bread
Fruit Salads
Vegetable 
Sides
Fruit    
Juice
Yogurt Pudding
White 
Bread
Grissini/ 
Crackers
COUNT 211 244 236 335 113 124 67 67 242 1639
% of TYPOLOGY 12,9% 14,9% 14,4% 20,4% 6,9% 7,6% 4,1% 4,1% 14,8% 100,0%
% of FOOD 52,9% 44,9% 47,4% 57,9% 66,1% 53,2% 66,3% 53,6% 59,0% 53,6%
% of TOTAL 6,9% 8,0% 7,7% 10,9% 3,7% 4,1% 2,2% 2,2% 7,9% 53,6%
COUNT 188 300 262 244 58 109 34 58 168 1421
% of TYPOLOGY 13,2% 21,1% 18,4% 17,2% 4,1% 7,7% 2,4% 4,1% 11,8% 100,0%
% of FOOD 47,1% 55,1% 52,6% 42,1% 33,9% 46,8% 33,7% 46,4% 41,0% 46,4%
% of TOTAL 6,1% 9,8% 8,6% 8,0% 1,9% 3,6% 1,1% 1,9% 5,5% 46,4%
COUNT 399 544 498 579 171 233 101 125 410 3060
% of TYPOLOGY 13,0% 17,8% 16,3% 18,9% 5,6% 7,6% 3,3% 4,1% 13,4% 100,0%
% of FOOD 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
% of TOTAL 13,0% 17,8% 16,3% 18,9% 5,6% 7,6% 3,3% 4,1% 13,4% 100,0%
FOOD ITEMS
Total
TIPOLOGY BASELINE
LABELLING
Northern Lunchroom
Total
Value df
Asym. Sig.         
(2 tailed)
Pearson Chi-Square 50,920a 8 ,000
Likelihood Ratio 51,313 8 ,000
N. of valid cases 3060
Chi-Square
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the results indicate a global negative outcome of the use of the Like label on the target items, the 
specific analysis to assess each item has not been conducted.  
 
4.3.4. Effect of the salience nudge in the southern lunchroom 
 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of the manipulation of environmental stimuli through the nudge of 
salience will be greater than the effect of the communication intervention and increase the 
selection of the target items. 
 
Hypothesis 3 compares the performance of the salience intervention in terms of changes in food 
choices, compared to the communication initiative. As we can see from the contingency table 
below (Table 25), the selection of whole bread (+ 10,2%), fruit (+ 15%), and salads (+ 12%) 
positively increased; whereas the selection of vegetables sides varied minimally (- 1%). 
 
 
Table 25. Results of the salience intervention/communication initiative. 
 
 
Table 26. The relative Chi-Square test. 
Southern Lunchroom
Whole 
Bread Fruit Salads
Vegetable 
Sides Fruit Juice Yogurt Pudding
White 
Bread
Grissini/ 
Crackers
COUNT 169 233 220 293 83 102 63 79 163 1405
% of TYPOLOGY 12,0% 16,6% 15,7% 20,9% 5,9% 7,3% 4,5% 5,6% 11,6% 100,0%
% of FOOD 44,9% 42,5% 44,0% 50,5% 56,1% 54,5% 56,3% 64,8% 47,7% 48,2%
% of TOTAL 5,8% 8,0% 7,5% 10,1% 2,8% 3,5% 2,2% 2,7% 5,6% 48,2%
COUNT 207 315 280 287 65 85 49 43 179 1510
% of TYPOLOGY 13,7% 20,9% 18,5% 19,0% 4,3% 5,6% 3,2% 2,8% 11,9% 100,0%
% of FOOD 55,1% 57,5% 56,0% 49,5% 43,9% 45,5% 43,8% 35,2% 52,3% 51,8%
% of TOTAL 7,1% 10,8% 9,6% 9,8% 2,2% 2,9% 1,7% 1,5% 6,1% 51,8%
FOOD ITEMS
Total
TYPOLOGY COMMUNICATION
SALIENCE
Value df
Asym. Sig.   
(2 tailed)
Pearson Chi-Square 36,494a 8 ,000
Likelihood Ratio 36,688 8 ,000
N. of valid cases 2915
Value Approx. Sig.
Phi coefficient ,112 ,000
Cramer's V ,112 ,000
2915
Chi-Square
a. 0 celle (.0%) hanno un conteggio at eso inferiore a 5. Il conteggio atteso minimo è 53.98.
Symmetric Measures
Nominal by nominal
N. of valid cases
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Also in this case, as in the previous hypothesis, the test reaches maximum significance (p = 0,000), 
which highlights the remarkably significant effect of the salience nudge (Table 26). As the 
significant variation of the relative frequencies between the two weeks displays, the third phase of 
the project showed a more relevant effect on food choices compared to the one in the northern 
lunchroom (see Figure 37 and Table 27). 
 
Figure 37. Changes in food choices between week 2 and 3 in each lunchroom. 
 
 
 Whole 
Bread 
Fruit Salads Vegetable 
Sides 
Fruit 
Juice 
Yogurt Pudding White 
Bread 
Grissini/ 
Crackers 
Southern 
Lunchroom 
10,2% 15,0% 12,0% -1,0% -12,2% -9,1% -12,5% -29,5% 4,7% 
Northern 
Lunchroom 
6,0% -1,9% -8,9% 4,9% 29,3% 13,8% 29,2% -2,7% 9,4% 
Table 27. The percentage change in food choices between week 2 and 3 in each lunchroom. 
So far, the analysis concerned on the overall trends of food decisions, with reference to the totality 
of the target and non-target products, with the disadvantage of diminishing the specific effect of 
each product through the algebraic sum (see the positive and negative trends of the previous graph) 
of the overall effects. The rest of the study will therefore look at the changes in food selection in 
relation to each target product, highlighting the impact of the salience nudge in altering the 
selection of the items. 
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It is important to note that the fact that most of the target items did not vary or even decreased 
during the communication initiative (see Table 16 and 18), and that the level of significance in 
both lunchrooms is not very high (p = 0,040), suggests that this initiative did not provide relevant 
outcomes. This led to the decision to compare only week 3 vs. week 1 in the following analysis of 
each item conducted for the southern lunchroom.   
 
Whole bread 
Hypothesis 3a: Manipulating the salience of whole bread by offering it in several points in 
the southern lunchroom will increase the choice of this item, compared to the baseline. 
Starting from whole bread, the hypothesis to be verified is the effectiveness of making this item 
more salient by increasing its visibility and by placing it in several strategic spaces in the 
lunchroom. Table 28 shows the variation in consumption choices derived from the nudge, 
comparing the salience week with the baseline, and the values 0 and 1 indicate respectively 
‘absence of choice’ or ‘choice of the item’. The results show that during the nudge intervention 
the consumption of whole bread is 30% compared to the 26,9 % of the baseline. 
However, it is important to point out that although the hypothesis under consideration is confirmed, 
the significance (p = 0,020) of the test is not maximum (Table 29). Since whole bread has a direct 
substitute product, it is likely that the nudge was effective only on those people that do not have a 
strong preference for white bread. 
 
Table 28. Effect of salience on the selection of whole bread. 
 
0 1
Count 492 181 673
% of TYPOLOGY 73,1% 26,9% 100,0%
% of whole bread 50,5% 46,6% 49,4%
% of TOTAL 36,1% 13,3% 49,4%
Count 483 207 690
% of TYPOLOGY 70,0% 30,0% 100,0%
% of whole bread 49,5% 53,4% 50,6%
% of TOTAL 35,4% 15,2% 50,6%
TYPOLOGY BASELINE
SALIENCE
Southern Lunchroom
Whole Bread
Total
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Table 29. The relative Chi-Square test.  
 
Fresh Fruit  
Hypothesis 3b: Manipulating the salience of fresh fruit in terms of perceived variety will 
increase the choice of this category, compared to the baseline. 
The same analysis is replicated for fresh fruit, and Table 30 illustrates the results. As before, the 
values 0 and 1 indicate respectively ‘absence of choice’ or ‘choice of the item’. In this case, the 
effect of the third week is significantly more significant and more incisive, with a change in 
consumption choices that passed from 29,9% during the baseline to 45,7% with the nudge 
intervention. The significance of this intervention, as evidenced by the Chi Square test (Table 31) 
is very high (p = 0,000). 
 
Table 30. Effect of salience on the selection of fresh fruit. 
 
Value gl
Asymptotic 
significance     
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 1,614 1 0,020
Continuity 
correction
c
1,465 1 0,023
Likelihood ratio 1,615 1 0,020
N of valid cases 1363
Chi-Square
0 1
Count 472 201 673
% of TYPOLOGY 70,1% 29,9% 100,0%
% of  fruit 55,7% 39,0% 49,4%
% of TOTAL 34,6% 14,7% 49,4%
Count 375 315 690
% of TYPOLOGY 54,3% 45,7% 100,0%
% of  fruit 44,3% 61,0% 50,6%
% of TOTAL 27,5% 23,1% 50,6%
TYPOLOGY BASELINE
SALIENCE
Southern Lunchroom
 Fruit
Total
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Table 31. The relative Chi-Square test. 
 
Fruit juice, Yogurt, Pudding 
Hypothesis 3c: The manipulation of the display of fresh fruit in the fridge counters entailed 
the relocation of fruit juices, yogurt, and pudding, on the higher shelves, making these items 
less salient. This manipulation may decrease the choice for these items, compared to the 
baseline. 
The high impact of the nudge on the selection of fresh fruit has led to an opposite effect on the 
consumption of the non-target items, which had been moved during week 3 in the upper shelves, 
making these items less visible and therefore less salient.  
Comparing the positive effect of fresh fruit with the selection of fruit juices, the following results 
are obtained (Table 32 and 33): 
 
Table 32. Comparing the effect of salience on fresh fruit/fruit juice. 
 
Value gl
Asymptotic 
significance     
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 36,088 1 0,000
Continuity correction
c 35,420 1 0,000
Likelihood ratio 36,316 1 0,000
N. of valid cases 1363
Chi-Square
Fruit Fruit Juice
Count 201 74 275
% of TYPOLOGY 73,1% 26,9% 100,0%
% in FOOD 39,0% 53,2% 42,0%
% of TOTAL 30,7% 11,3% 42,0%
Count 315 65 380
% of TYPOLOGY 82,9% 17,1% 100,0%
% in FOOD 61,0% 46,8% 58,0%
% of TOTAL 48,1% 9,9% 58,0%
Southern Lunchroom
FOOD ITEMS
Total
TYPOLOGY BASELINE
SALIENCE
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Table 33. The relative Chi-Square test.  
Comparing the positive effect of fresh fruit with the selection of yogurt, the following results are 
obtained (Table 34 and 35): 
 
Table 34. Comparing the effect of salience on fresh fruit/yogurt. 
 
 
Table 35. The relative Chi-Square test.  
Finally, the results of the comparison of fresh fruit and pudding, are displayed in Table 36 and 37. 
Value gl
Asymptotic 
significance     
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
9,172
b 1 0,002
Continuity 
correction
c 8,595 1 0,003
Likelihood ratio
9,073 1 0,003
N of valid cases 655
Chi-Square
Fruit Yogurt
Count 201 99 300
% of TYPOLOGY 67,0% 33,0% 100,0%
% in FOOD 39,0% 53,8% 42,9%
% of TOTAL 28,7% 14,1% 42,9%
Count 315 85 400
% of TYPOLOGY 78,8% 21,3% 100,0%
% in FOOD 61,0% 46,2% 57,1%
% of TOTAL 45,0% 12,1% 57,1%
Southern Lunchroom
FOOD ITEMS
Total
TYPOLOGY BASELINE
SALIENCE
Value gl
Asymptotic 
significance     
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
12,215b 1 0,000
Continuity correction
c
11,616 1 0,001
Likelihood ratio
12,127 1 0,000
N of valid cases
700
Chi-Square
158 
 
 
Table 36. Comparing the effect of salience on fresh fruit/pudding. 
 
 
Table 37. The relative Chi-Square test.  
The results from the analysis on the three non-target items, demonstrate a significant decrease in 
the selection of fruit juices (from 26, 9% to 17,1%), yogurt (from 33% to 21,3%), and pudding 
(from 24,4% to 13,5%), and all the variations are marked by the maximum level of significance (p 
= 0,000). 
With the last hypothesis, the analysis moves to the two target products from the category of 
vegetables: fresh salads (displayed on each side of the central area of the lunchroom to increase 
their visibility) and vegetable sides (offered in first position in the hot food counter). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fruit Pudding
Count 201 65 266
% of TYPOLOGY 75,6% 24,4% 100,0%
% in FOOD 39,0% 57,0% 42,2%
% of TOTAL 31,9% 10,3% 42,2%
Count 315 49 364
% of TYPOLOGY 86,5% 13,5% 100,0%
% in FOOD 61,0% 43,0% 57,8%
% of TOTAL 50,0% 7,8% 57,8%
TYPOLOGY BASELINE
SALIENCE
Southern Lunchroom
FOOD ITEMS
Total
Value gl
Asymptotic 
significance     
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 12,489
b 1 0,000
Continuity correction
c 11,760 1 0,001
Likelihood ratio 12,342 1 0,000
N of valid cases 630
Chi-Square
159 
 
Salads  
Hypothesis 3d: Manipulating the salience of salads by displaying them in the first 
counters located on each side of the central area will increase the choice of this category, 
compared to the baseline. 
Also in this case, the contingency Table 38 shows the positive effect of the salience intervention, 
with an increase in the choice of salads (from 24,2% to 40,6%), among the highest of the 
experiment. The significance of this hypothesis (p = 0,000) is demonstrated by the results of the 
Chi-Square test as shown in Table 39. 
 
Table 38. Effect of salience nudge on the selection of salads compared to the baseline. 
 
Table 39. The relative Chi-Square test. 
 
Vegetable Sides 
Hypothesis 3e: Manipulating the salience of vegetable sides by offering them at the 
beginning of the hot food counter will increase the choice of this category, compared to the 
baseline. 
0 1
Count 510 163 673
% of TYPOLOGY 75,8% 24,2% 100,0%
% of  salads 55,4% 36,8% 49,4%
% of TOTAL 37,4% 12,0% 49,4%
Count 410 280 690
% of TYPOLOGY 59,4% 40,6% 100,0%
% of  salads 44,6% 63,2% 50,6%
% of TOTAL 30,1% 20,5% 50,6%
Southern Lunchroom
 Salads
Total
TYPOLOGY BASELINE
SALIENCE
Value gl
Asymptotic 
significance     
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-square
41,565 1 0,000
Continuity correction
c
40,822 1 0,000
Likelihood ratio
41,949 1 0,000
N of valid cases
1363
Chi-Square
160 
 
Finally, the effect determined by salience on vegetable sides (Table 40), is less pronounced (from 
41,6% to 47,5%), compared to the results of fruit and salads. This is also visible from the level of 
significance (Table 41), which while being positive, is lower than in the previous hypotheses (p = 
0,027). 
 
Table 40. Effect of the salience nudge on the selection of vegetable sides. 
 
Table 41. The relative Chi-Square test. 
 
 
  
0 1
COUNT 353 320 673
% of TYPOLOGY 58,4% 41,6% 100,0%
% in  vegetable sides 46,7% 52,7% 49,4%
% of TOTAL 25,9% 23,5% 49,4%
COUNT 403 287 690
% of TYPOLOGY 52,5% 47,5% 100,0%
% in  vegetable sides 53,3% 47,3% 50,6%
% of TOTAL 29,6% 21,1% 50,6%
TYPOLOGY BASELINE
SALIENCE
Southern Lunchroom
 Vegetable Sides
Total
Value gl
Asymptotic 
significance     
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 4,89 1 0,027
Continuity correction
c
4,652 1 0,031
Likelihood ratio
4,892 1 0,027
N of valid cases
1363
Chi-Square
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4.3.5 Discussion of the findings 
 
In the domain of health promotion, health and weight changes are difficult to be directly associated 
to changes in dietary patterns. It is complex to separate the effects of a dietary intervention from 
other factors, as health and weight changes may result from physical activity, a different 
performance at work, a psychological state or life circumstance, and much more. In the present 
experimental project, instead of aiming to change and monitor the employee’s health and weight 
changes, the goal was to test whether people complied with the nudge towards the selection of 
healthier food choices. The effectiveness of the choice architecture was measured in terms of 
changes in choice (i.e. increase or decrease) of the targeted healthy food items. The patterns of 
selection of some additional, non-target food items were also monitored.  
 
H1: The use of the communication materials during the second week may prime the idea of healthy 
food increasing the choice of the target items, but relevant results compared to the baseline are 
not expected, because the intervention targets System 2. 
This hypothesis has been confirmed by the results in the northern lunchroom. In the northern 
lunchroom, only the selection of fruit increased (+ 8,4%), the selection of whole bread varied 
minimally (+ 0,2%), while the selection of salads (- 3,8%) and vegetables sides (- 11%) decreased. 
Hence, while there is a positive and significant outcome for fresh fruit, for the rest of the target 
items the communication initiative was not effective (i.e. whole bread) or even backfired (i.e. for 
salads and vegetables). 
This hypothesis has not been confirmed by the results in the southern lunchroom. In the southern 
lunchroom, the results are mixed: the choice of fresh fruit (+ 7,4%) and salads (+ 14,8%) increased 
significantly, whereas the selection of whole bread (- 3,4%) and of vegetable sides (- 4,4%) 
decreased significantly. In relation to the southern lunchroom, it is not possible to fully reject the 
hypothesis since while two items positively increased, the selection of two target items decreased. 
Furthermore, among the non-target items, the selection of white bread increased by 21,6% (Table 
18), which evidently contrasts with the intention of the communication initiative.  
In summary, the posters had a positive effect only on the consumption of fruit in the northern 
lunchroom, and on salads and fruit in the southern lunchroom, 3 out of 8 target items overall.  
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Figure 38. Effect of the communication intervention on the target items. 
 
The fact that the choice of some foods has even decreased during the week of communication 
suggests that the results of the communication initiative should be considered as not fully not 
reliable. For instance, in the case of vegetable sides, the selection of this category during the second 
week even decreased in both lunchrooms. A plausible explanation could have been that the type 
of offer of vegetable sides available in week 2 was less appealing to the public, leading to the 
decrease in the selection in both lunchrooms. However, this is not the case, because the menu 
changes daily but the same options are offered in rotation during each week. Another possible 
explanation for this outcome could be found in the layout of the poster itself: in fact, while the 
claim was “Vegetables? Your best choice”, the image displayed a salad bowl (Figure 37, p. 124). 
However, if the poster truly had an impact, the selection of salads should have increased in both 
lunchrooms. 
For the category of salads, data from the northern and the southern lunchroom are not coherent. In 
the southern cafeteria the selection of salads increased evidently (from 42,6% during the baseline 
to 57,4 % with the communication initiative); whereas in the northern cafeteria, the communication 
initiative did not impact positively on the selection of salads, in fact a - 3,8% decrease occurred. 
Perhaps, the different positioning of the posters might explain the different outcomes. The posters 
were displayed differently at the entrance of each lunchroom, which was due to a diverse 
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configuration of the spaces and to the presence of other elements on the walls that could not be 
removed. In the southern cafeteria, the poster displaying the image of salads (see Figure 37, p. 
124) was displayed at the center of an empty wall at the entrance, in a very salient location. Instead, 
in the northern cafeteria, the poster displaying the image of salads was located at the entrance but 
close to another poster of large dimensions displaying a food pyramid, which could not be removed 
(see Figure 5 in the Appendix).  
The mixed results of the communication initiative influenced the successive decision, in the 
analysis of each target item in the southern lunchroom, to compare exclusively the first week with 
the third week. It is more sensible to make a comparison between week 1 and 3, yet by bearing in 
mind the positive outcomes obtained in the second week (i.e. in the case of fruit and salads). 
Communication initiatives are an attempt to rationally persuade the consumers, and health 
communication has been long dominated by the classic stimulus-response theoretical perspective 
(Lupton, 1994). The realization of the communication phase involved the positioning of three 
posters of big dimension, only at the entrance of the lunchrooms. The posters contained a minimal 
amount of text, while more space was devoted to a large image in the attempt to prime people with 
the idea of these healthy items. Despite these precautions, the posters globally had a positive 
impact only on three out of eight items. Perhaps, if the posters were visible also in the point-of 
choice (i.e. inside the area for the selection of food) the results might have improved. Still, in 
consideration of the limited impact of this type of initiatives, the effect would still have been 
limited. The results of this study are in line with the behavioural economics literature of System 1 
and 2 (e.g. Stanovich and West, 2000; Kahneman, 2011); humans are not rational decision-makers 
therefore persuasion-based interventions can yield only limited results.  
H2: The effect of the manipulation of the environmental stimuli through the labelling intervention 
will be greater than the effect of the communication intervention and increase the selection of the 
target items.  
This hypothesis was not confirmed. The analysis provided mixed results: only the selection of 
salads increased evidently during the labelling nudge (+ 9%), fruit had a minimal variation (+ 
1,8%), while the selection of whole bread and vegetable sides decreased (- 6% and - 4,8% 
respectively).  
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H2a: The use of a green label in the northern lunchroom to indicate the healthy options, will 
positively prime people and guide choices, increasing the consumption of the target items, 
compared to the baseline.  
This hypothesis was not confirmed. The green label employed in this experiment, “the Like 
sticker”, provided poor results. The positive effect during the intervention is related to the increase 
in the selection of salads exclusively.  
 
 
Figure 39. Effect of labelling/communication 
 
As explained in the first chapter, priming (e.g. Bargh et al., 2001; Kahneman, 2011) improves a 
person’s ability to detect an object or stimulus, and increases the speed and efficiency of interaction 
with the environment (Squire and Kandel, 2000). As illustrated in chapter 2, the scientific literature 
on the use of semaphore labels provided encouraging results (see Jones and Richardson, 2007; 
Temple et al., 2011; Thorndike et al., 2012). The present experiment, instead of a semaphore 
scheme, employed a green label exclusively, since the members of the WHP team were concerned 
that the red and yellow labels might convey a punitive impression and wanted to minimise potential 
complaints. It seems that compared to the semaphore scheme, the use of the green label 
exclusively, is less efficient. It would be interesting to test, in a follow-up initiative, if the addition 
of the red and yellow labels could provide positive outcomes in the context of the Niguarda 
hospital. A second explanation of the limited effectiveness of this intervention is that priming 
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occurs only when people are not aware of the potential impact of the prime (Schwartz et al 1991). 
Research demonstrated that when people can consciously recall the priming episode, or are subtly 
reminded of the primed concept, effects are not likely to be obtained (ibid.) Following Hansen and 
Jespersen’s (2015) framework, we can locate the Like label in the Transparent-Type 2 quadrant of 
the matrix. The Like label was designed to influence the automatic system guiding deliberate food 
choices (i.e. Type 2), and its intent was overt (i.e. Transparent). In the case of the Like label, the 
positive affective association (Kiviniemi et al. 2007) associated to the target healthy items was not 
subliminal but evident. Furthermore, the workers were aware that a research was taking place and 
it was easy to identify the scope of the labelling nudge intervention, whereas the salience 
intervention could have been simply interpreted as a re-arrangement of the products, as it 
commonly occurs in the lunchroom during the year.  
 
H3: The effect of the manipulation of environmental stimuli through the nudge of salience will be 
greater than the effect of the communication intervention and increase the selection of the target 
items compared to the baseline. 
This hypothesis has been confirmed. The selection of whole bread (+ 10,2%), fruit (+ 15%), and 
salads (+12%) increased significantly during the nudge week compared to the communication 
week. Only the selection of vegetable sides decreased minimally (- 1%) during the third week. 
Hence, the nudge of salience provided more effective compared to the labelling nudge.  
 
 
Figure 40. Effect of salience intervention/communication initiative 
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H3a: Manipulating the salience of whole bread by offering it in several points in the southern   
lunchroom will increase the choice of this item, compared to the baseline.  
This hypothesis has been confirmed. In the southern cafeteria, the first basket of whole bread was 
offered at the entrance of the lunchroom, on the table were customers collect their tray and 
serviette; while a second basket was positioned on a table in the central area. In order to maintain 
freedom of choice, white bread was still offered in the original location, close to cutlery and right 
before the cash registers. The results confirm that a higher degree of accessibility alters people’s 
perception and choices (see Wansink, 2004; Painter et al., 2002). Convenience is an environmental 
factor that influences food choice: if a food item is easy to see and reach, people are more likely 
to choose it. During the salience intervention, the selection of whole bread increased by 3,1% 
compared to the baseline (Table 28). During the second week the selection of whole bread had 
dropped (Table 18), and the nudge restored the selection of this item. However, the impact of this 
intervention is less substantial than the effect obtained on fruit or salads in the southern lunchroom, 
and the significance of this change is not maximum (p = 0,020). It is likely that the nudge 
influenced those people who did not have a stable preference for either whole or white bread (see 
Goldin, 2015, for a framework on the role of preferences in nudge interventions).  
H3b: Manipulating the salience of fresh fruit in terms of perceived variety will increase the 
choice of this category, compared to the baseline. 
This hypothesis has been confirmed. Consistently with the expectations and the literature on the 
influence of perceptual salience and perceived variety, the selection of fruit increased during the 
nudge week (see Table 30). In this case the significance of the increase in the selection of this 
items was supported by the increase in the selection of fruit that occurred during week 2 (see Table 
25). 
While Van Kleef et al. (2012) successfully nudged healthy snacks by displaying the items on the 
higher shelves; in the context of the southern lunchroom the ideal positions identified during the 
preliminary observations were the lowest (i.e. tray-level) and the mid shelf to offer fruit. In line 
with the study conducted by Van Kleef et al. (2012) the availability of fruit was altered, 
particularly, 50 % of the shelves in the fridge counters were occupied exclusively by fruit (see 
Figure 38). Rolls (1986) and Rolls and McDermott (1991) demonstrated that a higher degree of 
variety of food can increase consumption volume. However, actual variety is not necessarily 
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required, since merely altering availability can be a successful strategy. Kahn and Wansink (2004) 
demonstrated that merely altering the structure of an assortment leads to an increase in the 
perceived variety and thereby to an increase in consumption. In this study, rather than increase 
consumption, the aim was to trigger the selection of fruit. The effectiveness of this intervention 
demonstrates that perceived variety not only increases the consumption volume of an item, but 
also triggers the desire for that item. One explanation, as Kahn and Wansink (2004) pointed out, 
is that the perception of a higher variety of an assortment is automatically associated to a higher 
level of enjoyment; secondly, the effect occurred because a higher availability of fruit increased 
its salience and attractiveness.  
 
Figure 41. Assortment of the fridge counter during the salience nudge week. 
 
H3c: The manipulation of the display of fresh fruit in the fridge counters entailed the relocation 
of fruit juices, yogurt, and pudding on the higher shelves, making these items less salient. This 
manipulation may decrease the choice for these items, compared to the baseline. 
This hypothesis has been confirmed. While this study was focused on the promotion of healthy 
foods, changes to other items deemed less favourable were also applied, by manipulating the 
location of these items to make them less salient. The rearrangement of yogurt (from 33% in week 
1 to 21,3% in week 3), pudding (from 24,4% in week 1 to 13,5% in week 3), and fruit juices (from 
26,9% in week 1 to 17,1% in week 3) on the upper shelves determined a significant decrease in 
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their selection, confirming the effectiveness of altering accessibility and changing perceptual 
salience. 
 
Figure 42. Effect of salience on the substitute products of fruit. 
 
H3d: Manipulating the salience of salads by displaying them in the first counters located on 
each side of the central area will increase the choice of this category, compared to the baseline.  
This hypothesis has been confirmed. The choice of salads increased from 24,2% in the baseline 
week up to 40,6% during the salience nudge (see Table 38). Therefore, perceptual salience is 
confirmed to be an effective mechanism. However, a significant and positive variation in the 
choice of salads (+14,8%) occurred already in the passage from the baseline to the communication 
week (see Table 18). Therefore, the success of the communication initiative was extended by the 
nudge during week 3. 
H3e: Manipulating the salience of vegetable sides by displaying them in the first position in the 
hot food counter will increase the choice of this category, compared to the baseline. 
This hypothesis has been confirmed. This intervention was ideated according to the literature on 
perceptual salience (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman, 2011). Order 
effects are also commonly known in the literature on choice architecture, which can take place in 
several ways (e.g. Dayan and Bar-Hillel 2011; Cohen and Babey, 2012). Wansink and Hanks 
(2013), investigating order effects, revealed that people are biased by the order of presentation of 
food, and Wansink calls the ‘‘first foods most’’ principle, the phenomena that occurs when people 
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select the food that they see first (ibid.). In this case, the salience nudge on vegetable sides (from 
41,6% during the baseline to 47,5% during the salience week) was less effective compared to the 
results of the intervention on salads. The level of significance (p = 0,027) despite being positive, 
is inferior compared to the previous hypotheses. Perhaps, the public’s reaction had reduced the 
potential impact of the intervention. In fact, the change in the disposition of food applied at the hot 
food counter, was ill-received by the customers, objections were made about the reversed order in 
the display of the food. Some people could not understand where they should queue generating 
confusion, and staff was repeatedly interrogated about the reason of the new arrangement, some 
people even presented unpleasant comments. Thus, negative emotions might have influenced 
people’s decision-making process diminishing the potential impact of the nudge.  
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4.5. Strengths and limitations 
 
In in view of the study’s findings, the relevant strengths and limitations should be considered. The 
main strength of the present research is that, to date, it represents the first initiative of choice 
architecture carried out in an Italian hospital. While the approach of nudging is receiving 
international attention, becoming a policy tool (see Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Marteau et al., 
2011; Ly and Soman, 2013; Chetty, 2015) with practical applications in several countries (e.g. 
Behavioural Insights Team, 2014, 2016; White House, 2016), it is the first time that a choice 
architecture intervention is tested in the context of an Italian public hospital. Furthermore, the 
study was officially activated as an initiative of the Workers Health Promotion program, whose 
relevance is recognised at a regional, national and international level. The present study is the first 
application of a choice architecture intervention that could be repeated in other Italian health care 
establishments.  
The field study was based on the food choices that occurred during three weeks for two lunchroom 
populations. The strength of field studies is that they are carried out in natural, real-life situations, 
and the homogeneous sample of workers convey an added value to the research. One strength of 
the study comes from the extent of the data collected. Data registered through video cameras 
provide an accurate and error-free account of food choices compared to self-reported data. 
Furthermore, the presence of a control week, enabled a valuable comparison of the changes 
occurred in choice. Seasonal changes were also taken into account by conducting the research in 
the same period, during the summer month of June. 
The strict privacy policy at Niguarda did not allow the collection of personal data such as gender 
or age, which could have been interesting to form a more comprehensive account of the choice 
patterns. The database with the observations was progressively built during the viewing of the 
collected footage, which consisted exclusively of trays. Because of this, analysis could not be 
expanded to sociological considerations, hence the lack of possibility of crossing decisions on the 
basis of personal data such as sex and age is a limit of the research. As previously explained, the 
experimental action was not free but tied to a restrictive privacy policy (see pp. 130-132), which 
was implemented to prevent the issues that arose from the workers during the first WHP initiative 
in the lunchrooms (see pp. 115-116). 
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Another limitation of the study is that it only controlled for target food selection and not for actual 
consumption, which could have been monitored through the collection of tray waste data. 
However, the objective of the study was to verify the effectiveness of the nudges to guide people’s 
choices, and actual consumption can be determined by other variables such as liking or satiety. 
Finally, since the research was conducted over the course of three-weeks, long-term effects cannot 
be established. 
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5. Conclusion  
 
This dissertation provided a broad literature review of the main contributions to the study of 
unconscious processes, focusing on automatic behaviour and decision-making, and successively 
on the relation between eating behaviour and environmental influences. Human functioning is 
supported and guided by automatic processes of thought that working in parallel are faster than 
conscious decisions, and accompanied by little or no awareness of their influence on behaviour.  
As previously stressed, equipping people with knowledge about a healthy diet and the health costs 
of unhealthy nutrition is very important, but insufficient to change behaviour. In the same way, 
information that aims to rationally persuade people to change behaviour, as in the use of calorie 
labels or other forms of standard communication is not a credible solution. Furthermore, the 
cognitive cost of sticking to a diet, of monitoring each eating episode, added to the myriad of other 
thoughts in one’s mind, and to the environmental variables that influence individual behaviour, 
makes it unreasonable to expect that people will successfully manage to adopt a mindful and 
optimal nutrition behaviour at all times, following nutrition recommendations. If sustained 
cognitive monitoring is hard for those who are disciplined and motivated, it is virtually unbearable 
for those who are not, and reliance on willpower can be very disappointing. Nutrition behaviour is 
particularly challenging in out-of-home contexts (see Cohen and Babey, 2012) since people are 
faced with a cornucopia of food choices, biased by cues, influenced by norms, which explains why 
we fall into environmental traps. This situation suggests a complementary strategy, that is, 
focusing on altering the context of choice. Choice architecture relies on environmental 
interventions that guide people into taking better food choices. These alterations to the 
environment represent small steps that enable people to make improved choices and benefiting, 
over time, in terms of prevention and perhaps even weight loss. Nudges in the environment support 
people to effortlessly select the best options without the necessity of being disciplined or fully 
motivated. At the same time, libertarian paternalism ensures freedom of choice, so the person can 
decide without restrictions to avoid the nudge and follow its preferences.   
 
Interventions informed by psychology provide more productive results, and the evidence presented 
in chapter 2 about the implementation of nudges in the domain of health illustrates this point. 
Policymakers are fruitfully starting to gather from the results of academic research, developing 
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empirically informed policies. The list of choice-preserving strategies is ample and growing, 
therefore it is important to test the impact of these interventions on larger population and in 
different cultures, as the present research aimed to do. The simple and low-cost nature of the 
present intervention makes it an inexpensive policy initiative that can be easily implemented in 
hospitals as well as in other establishments across the region and the nation.  
 
The development of the WHP initiative required a lengthy process of meeting, which involved the 
WHP team (composed of ten members), the CIR Food delegates and the management of the 
hospital. The process was complex at times, especially when the concern over the public’s 
reactions came into discussion. This determined first the reduction of the semaphore labelling 
scheme to a simple green label; and later, the concern over privacy led to the impossibility to gather 
any demographic data on the population. Still, the fact that nudging is not invasive and a liberty-
preserving approach, was the winning card that led the management to welcome the initiative in 
the first place. Finally, one communication initiative and two choice architecture strategies were 
tested in the two lunchrooms. In relation to the mixed results of the communication initiative, this 
reinforces the view that it is necessary to act on the unconscious and automatic level to successfully 
influence food choices. 
In the northern lunchroom, a labelling nudge was tested to induce positive affective association 
towards the target items. The labelling intervention did not provide the expected results, with a 
positive effect on the selection of salads (+ 9% compared to the communication week), and a minor 
increase in the selection of fruit (+1,8% compared to week 2). This suggests that the green label 
was not a sufficiently strong strategy to produce behaviour change in relation to the selection of 
the target healthy items. It is likely that the results would have improved with the use of a 
semaphore labelling scheme (see Jones and Richardson, 2007; Temple et al., 2011; Thorndike et 
al., 2012). Furthermore, the transparent nature of the nudge (see Hansen and Jespersen, 2015) in 
which the aim was clear, might have reduced the priming effect (see Schwartz et al., 1991). 
Considering the role of accessibility in the decision-making process of food consumption is 
relevant for the development of effective nudge interventions. The results in the southern 
lunchroom confirmed that increasing the salience of healthy items by enlarging their visibility, is 
a promising strategy. Increasing the visibility and desirability of whole bread by offering it at the 
entrance of the cafeteria in wicker baskets attracted consumer’s attention (+ 10,2% compared to 
175 
 
week 2). The nudge on whole bread was particularly successful since in week 2 the selection of 
this item decreased compared to the baseline, and the nudge restored consumption increasing its 
selection. Offering salads in a more prominent location also increased their selection. Manipulating 
the salience of fresh fruit by merely increasing the quantity displayed, enhanced the desirability 
and visibility of this category, positively impacting on choice. In the same fridge counter, placing 
less healthy (sugary) items in the least convenient, less salient, highest shelves did also influence 
choices: in fact, while the selection of fresh fruit increased, the choice of yogurt, pudding, and fruit 
juices especially, decreased. The salience nudge applied on salads was effective, and in this case 
the communication intervention supported this positive outcome. In fact, the increase in the 
selection of salads began in the second week, and it was confirmed by a stronger and positive 
variation during the nudge week. Finally, the nudge applied to vegetable sides was also successful, 
however it provided less significant results compared to the previous hypotheses.  
Overall, this study provides encouraging evidence about the influence of small changes on 
customer’s food selection in a hospital lunchroom. The work environment has a relevant influence 
on food choices since people spend most of their day at the workplace, consuming a large amount 
of their daily energy intake. The opportunity to improve the employee’s diet at lunchtime raises 
the potential for significant gains in terms of personal well-being and performance, and the present 
findings have implications for practice and policy. As the literature discussed in chapter 3 
demonstrates, there is a range of possibilities of implementation of nudging strategies, from 
labelling schemes, to product accessibility and variety, menu orders, and so on. Regardless of the 
type of nudging strategy, engagement with the cafeteria staff is an important determinant to 
achieve a successful implementation. It is also crucial that changes are not burdensome and do not 
detract time from the day-to-day service of the staff. Whilst the nudges employed in this 
intervention have a valuable contribution to make, further choice architecture strategies need to be 
tested to improve people’s choices in workplaces, especially in the longer term. Most nudge 
initiatives only document the effectiveness of the intervention during the specific time period, and 
it is not known whether the effects persist or fade in the long run. A crucial step for future research 
is to investigate behaviour change over time and after the context changes, and to develop 
interventions to support the formation of habits; boundary research should also be encouraged, 
especially between the fields of consumer neuroscience, consumer psychology, nutrition 
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behaviour and behavioural economics, to develop innovative strategies and conduct studies with 
practical impact. 
In relation to the generalisation of the research findings, it is interesting to stress that the data on 
overweight and obesity of the population of Niguarda’s workers, as previously mentioned (see 
paragraph 4.1.2.), is in line with the data of the broader Italian population. This assigns to the 
sample an element of representativeness in favour of the potential generalisation of the results.  
It is not the first time that encouraging evidence has been provided with the activation of nudging 
strategies in a lunchroom (e.g. Rozin et al., 2011; Hanks et al., 2012; Thorndike et al., 2012). In 
fact, the aim of the present study was to replicate salience and labelling strategies that proved to 
be effective in other cultural contexts, to observe their impact in the Italian context. The positive 
results of the research support the generalisation of the research findings to other similar 
populations of employees as in the lunchrooms of other hospitals or private organisations. It is not 
possible to declare with certainty if the same intervention in school lunchrooms or cafeterias that 
involve a target in a different age could provide the same results, therefore the initiative should be 
replicated to observe the effects on different populations. Furthermore, Milan is a peculiar context 
with its own features, therefore it would be fruitful to extend the intervention to other smaller 
realities of the Lombardy region, as well as to other regions to provide more solid results. 
The evidence on automaticity and bounded rationality should enlighten the development of the 
policy process: the question that policy makers ought to focus on should no longer be how to 
influence individuals to change their food consumption behaviour, since posing this question still 
implies that people make independent and rational choices. Rather, the focus should be on ‘where 
and how does the food consumption behaviours occur?’: in other words, rather than focusing on 
the individual, the central issue is to understand the consumption process in the environment in 
which it takes place, and the mental mechanisms that support the behaviour. Looking at how a 
certain eating behaviour occurs in its context is the first step to identify the suitable strategies to 
satisfy the very same drivers of behaviour. As the present dissertation has illustrated and 
empirically tested, changes in the physical environment where the behaviour occurs is crucial to 
initiate and facilitate behavioural change. Behaviours are tied to habit and context therefore 
altering the circumstances is a key factor.  
The first step of an effective policy should be to identify the set of environmental and mental 
barriers to the desired behaviour by carefully considering what barriers can actually be addressed, 
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as well as the existence of opposing forces that influence behaviour (e.g. marketing strategies or 
social norms). Policy-makers could support initiatives in workplaces by diffusing and financing 
networking, good-practice sharing and by defining rules if necessary. In fact, workplaces are one 
of the most important contexts as people spend most of their days at work and influencing people 
towards optimal eating behaviours is a more promising and feasible strategy than attempting to 
influence home behaviours. Particularly, policy could support correct practices in workplaces by 
developing synergies with the caterers, where reasons could be found in reducing food waste or 
saving money. In the same way, synergies with the public or private organisations could be 
motivated by having healthier employees. Finally, Interventions should be prioritised, for instance 
on a certain issue (e.g. increasing the consumption of fruit and vegetables) or on a particular 
segment of the population (e.g. employees).  
The standard policy initiative to change food behaviours has been to generate education or 
communication campaigns. It is likely that the performance could be much higher if information 
was designed by considering bounded rationality. For instance, information should be made more 
salient and precise pieces of information should be presented with a contemplated timing. At the 
same time, bearing in mind that communication is just a small part of a complex set of patterns 
that define behaviour and that it impacts on rational thinking, should inform policy-makers to 
revise the financial resourcing of these interventions, as funds could be devoted elsewhere. 
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Appendix A: Maps of the lunchroom spaces 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of the northern lunchroom during baseline (1) and during the communication phase (2). 
 
Figure 2. Map of the northern lunchroom during the nudging intervention (3).  
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Figure 3. Map of the southern lunchroom during baseline (1) and during the communication phase (2).  
 
 
Figure 4. Map of the southern lunchroom during the nudging intervention (3). 
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Appendix B: Photographic documentation 
 
Photos taken at the Northern Lunchroom during the baseline (1) 
 
 
Figure 5. Walls on the right side at the entrance of the lunchroom.  
 
Figure 6. Walls on the left side at the entrance of the lunchroom. 
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Figure 7. Entrance of the lunchroom where the trays are available. 
 
 
Figure 8. View of the counter with bread baskets before the cash registers. 
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Photos taken at the Northern Lunchroom during the communication week (2) 
 
 
Figure 9. Wall on the left side of the entrance. 
 
 
Figure 10. Wall on the right side of the entrance. 
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Photos taken at the Northern Lunchroom during week three (labelling) 
 
 
Figure 11. Poster explaining the Like sticker located near to the menu blackboard.  
 
 
Figure 12. The Like sticker added to the posters. 
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Figure 13. Like sticker at the vegetable side dish counter. 
 
 
Figure 14. Like sticker on the fresh salads counter.  
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Figure 15. Like sticker at the fridge counter.  
 
 
Figure 56. Like sticker on the whole bread baskets. 
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Photos taken at the Southern Lunchroom during the baseline (1) 
 
 
Figure 17. Entrance of the lunchroom. 
 
 
Figure 18. View of the hot meals serving area. 
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Figure 19. View of the lunchroom from the table at the entrance where trays are available. 
 
     
Figure 20. The images show the location of the three video cameras at the cash registers. 
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Photos taken at the Southern Lunchroom during week 3 (salience) 
 
 
Figure 21. View of the whole bread baskets located at the entrance (unfortunately the poor quality of this image 
makes the bread look white, but this was actually whole bread). 
 
Figure 22. View of the new table displaying two baskets (one per hallway) of whole bread. 
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Figure 23. View of the central space of the lunchroom, with salads counters in first position on both sides (yellow 
arrows). 
 
 
Figure 24. View of the salad counter (left) and the counter that displays the ‘complete meal’ (right). 
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Figure 25. View of the fridge counter (left side of the hallway) displaying fresh fruit on the lower (tray level), and 
mid-level (eye-level) shelves. 
 
 
Figure 26. View of the fridge counter on the right side of the hallway. 
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